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Introduction 
This dissertation is entitled "Defining the Republic" because it is a 
comparison of the definitions of what specifically the newly-founded 
republic of the United States should be like between the views of 
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison.  I have chosen to compare 
these two Founders because they could agree on the form of 
government they wanted for the United States, namely the Constitution, 
but once they attained their goal, they became bitter political enemies 
since they could not agree on how to implement the Constitution they 
had both worked so hard to obtain.  That is, they had conflicting 
definitions of, and expectations for, what the republic of the United States 
would be like. 
 Hamilton and Madison were not the only two Founders with 
conflicting definitions of what the United States should be.  Anyone who 
looks at the conflict over ratification of the Constitution will see a wide 
variety of visions.  Also, the political conflicts beginning in the 1790's only 
add more material showing the range of disagreement among the 
Founders. 
 One individual who specifically mentioned the problem of defining 
a republic was John Adams.  In one letter he wrote Mercy Warren about 
his objections to her history of the American Revolution, he said:   
"The first appearance of a national stipulation in favor of 
Republican government was in the Constitution of the United 
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States, in which a Republican constitution was guaranteed to 
the several States.  It may perhaps be a sufficient 
recommendation of this article to say that it was introduced 
by Mr. Charles Pinckney, of South Carolina; and he ought to 
have the glory of it.  But I confess I never understood of, and I 
believe no other man ever did, or ever will."1 
 
 One problem with the word "republic," as Adams pointed out, is it 
has been given so many definitions throughout history.  Adams stated a 
republic is a government of "more than one," but goes on to argue this is 
almost no definition at all.  "A Republican government is a government of 
more than one.  The word Republic has been used, it is true, by learned 
men, to signify every actual and every possible government among men - 
that of Constantinople as well as that of Geneva."2   
 For Adams, the distinction then is between republics which are free 
and those which are not free.   
"The most accurate distinction, then, has been between free 
republics and republics which are not free.  It is not even said 
in our Constitution that the people shall be guaranteed a free 
and republican government.  The word is so loose and 
indefinite that successive predominant factions will put 
glosses and constructions on it as different as light and 
darkness; and if ever there should be a civil war, which 
Heaven forbid, the conquering General in all his triumph may 
establish a military despotism, and yet call it a constitutional 
republic, as Napoleon has already set him the example.  The 
only effect of it that I could ever see is to deceive the people; 
and this practice my heart abhors, my head disapproves, 
and my tongue and my pen have ever avoided.  I am no 
Pharisee, Jesuit, or Machiavellian."3 
                                                          
1 Adams, John and Mercy Warren, Correspondence Between John Adams and Mercy 
Warren (New York:  Arno Press, 1972), 352-353. 
2 Ibid, 353. 
3 Ibid, 353. 
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 Adams points out just how "loose and indefinite" the word republic 
is, how many different types of government have been identified as 
republics, and the danger that follows from relying on such an ill-defined 
word to describe and understand just what form of government the 
United States exists under.  It is that difficulty in defining the word republic I 
want to further explore through my comparison of Hamilton and Madison. 
Now, Hamilton and Madison did not see their disagreements as a 
matter of conflicting definitions of "republic," or indeed any other word.  
They simply wanted different things for the United States.  The reason I 
argue for taking the approach I advocate in comparing their conflicting 
visions is that by focusing on a word central to both (after all, both 
considered themselves republicans), one gains a theme around which to 
organize such a comparison.  This means it can also be used for other 
Founders, and later individuals as well. 
 Examination of the ideas of the Founders is important because of 
the influence they had on later generations down to today.  All sorts of 
individuals, from all sorts of ideological perspectives, call upon the 
Founders in support of their policy goals.  However, the Founders were not 
the coherent group, with coherent sets of ideas and political principles, 
that many would like them to be.  So it is rather to their differences and to 
their conflicts that we must look to fully understand their influence.  In so 
doing we can not only more completely understand them, but ourselves 
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as well. 
 Not surprisingly, the literature on Hamilton and Madison is vast.  
However, the literature that focuses on both of them at the same time is 
much smaller.  Even within the smaller corpus of work no one has yet done 
the specific kind of work I propose.  Nevertheless, a survey of work done 
thus far that will assist in the project I propose is in order. 
 One simply cannot do any work during this era without consulting, 
and distinguishing one's work from, Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick's "The 
Age of Federalism."  Elkins and McKitrick do compare Hamilton and 
Madison, but with an eye towards explaining why they differed.  For Elkins 
and McKitrick, their differences all boil down to the different goals, and 
different feelings toward, each man had vis a vis relations with Great 
Britain.  In short, Hamilton's "Anglophilia" and Madison's "Anglophobia" 
underlay their conflict.  Elkins and McKitrick do identify the question I focus 
on, that of defining of what a republic should be, once the Founders had 
achieved the goal of ratifying the Constitution. 
 "But once the new government was in being, and its 
legitimacy established, a new kind of ideological problem, 
hitherto not of the first urgency, became insistent.  The 
Revolution had made the United States republican, and now 
it had been determined that these states were no longer a 
republican confederation, but a republican nation.  But what 
else?  Beyond the words of the Constitution and the 
republican values represented by General Washington, what 
was to be its character?  At the beginning of 1790, the 
answer still lay very much in the future.  Now that it lies in the 
past, we find it hard to imagine how heavily this question 
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could have weighed upon the leaders of the time."4 
 
 For Elkins and McKItrick, the conflict began with Hamilton's policy 
goals as Treasury Secretary.  They begin, following Lance Banning's The 
Jeffersonian Persuasion, by noting the similarities (which shocked and 
horrified Madison), between Hamilton's proposals for funding the national 
debt, creating a national bank, and providing governmental support for 
manufacturing, and the "Court" policies of Sir Horace Walpole as Prime 
Minister of Great Britain.   
"As the Hamiltonian program revealed itself over the the next 
two years - a sizable funded debt, a powerful national bank, 
excises, national subsidized manufactures, and eventually 
even a standing army - the Walpolean parallel at every point 
was too obvious to miss.  It was in resistance to this, and 
everything it seemed to imply, that the ‘Jeffersonian 
Persuasion’ was erected.”5 
 
 For most who have studied this era, the conflict between Hamilton 
and Jefferson is the focus of their work.  However, Elkins and McKitrick take 
a similar approach to mine in emphasizing that one must first look at 
Madison vs Hamilton to truly understand the conflicts of that era.   
"The character and quality of national life in the 1790's are 
thus not to be understood aside from the warfare of 
Hamiltonian Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans.  Worth 
noting, however, is that the groundwork for Jefferson's side 
was laid not by Jefferson himself, but by his friend and fellow 
Virginian, James Madison.  It is to James Madison's 
estrangement from his friend, Alexander Hamilton, that one 
must go as a first step in plumbing the political passions of the 
                                                          
4 Elkins, Stanley and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism (New York:  Oxford University 
Press, 1993), 78. 
5 Ibid, 19. 
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1790's."6 
 
 Again, as I mentioned above, this conflict between Hamilton and 
Madison boils down to, for Elkins and McKitrick, their respective 
“Anglophilia” and “Anglophobia.”  They argue Madison’s point of view 
resulted from, first, what they term the “Virginia principle.”  This is a 
contrasting way of thinking to the way Elkins and McKitrick ascribe to most 
of the members of the Constitutional convention.  Elkins and McKitrick’s 
second influence on Madison’s point of view is the aforementioned 
“Anglophobia.” 
“This was an anglophobia that could make ‘England’ a word 
capable of tainting almost anything.  Few other individuals 
were more propelled by it in all they thought, said, and did 
than Jefferson and Madison, and nothing was more of a 
constant than this same anglophobia in the hostility to 
Hamiltonian Federalism, which depended for its very life on a 
prosperous commerce with England, or to give body to the 
wild francophilia – or ‘Gallomania’ as the Federalists sullenly 
called it – that persisted throughout the 1790s.”7 
 
 In contrast, Hamilton’s “Anglophilia” they attribute to his having 
grown up in a commercial environment, unlike Madison’s more agrarian 
background.  His plans, so clearly outlined in his work as Treasury 
Secretary, displayed his affinity for a more commercial vision for the 
republic. 
“A clear by-product of all this, for Alexander Hamilton, was 
the makings of a very special attitude toward England.  An 
anglophile position on virtually everything was a basic 
                                                          
6 Ibid, 77. 
7 Ibid, 27. 
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component in what Hamilton would come to stand for 
ideologically, and it would be of extraordinary importance in 
the political divisions of the future.”8 
 
 So, with Elkins and McKitrick, we see an argument for the eventual 
conflict between erstwhile friends Hamilton and Madison attributed to 
different preferences regarding the United States’ relationship with Great 
Britain.  They hint at deeper preferences, though, such as different views 
on the economy, but do not pursue them.  It is to one such deeper 
preference this work is dedicated. 
 Lance Banning, in his The Sacred Fire of Liberty, also examines the 
conflict between Hamilton and Madison.  Starting with Hamilton’s 
attempts to understand the developing conflict between himself and 
Madison, Banning argues that their views had never been exactly the 
same, as Hamilton seemed to think at first. 
“But Hamilton and Madison, as I have shown, had never really 
shared ‘the same point of departure’; and Madison’s 
positions in the years through 1789 were not what many 
modern analysts have taken them to be.  Hamilton 
misunderstood his colleague, and sharing some of Hamilton’s 
assumptions, later analysts have often shared in his 
misjudgment.”9 
 
 In contrast to other scholars who see a shift in Madison’s beliefs from 
the 1780s to the 1790s, Banning argues for conflicting underlying 
preferences between Hamilton and Madison all along regarding the 
                                                          
8 Ibid, 128 
9 Banning, Lance, The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison and the Founding of the 
Federal Republic (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 1995), 296. 
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desirable extent of national power. 
“Madison, as has been shown, had never been a ‘nationalist’ 
in Hamilton’s conception of that term.  Even as he led the 
nation through the framing and ratifcation of the Constitution, 
he had also shown a lively fear of distant, independent rulers, 
a fear he had displayed repeatedly during the 1780s. . . . In 
the 1780s as in the 1790s, Hamilton’s most cherished object 
was to build a modern nation-state.  Madison’s fundamental 
purpose was to nurture and defend a revolutionary order of 
society and politics, which he regarded as profoundly 
inconsistent with the policies that many economic nationalists 
intended to pursue.”10 
 
 So, we see with Banning an explanation of the conflict between 
Hamilton and Madison as based on different preferences regarding the 
balance of power between the states and the national government, 
which he argues were there all along, even during the time they worked 
so closely together to get the Constitution they later could not agree on 
how to interpret and carry into effect. 
 James H. Read, in his Power versus Liberty, focuses on the question 
of power, and similarly to Banning, attributes the conflict between 
Hamilton and Madison to different preferences as to where power should 
reside in the United States. 
“What Madison argued against – and believed he saw in 
Hamilton’s rule of constitutional construction – was the use of 
implied powers in a way that allowed the indefinite expansion 
of governmental power.  There is a difference between 
implied powers and complete powers, and Madison’s 
argument against the Bank hinges on this difference.  Neither 
those who drafted the Constitution nor the people when they 
ratified it had clear ideas of the extent of the power it 
                                                          
10 Ibid, 296-297. 
 9   
 
granted.  But they understood very clearly that the document 
was not designed to allow indefinite expansion of the powers 
of the national government.”11 
 
 I think Read’s analysis is enlightening because it focuses specifically 
on different underlying preferences between Hamilton and Madison 
regarding how to deal with the question of power itself, and compares 
the two directly on this question.   
“The key to understanding Hamilton’s views on power and 
liberty and why he aroused such extraordinary fears among 
his contemporaries is the fact that Hamilton made a basic 
distinction between the liberty of citizens and the power of 
states, while most of his opponents did not.  He believed it 
was possible greatly to expand the power of the national 
government with respect to the states without upsetting the 
ordinary balance between the power of government and the 
liberty of citizens.  But in a sovereignty contest between 
national government and states, no such balance was 
possible.”12 
 
 Forrest McDonald, in his Novus Ordo Seclorum, focuses on differing 
underlying definitions of what a republic should be like, so his work is in 
part similar to this dissertation. 
“For example, Hamilton, who had inherited almost nothing, 
was wont to define a republic as any government in which no 
one had a hereditary status; whereas his friend Madison, who 
had inherited the status of freeman amidst slavery and whose 
blacks had inherited their status as slaves, preferred a 
definition that would avoid the sticky question of status and 
merely considered as republican any system in which 
governmental power derived from the consent of the 
                                                          
11 Read, James H., Power versus Liberty:  Madison, Hamilton, Wilson, and Jefferson 
(Charlottesville:  University Press of Virginia, 2000), 12. 
12 Ibid, 15. 
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‘public.’”13 
 
 Like other scholars, McDonald describes Hamilton as a thinker more 
in the vein of a political economist, while Madison is more of a political 
theorist for him.  McDonald points to this as being one of the sources of 
their disagreement, in that they came to the subject of interpreting the 
Constitution from different mindsets. 
“There is a mystery here:  despite their close collaboration in 
1787-1788 and the many conversations on public matters 
they had engaged in during that period, Hamilton and 
Madison apparently never discussed at any length their 
thoughts on political economy.  When, in the period 1789-
1791, the differences between them became overwhelmingly 
obvious, both men were genuinely surprised.”14 
 
 McDonald argues Hamilton believed his plans would increase the 
quality of human life in the new republic. Note the positive role McDonald 
identifies in Hamilton’s ideas regarding the role of the national 
government.  For Hamilton, but not Madison, it is to the actions of the 
national government that one can look for potential improvements in life 
for United States citizens. 
“The greatest benefits of a government-stimulated and 
government-channeled system of free private enterprise for 
profit, as Hamilton visualized things, were spiritual, not 
economic – the enlargement of the range of human freedom 
and the diversification of the possibilities for human 
endeavor.”15 
 
                                                          
13 McDonald, Forrest, Novus Ordo Seclorum:  The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution 
(Lawrence, Kansas:  University Press of Kansas, 1985), 5. 
14 Ibid, 135-136. 
15 Ibid, 141 
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 Madison, on the other hand, was never, in McDonald’s view, as 
sanguine regarding the role of the national government as Hamilton.  It is 
true he did want to increase the power of the federal government, but 
not as much as Hamilton.  McDonald attributes this to Hamilton not having 
as close emotional ties with his adopted home state of New York as 
Madison did with Virginia. 
“The Madison of the 1780s, however, is generally 
regarded as having been as solidly entrenched in the 
nationalist camp as Hamilton was.  This view of Madison as 
ardent nationalist must be tempered by at least two major 
sets of qualifications.  One was that throughout his career on 
the national stage, at least until Jefferson became president, 
Madison was always mindful of the interests of his state and 
was rarely if ever willing to do anything in the national interest 
which he believed to be inconsonant with the interests of 
Virginia.  That alone repeatedly set him apart from such 
nationalists as Gouverneur Morris, Hamilton, and Washington. 
 The other qualification to Madison’s nationalism was 
that it was a matter of vital concern with him that the 
national government be appropriately balanced and 
checked, lest it become an engine of tyranny.”16 
 
 I have saved for last the works most similar to my own.  The 
aforementioned works did not concentrate solely on Hamilton and 
Madison, but included their disagreement as part of each one’s overall 
work.  Colleen A. Sheehan’s 2004 American Political Science Review 
article, “Madison v. Hamilton:  The Battle Over Republicanism and the 
Role of Public Opinion,” does directly compare Hamilton and Madison, 
taking their conflicting ideas as the main point of her work.  However, she 
                                                          
16 Ibid, 204 
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does not compare them on a variety of points, as I propose for this 
dissertation.  Rather, she focuses on their conflicting views of the role of 
public opinion in determining public policy. 
“By 1801, and probably earlier, Hamilton recognized that 
Madison’s opposition to him and the Federalists was 
propelled by a fundamental philosophic disagreement over 
the nature and role of public opinion in a republic.  Tied to 
Madison’s and Hamilton’s differing perspectives on public 
opinion were conflicting interpretations of the Constitution 
and divergent visions of America’s economic future.  These 
disagreements between the two leading Publii shattered their 
Roman alliance of 1787-88.”17 
 
 Sheehan argues Madison was far more in favor of ongoing input 
from citizens, not just political elites, in determining public policy.  Also, 
though, she argues he was in favor of limiting the interpretation of the 
Constitution to how those who ratified it thought of it at the time of 
ratification. 
“In Madison’s mind, the principle of popular sovereignty 
meant the recognition of the supremacy of the Constitution, 
understood and administered in a manner consistent with the 
sense of the people who ratified and adopted it.  It also 
meant the ongoing sovereignty of public opinion, which 
requires the active participation of the citizenry in the affairs 
of the political community.”18 
 
 Hamilton had, Sheehan argues, a very different understanding of 
the role of public opinion.  Following on his well-known concerns 
regarding democratic forms of government, Hamilton wanted as little 
                                                          
17 Colleen A. Sheehan, “Madison v. Hamilton:  The Battle Over Republicanism and the 
Role of Public Opinion,” American Political Science Review 98, no. 3 (2004): 405 – 406. 
18 Ibid, 406. 
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ongoing, direct, participation by citizens in government.  Rather, Sheehan 
states, Hamilton wanted citizens to participate through expressing, or 
withholding, their “confidence” in their elected leaders. 
“Hamilton feared that the Republican agenda embraced the 
naive democratic optimism of his age, that in fact it had 
close connections across the seas to the ‘vain reveries of a 
false and new fangled philosophy’ of the French 
Enlightenment.  In contrast, he advocated a less active, more 
submissive role for the citizenry and a more energetic and 
independent status for the executive and his administration.  
For him, public opinion was the reflection of the citizens 
‘confidence’ in government.”19 
 
 Another article which compares Hamilton and Madison on a 
specific issue is Michael Schwarz’s “The Great Divergence Reconsidered:  
Hamilton, Madison, and U.S. – British Relations, 1783-89.”  As the title 
indicates, Schwarz compares the two on how they differed in regards to 
dealing with Great Britain during the era of the Articles of Confederation. 
 Schwarz references the controversy which of the two, Hamilton or 
Madison, had supposedly “abandoned” the other.  Various authors have 
taken the side of one or the other, but Schwarz argues that Madison had 
good reason to consider that it was Hamilton who had abandoned him. 
“Because Madison and Hamilton led the movement for 
constitutional reform, and because the sorry state of foreign 
affairs provided substantial impetus for that movement, it 
seems reasonable that we should reassess the Great 
Divergence of the 1790s by examining Madison and 
Hamilton’s approach to Anglo-American relations in the 
1780s.  On this issue, at least, important evidence suggests 
that in specific yet fundamental ways it was Hamilton, not 
                                                          
19 Ibid, 406. 
 14   
 
Madison, who reversed course.”20 
 
 Even though Madison and Hamilton had worked together on The 
Federalist, it was only a few years after the ratification of the Constitution 
that their differences became all-too-evident.  Schwarz characterizes their 
differences over how to deal with Great Britain as tied to their conflicting 
estimations on either the utility, or danger, of the United States continuing 
to have Great Britain as its primary trade partner.   
“By the time the Wars of the French Revolution broke out in 
1792, Hamilton and Madison had developed irreconcilable 
views of America’s proper relationship to Great Britain.  As 
Secretary of the Treasury, Hamilton saw in Britain a model of 
stability and an invaluable trading partner, whose commerce 
would provide a major source of revenue to support his 
ambitious fiscal plans.  Madison, on the other hand, had 
come to view Britain as an enemy to republican liberty and 
an implacable foe to American independence, which he 
feared was threatened by Britain’s virtual monopoly over 
American trade.  They had, however, arrived at these 
differing views from much the same starting point.  
Throughout the 1780s, Hamilton and Madison shared similar 
concerns and offered similar solutions to every important 
problem in Anglo-American relations.”21 
 
 Schwarz’s claim that Hamilton wanted to continue relations with 
Great Britain as part of his economic goals for the United States is 
plausible, but he does not offer any direct statement from Hamilton 
himself to support it.  Likewise, his estimation of Madison’s motivation is also 
plausible, but he does not offer any statement from Madison himself 
                                                          
20 Michael Schwarz, “The Great Divergence Reconsidered:  Hamilton, Madison, and U.S.-
British Relations, 1783-89,” Journal of the Early Republic 27, no. 3 (2007):  409. 
21 Ibid, 410-411. 
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either.  So, for me, Schwarz’s characterization is indicative of the kind of 
claim that needs more evidence before we can be truly confident it is 
correct. 
 As is clear from this review of other work done, the sort of direct, 
issue-by-issue comparison of Hamilton and Madison has not been done, 
with the exception of Sheehan’s and Schwarz’s articles I just discussed.  
This dissertation will expand the comparison of Hamilton and Madison into 
new areas that have not been as fully explored as they will be here.  This is 
my original contribution to the literature on Hamilton, Madison, 
Constitutional interpretation, and the early history of the United States 
republic. 
 In Chapter One, I will review the history of the idea of a republic, 
beginning with Polybius and continuing up until the time of Hamilton and 
Madison.  My approach follows, for the most part, the presentation from 
J.G.A.  Pocock’s The Machiavellian Moment.  My approach differs slightly 
from his, though, in that I will include some individual thinkers he does not. 
 In Chapter Two I will compare Hamilton and Madison on the issue of 
slavery.  As I will show, Hamilton was a documented opponent of slavery 
since service in the Army during the Revolution.  He also was active in the 
New York Manumission society to the end of his life.  Madison, on the other 
hand, while he disliked slavery, and even expressed a desire to have as 
little to do with it as possible, did not take any overt action to oppose 
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slavery throughout his life.  Only late in life did he offer a rather tepid 
support for the idea of resettling voluntarily freed slaves in Africa.  Also, 
Hamilton did not display any bias towards blacks, considering them to be 
to be just as competent as whites.  He did not express any reservations or 
fears regarding freed slaves living alongside other Americans.  Madison, 
though, was convinced to the end of his life that blacks and whites could 
not life together successfully. 
 In Chapter Three I will compare Hamilton and Madison on the issue 
of how the United States should position itself between the two major 
powers of the early period of American history, France and Great Britain.  I 
will show how, rather than having an “Anglophilia,” as Elkins and McKitrick 
describe him, Hamilton had a staunch focus on the well-being of the 
United States.  He was concerned about the influence of both major 
powers, and the influence of Europe in general, rather than having a 
preference for one over the other.  Madison, though, was more attached 
to republicanism, as he understood it, than to France.  He supported 
connections with France as a way of counterbalancing the influence of 
Great Britain, but once France had left its experiment in republicanism 
behind for the rule of Napoleon, he treated France no differently than any 
other foreign country. 
 In Chapter Four I will compare Hamilton and Madison on the issue of 
Constitutional interpretation.  I will show how their differences of opinion 
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existed even during the time they worked together on The Federalist, as 
Hamilton and Madison’s opinions, which I will document, during that time 
showed sharply different expectations.  Neither departed from the other in 
later years, because neither understood they had conflicting views all 
along.  That they did not realize this only shows that they simply did not 
have an in-depth discussion of their expectations for the future of the 
United States. 
 In Chapter Five I will compare Hamilton and Madison on the issue of 
religion.  Madison, as is well known, was an ardent defender of individual 
religious freedom throughout his adult life.   He did not express any strong 
religious beliefs of his own at any point in his life.  His focus was not on 
personal piety, but rather on freedom from religion.  He even tried to have 
the protections from official religion in the United States Constitution 
extended to limit the state governments as well during the time Congress 
was writing the Bill of Rights.  Hamilton was similarly not given to religious 
expressions during most of his life, but he did show some religious 
reflections when young and still living in the Caribbean.  However, as he 
aged, especially after leaving public office, he showed greater and 
greater interest in religion.  He expressed his thoughts on Christianity in 
writing more and more during the late 1790s and early 1800s.  Finally, as he 
lay dying, he wanted to receive Communion. 
 In Chapter Six I will compare Hamilton and Madison on the issue of 
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federal government involvement in the economy.  Both showed their later 
preferences before the Constitution was ratified, so again, neither 
genuinely departed from the other in later years.  Hamilton showed his 
strong preference for government regulation of various aspects of the 
economy all along, and Madison, while favoring regulation in some ways, 
was nowhere near as eager to involve the federal, rather than state, 
government in economic matters. 
 My conclusion will focus on the overall implications for 
republicanism of the differing points of view Hamilton and Madison had.  
As I mentioned above, there is no one definitive definition of the word 
“republic,” and so what it means for the United States to be a republic has 
been a source of constant debate throughout its history.  The differences 
Hamilton and Madison had will help highlight that debate, as both were 
pivotal figures in the early history of the United States, and their influence 
has continued to this day. 
  
19 
Chapter One:  Definitions of a Republic From Other Authors 
 Since this dissertation is an examination of the idea of a republic 
according to the preferences of Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, 
I will dedicate this chapter to a discussion of the background to the idea 
of a republic throughout history. In so doing, my approach is heavily 
influenced by J.G.A. Pocock’s The Machiavellian Moment, although I will 
include some figures he does not in my presentation.  Regardless of 
whether they are all strictly within the historical development of 
republican thought as it is currently understood, I argue the individuals I 
include are worth discussing because Hamilton and Madison did not 
concern themselves with the intellectual categories that we later 
academics use.  Their thought on what constituted “proper” 
republicanism drew on a wider range of influences. 
 As Pocock argues, though, the primary source for what we now 
identify as republican thought, with its emphasis on a mixed constitution, is 
Polybius and his The Histories. 
“The sixth book of Polybius’ Histories, though it did not 
become available in a language other than Greek until the 
second decade of the sixteenth century, exercised so great 
an influence on Renaissance ideas about politics in time that 
it may be considered here as indicative of that age’s 
fundamental conceptual problems.”22 
 
                                                          
22 Pocock, J.G.A., The Machiavellian Moment:  Florentine Political Thought and the 
Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1975), 77. 
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 As is well known, Polybius borrowed the idea for a mixed 
constitution from Aristotle, but further elaborated on and expanded 
Aristotle’s ideas.  The whole point of positing a mixture of different political 
systems was stability, at least one which would conceivably last longer 
than any of the stages through which Polybius argues societies moved as 
a matter of regular history. 
“In the natural, spontaneous course of events, the first system 
to arise is monarchy, and this is followed by kingship, but it 
takes the deliberate correction of the defects of monarchy 
for it to develop into kingship.  Kingship changes into its 
congenital vice – that is, into tyranny – and then it is the turn 
of aristocracy, after the dissolution of tyranny.  Aristocracy 
necessarily degenerates into oligarchy, and when the 
general populace get impassioned enough to seek redress 
for the crimes committed by their leaders, democracy is born.  
And in due course of time, once democracy turns to violating 
and breaking the law, mob-rule arises and completes the 
series.”23 
 
 Polybius’ cure for this endless cycle is once again the mixture of all 
three types of government at its best, kingship, aristocracy, and 
democracy, specifically exemplified by the Roman republic.  The three 
components, or building blocks, as Polybius called them, were the consuls, 
which provided the kingship element, the senate, which provided the 
aristocratic element, and the people, which provided the democratic 
element. 
“To a considerable extent, then, each of the three 
components of the Roman constitution can harm or help the 
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other two.  This enables the whole made up of all three parts 
to respond appropriately to every situation that arises, and 
that is what makes it the best conceivable system of 
government.”24 
 
 I will follow an historical approach to discussing the other authors 
who followed in Polybius’ footsteps, so the next individual I have included 
is Cicero, the Roman senator.  He also discussed the possible types of 
government as including monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. 
“When, therefore, the supreme power is in the hands of one 
man, we call that man a king and that form of government a 
monarchy.  When it is in the hands of certain selected 
persons, the state is said to be ruled by the will of an 
aristocracy.  And a state is democratic – for that is the term 
used – when all authority is in the hands of the people 
themselves.  Any one of these three forms of government, 
while not, of course, perfect nor in my judgment the best, is 
nevertheless a possible form of government, if the bond holds 
which originally united its members in the social order of the 
commonwealth; and one may be better than another.”25 
 
 Cicero does not posit the same cycle of governments as Polybius, 
merely listing the options he sees as possible.  However, he does argue 
there is in fact a kind of government which is superior to any of these 
three, and here we see a continuation of Polybius’ mixed model. 
“There is, accordingly, a fourth kind of commonwealth which, 
in my opinion, should receive the highest approval, since it is 
formed by the combination, in due measure, of the three 
forms of state which I described as original.”26 
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 Machiavelli, in The Discourses, also presents Polybius’ cycle without 
specifically referring to him by name.  Humans originally select the 
strongest man among them to rule, and thus begins the cycle through 
kingship, tyranny, aristocracy, oligarchy, democracy, anarchy, and then 
begin the cycle all over again.  However, there is a kind of government 
that is better than any of these by itself. 
“I say, then, that all kinds of government are defective; those 
three which we have qualified as good because they are too 
short-lived, and the three bad ones because of their inherent 
viciousness.  Thus sagacious legislators, knowing the vices of 
each of these systems of government by themselves, have 
chosen one that should partake of all of them, judging that to 
be the most stable and solid.  In fact, when there is combined 
under the same constitution a prince, a nobility, and the 
power of the people, then these three powers will watch and 
keep each other reciprocally in check.”27 
 
 Machiavelli argues the origin of this especially worthwhile form of 
government comes from a gifted legislator, who sets up laws which 
thereafter are complied with throughout subsequent generations.  For 
Machiavelli, one such legislator was Lycurgus, whose model of 
government for Sparta lasted for centuries.  Even though Rome did not 
have any such individual legislator, though, it nevertheless developed the 
type of government of which Machiavelli approves. 
“But let us come to Rome.  Although she had no legislator like 
Lycurgus, who constituted her government, at her very origin, 
in a manner to secure her liberty for a length of time, yet the 
disunion which existed between the Senate and the people 
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produced such extraordinary events, that chance did for her 
what the laws had failed to do.  Thus, if Rome did not attain 
the first degree of happiness, she at least had the second.  
Her first institutions were doubtless defective, but they were 
not in conflict with the principles that might bring her to 
perfection.”28 
 
 Returning to Pocock, he argues the “glue,” if you will, of this 
preferred, mixed form of government, according to Machiavelli, is virtue.  
Just having the structural elements of a monarchical element, an 
aristocratical element, and a democratical element, are not enough.  
What is needed in addition is, specifically, “civic” virtue, in order for such 
republics to succeed. 
“The republic or polity was in yet another sense a structure of 
virtue:  it was a structure in which every citizen’s ability to 
place the common good before his own was the 
precondition of every other’s, so that every man’s virtue 
saved every other’s from that corruption part of whose time-
dimension was fortuna.  The republic was therefore a 
structure whose organizing principle was something far more 
complex and positive than custom.”29 
 
 Pocock ascribes the importation of Machiavellian republican 
influence into England to the political conflict which led to that nation’s 
Civil War.  Instead of monarchical and feudal ideas, some allowance was 
held to be needed for the other sources of political power, namely the 
aristocracy and the people.  Pocock identifies the crucial step as having 
been taken by Charles 1’s advisors. 
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“On 21 June 1642, with about two months to go before the 
formal beginnings of civil war, two of Charles 1’s advisors – 
Viscount Falkland and Sir John Colepeper – drafted, and 
persuaded him to issue, a document in which the King, not 
Parliament, took the step of declaring England a mixed 
government rather than a condescending monarchy.  His 
Majesty’s Answer to the Nineteen Propositions of Both Houses 
of Parliament . . . is a crucial document in English political 
thought, and among other things one of a series of keys 
which opened the door to Machiavellian analysis.  In 
essence, it asserts that the government of England is vested in 
three estates, the King, the lords, and the commons, and that 
the health and the very survival of the system depend upon 
maintenance of the balance between them.”30 
 
 While he is not included among the authors Pocock discusses, I am 
including Thomas Hobbes because of his undisputed place in the 
development of English, and thus later American, political thought.  
Hobbes also identifies three main types of government, monarchy, 
aristocracy, and democracy.  However, for Hobbes, the most important 
goal for any form of government, is not virtue as with Machiavelli, but 
rather peace and security. 
“The difference between these three kindes of Common-
wealth, consisteth not in the difference of Power; but in the 
difference of Convenience, or Aptitude to produce the 
Peace, and Security of the people; for which end they were 
instituted.”31 
 
 For Hobbes, the kind of government whose end result is most clearly 
the peace and security of the people, is in fact monarchy.  Hobbes 
argues that the interest of the monarch is the same as that of the country 
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as a whole, and thus monarchy is best suited to creating the hoped-for 
outcomes of peace and security. 
“From whence it follows, that where the publique and private 
interest are most closely united, there is the publique most 
advanced.  Now, in Monarchy, the private interest is the 
same with the publique.  The riches, power, and honour of a 
Monarch arise onely from the riches, strength and reputation 
of his Subjects.  For no King can be rich, nor glorious, nor 
secure; whose subjects are either poore, or contemptible, or 
too weak through want, or dissension, to maintain a war 
against their enemies:  Whereas in a Democracy, or 
Aristocracy, the publique prosperity conferres not so much to 
the private fortune of one that is corrupt, or ambitious, as 
doth many times a perfidious advice, a treacherous action, 
or a Civill warre.”32 
 
 It is with James Harrington, however, who Pocock does identify as 
being clearly within the republican tradition, that we begin to receive 
even more details regarding what a republic should be like, more than just 
having a mixed government.  For Harrington, land ownership, and also 
possession of weapons, is vital. 
“But the tillage, bringing up a good soldiery, bringeth up a 
good commonwealth . . .  for where the owner of the plough 
comes to have the sword too, he will use it in defence of his 
own, whence it hath happened that the people of Oceana, 
in proportion to their property, have always been free, and 
the genius of this nation hath ever had some resemblance 
with that of ancient Italy, which was wholly addicted unto 
commonwealths, and where Rome came to make the 
greatest account of her rustic tribes and to call her consuls 
from the plough.”33 
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 It is this ownership of land, though, which specifically provides for 
Harrington the means of balancing power within a commonwealth.  
Rather than relying solely on civic virtue, having a successful 
commonwealth means the otherwise weakest of the three, the people, 
have sufficient land to counteract the power of the other two. 
“And if the whole people be landlords, or hold the lands so 
divided among them, that no one man, or number of men, 
within the compass of the few or aristocracy, overbalance 
them, the empire without the interposition of force is a 
commonwealth.”34 
 
 Furthermore, Harrington defines “popular government” as the best, 
because it best approximates what human beings can accomplish 
through the use of their reason. 
“Mankind then must either be less just than the creature, or 
acknowledge also his common interest to be common right.  
And if reason be nothing else but interest, and the interest of 
mankind be the right interest, then the reason of mankind 
must be right reason.  Now compute well, for if the interest of 
popular government come the nearest unto the interest of 
mankind, then the reason of popular government must come 
the nearest unto right reason.”35 
 
 But what, exactly, kind of “popular government” did Harrington 
intend in The Commonwealth of Oceana?  Not only does his ideal form of 
government rely on widespread land ownership, armed commoners, and 
a mixed government, it also specifically includes voting rights.  Missing are 
references to a hereditary monarchy, or a hereditary aristocracy as well. 
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“An equal commonwealth by that which hath been said is a 
government established upon an equal agrarian, arising into 
the superstructures or three orders, the senate debating and 
proposing, the people resolving, and the magistracy 
executing by an equal rotation through the suffrage of the 
people given by the ballot.”36 
 
 John Locke is another author who, like Thomas Hobbes, is not 
included among those considered by Pocock to be within the republican 
tradition.  Nevertheless, any discussion of background influences on early 
Americans such as Hamilton and Madison would be incomplete without 
noting his contributions. 
 To begin, Locke of course argues that organized societies come 
into being through the consent of the people who constitute them, in 
order to better protect their “liberty and property.”  For Locke, there are 
specific goals people have in mind when they make the choice to live 
together rather than apart.  Those goals limit the range of actions any 
government the people choose to create can take on its own.  Moreover, 
the primary part of government for Locke is in fact the legislature which is 
the first thing created. 
“THE great end of mens entering into Society, being the 
enjoyment of the Properties in Peace and Safety, and the 
great instrument and means of that being the Laws 
established in that Society; the first and fundamental positive 
Law of all Common-wealths, is the establishing of the 
Legislative Power; as the first and fundamental natural law.”37 
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 Not only is the form of government chosen by the people who 
choose to create it limited in what it can do, the people who created it 
can change the government itself if they so choose. 
“. . . there remains still in the People a Supream Power to 
remove or alter the Legislative, when they find the Legislative 
act contrary to the trust reposed in them.”38 
 
 Furthermore, the government itself can even be removed if that is 
felt to be necessary. 
“There is therefore, secondly, another way whereby 
Governments are dissolved, and that is; when the Legislative, 
or the Prince, either of them act contrary to their Trust.”39 
 
 Algernon Sidney, writing, like Locke, in response to Sir Robert Filmer’s 
Patriarcha, makes arguments quite similar to Locke’s in regards to the 
origins and limited powers of government.  His arguments do include the 
notion of “justice” in the forming of governments, though. 
“The liberty of one is thwarted by that of another; and whilst 
they are all equal, none will yield to any, otherwise than by a 
general consent.  This is the ground of all just governments; for 
violence or fraud can create no right; and the same consent 
gives the form to them all, how much soever they differ from 
each other.”40 
 
 The purpose of creating government, according to Sidney, is justice, 
and those who are given power under any form of government, are there 
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to carry out justice.  Justice is the good of the society, not of any one 
individual or group within that society. 
“‘Tis lawful therefore for any such bodies to set up one, or a 
few men to govern them, or to retain the power in 
themselves; and he or they who are set up, having no other 
power but what is conferred upon them by that multitude, 
whether great or small, are truly by them made what they 
are; and by the law of their own creation, are to exercise 
those powers according to the proportion, and to the ends 
for which they were given.”41 
 
 Sidney does give pride of place to mixed government as being the 
best of all possible choices. 
“And if I should undertake to say, there never was a good 
government in the world, that did not consist of the three 
simple species of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, I 
think I might make it good.”42 
 
 Like Locke, Sidney clearly states that governments can be changed 
as desired. 
“. . . whilst the foundation and principle of a government 
remains good, the superstructures may be changed 
according to occasions, without any prejudice to it.”43 
 
 Sidney’s main concern is with “corruption,” which, even if a 
government is initially set up well, can cause its decline into despotism.  
Corruption for Sidney is ultimately reliance on the monarch for one’s 
income, since it is in absolute monarchies that corruption inevitably 
occurs. 
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“This being the state of the matter on both sides, we may 
easily collect, that all governments are subject to corruption 
and decay; but with this difference, that absolute monarchy 
is by principle led unto, or rooted in it; whereas mixed or 
popular governments are only in a possibility of falling into it:  
As the first cannot subsist, unless the prevailing part of the 
people be corrupted; the other must certainly perish, unless 
they be preserved in a great measure free from vices:  and I 
doubt whether any better reason can be given, why there 
have been and are more monarchies than popular 
governments in the world, than that nations are more easily 
drawn into corruption than defended from it; and I think that 
monarchy can be said to be natural in no other sense, than 
that our depraved nature is most inclined to that which is 
worst.”44 
 
 This need for virtue in Sidney’s thought does reveal a conflict within 
his argument.  At one point he admits that aristocratically-rooted 
governments are less subject to corruption that popular, or 
democratically-rooted governments. 
“If it be said, that those governments in which the 
democratical part governs most, do more frequently err in the 
choice of men or of the means of preserving that purity of 
manners which is required for the well-being of a people, 
than those wherein aristocracy prevails; I confess it.”45 
 
 However, just sentences later, he extols the virtues of democracy as 
the form of government most likely to be the best one possible. 
“. . . and of all governments, democracy, in which every 
man’s liberty is least restrained, because every man hath an 
equal part, would certainly prove to be the most just, rational 
and natural;”46 
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 Be that as it may, Sidney’s goal in Discourses Concerning 
Government is to argue against absolute monarchies, because they are 
the most unjust possible form of government.  Power comes from the 
people, not from divine right.  Power proceeds upwards from the people 
to their magistrates, and does not descend from a divinely appointed 
monarch. 
“. . . I take liberty to say, that whereas there is no form 
appointed by God or nature, those governments only can be 
called just, which are established by the consent of nations.  
These nations may at the first set up popular or mixed 
governments, and without the guilt of sedition introduce them 
afterwards, if that which was first established prove 
unprofitable or hurtful to them; and those that have done so, 
have enjoy’d more justice in times of peace, and managed 
wars, when occasion requir’d, with more virtue and better 
success, than any absolute monarchies have done.”47 
 
 Sidney was a martyr to other Whigs, especially the later “True Whig” 
writers who were so influential with the leaders of the American 
Revolution.  His Discourses Concerning Government were the source of 
ideas which revolutionary leaders across the colonies called upon to justify 
their complaints regarding the actions of Parliament and King.  Some 
passages of his need only be mentioned to show the influence of his 
thought. 
“But those who seek after truth, will easily find, that there can 
be no such thing in the world as the rebellion of a nation 
against its own magistrates, and that rebellion is not always 
evil.”48 
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 This passage also needs no further comment in regards to not only 
the ideas, but the actions taken, by leaders of the American Revolution. 
“But tho every private man singly taken be subject to the 
commands of the magistrate, the whole body of the people 
is not so; for he is by and for the people, and the people is 
neither by nor for him.   The obedience due to him from 
private men is grounded upon, and measured by the general 
law; and that law regarding the welfare of the people, 
cannot set up the interest of one or a few men against the 
puclick.  The whole body therefore of a nation cannot be tied 
to any other obedience than is consistent with the common 
good, according to their own judgment:  and having never 
been subdued or brought to terms of peace with their 
magistrates, they cannot be said to revolt or rebel against 
them to whom they owe no more than seems good to 
themselves, and who are nothing of or by themselves, more 
than other men.”49 
 
 Montesquieu, as has been demonstrated by Donald Lutz50, was 
cited a comparable number of times as John Locke during the 1760’s and 
1770’s (15 vs. 18), and his influence on the separation of powers debate 
clearly justifies his inclusion here.  Montesquieu identifies a somewhat 
different set of possible governments than do the other authors I have thus 
far discussed. 
“There are three kinds of government:  REPUBLICAN, 
MONARCHICAL, and DESPOTIC.  To discover the nature of 
each, the idea of them held by the least educated of men is 
sufficient.  I assume three definitions, or rather, three facts:  
one, republican government is that in which the people as a 
body, or only a part of the people, have sovereign power; 
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monarchical government is that in which one alone governs, 
but by fixed and established laws; whereas, in despotic 
government, one alone, without law and without rule, draws 
everything along by his will and his caprices.”51 
 
 Notice his inclusion of both democracy and aristocracy under the 
label of republic, and his definition of a monarchy as one which abides by 
laws, which is what distinguishes it from the rule of a despot.  Also, 
Montesquieu distinguishes between the “nature” of a type of government 
and its “principle.” 
“There is this difference between the nature of the 
government as its principle:  its nature is that which makes it 
what it is, and its principle, that which makes it act.  The one is 
its particular structure, and the other is the human passions 
that set it in motion.”52 
 
 The particular principle that both democratic republics and 
aristocratic republics need is “virtue,” although Montesquieu argues 
aristocracies need it less than democracies. 
“Just as there must be virtue in popular government, there 
must also be virtue in the aristocratic one.  It is true that it is 
not as absolutely required.”53 
 
 Montesquieu goes into considerable detail to specify just what kind 
of virtue he argues is necessary for a democratic republic to exist. 
“One can define this virtue as love of the laws and the 
homeland.  This love, requiring a continuous preference of 
the public interest over one’s own, produces all the individual 
virtues; they are only that preference. 
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 This love is singularly connected with democracies.  In 
them alone, government is entrusted to each citizen.  Now 
government is like all things in the world; in order to preserve 
it, one must love it.”54 
 
 Montesquieu also provides, and argues in favor of, a specific 
definition of “liberty” as part of his presentation of what a government is 
like when people have a country in which they can enjoy liberty.  First of 
all, liberty does “not” mean just doing whatever one chooses to do: 
“It is true that in democracies the people seem to do 
what they want, but political liberty in no way consists in 
doing what one wants.  In a state, that is, in a society where 
there are laws, liberty can consist only having the power to 
do what one should want to do and in no way being 
constrained to do what one should not want to do. 
 One must put oneself in mind of what independence is 
and what liberty is.  Liberty is the right to do everything the 
laws permit; and if one citizen could do what they forbid, he 
would no longer have liberty because the others would 
likewise have this same power.”55 
 
 Montesquieu does not automatically assign political liberty to 
republics or democracies.  In fact, he states that quite often republics and 
democracies are less free than monarchies.  This is due to his insistence 
that the exercise of power by any one person or group be constrained, or 
checked, by the power of other people or other groups. 
“Democracy and aristocracy are not free states by 
their nature.  Political liberty is found only in moderate 
governments.  But it is not always in moderate states.  It is 
present only when power is not abused, but it has eternally 
been observed that any man who has power is led to abuse 
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it; he continues until he finds limits.  Who would think it?  Even 
virtue has need of limits. 
 So that one cannot abuse power, power must check 
power by the arrangement of things.  A constitution can be 
such that no one will be constrained to do the things the law 
does not oblige him to do or be kept from doing the things 
the law permits him to do.”56 
 
 Most countries, according to Montesquieu, did not have political 
liberty as their purpose, not even the Italian republics of his day.  The only 
country he considered as having political liberty as its purpose was Great 
Britain, because there political power was divided between different 
branches of government.  The influence of this distinction on the United 
States Constitution and its division of power between executive, legislative 
and judicial powers is of course well known. 
“In each state there are three sorts of powers:  
legislative power, executive power over the things depending 
on the right of nations, and executive power over the things 
depending on civil right.  . . . Political liberty in a citizen is that 
tranquility of spirit which comes from the opinion each one 
has of his security, and in order for him to have this liberty the 
government must be such that one citizen cannot fear 
another citizen. 
 When legislative power is united with executive power 
in a single person or in a single body of the magistracy, there 
is no liberty, because one can fear that the same monarch or 
senate that makes tyrannical laws will execute them 
tyrannically. 
 Nor is there liberty if the power of judging is not 
separate from legislative power and from executive power. . . 
. All would be lost if the same man or the same body of 
principal men, either of nobles, or of the people, exercised 
these three powers:  that of making the laws, that of 
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executing public resolutions, and that of judging the crimes or 
the disputes of individuals.”57 
 
 David Hume, even though his role was more that of a foil than of a 
source of inspiration because of his support for the monarchy and his 
preference for tradition rather than innovation, nevertheless was a widely 
read, and even cited, author during the early decades of the United 
States, as again Donald Lutz has shown.58  Even though Hume was 
hesitant to recommend any changes to political institutions, he 
nevertheless did ponder the possibility of exploring the idea of an ideal 
form of government against which current forms could be compared so 
as to provide a kind of model for alterations. 
 “First, a legislature is essential, but not a unicameral legislature: 
All free governments must consist of two councils, lesser and 
greater; or, in other words, of a senate and people.  The 
people, as HARRINGTON observes, would want wisdom, 
without the senate:  The senate, without the people, would 
want honesty.”59 
 
 Interestingly, Hume precedes later individuals such as Madison in 
arguing that it is possible to extend a republic over a large country.  In 
fact, Hume argues that if done properly, a large republic would have 
distinct advantages over a small one. 
“We shall conclude this subject, with observing the falsehood 
of the common opinion, that no large state, such as FRANCE 
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or GREAT BRITAIN, could ever be modelled into a 
commonwealth, but that such a form of government can 
only take place in a city or small territory.  The contrary seems 
probable.  Though it is more difficult to form a republican 
government in an extensive country than in a city; there is 
more facility, when once it is formed, of preserving it steady 
and uniform, without tumult and faction.”60 
 
 In fact, Hume argues that such large countries are precisely the sort 
in which one can, slowly and cautiously to be sure, approach more 
refined and perhaps even ideal forms of government. 
“In a large government, which is modelled with masterly skill, 
there is compass and room enough to refine the democracy, 
from the lower people, who may be admitted into the first 
elections or first concoction of the commonwealth, to the 
higher magistrates, who direct all the movements.”61 
 
 I conclude this discussion with an examination of John Trenchard 
and Thomas Gordon’s Cato’s Letters, which antedated the American 
Revolution by only a few decades.  That Cato’s Letters was widely read, 
appreciated, and used by the leaders of the American Revolution is 
already well known.  They also, like others before mentioned, locate 
ultimate power in the people at large. 
“The first Principles of Power are in the People; and all the 
Projects of Men in Power ought to refer to the People, to aim 
solely at their Good, and end in it:  And whoever will pretend 
to govern them without regarding them, will soon repent it.”62 
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 The only form of government that can be called good according to 
Trenchard and Gordon is the one which aims at the common good, 
rather than the good of one or of a few. 
“Dominion that is not maintained by the Sword, must be 
maintained by Consent; and in this latter Case, what Security 
can any Man at the Head of Affairs expect, but from pursuing 
the People’s Welfare, and seeking their good Will?  The 
Government of One for the Sake of One, is Tyranny; and so is 
the Government of a Few for the Sake of Themselves:  But the 
Government executed for the Good of All, and with the 
Consent of All, is Liberty; and the Word (Government) is 
prophaned, and its Meaning abused, when it signifies any 
Thing else.”63 
 
 The only form of government which does actively seek the good of 
all is the government that dutifully represents all of the people.  That form 
of government is the mixed constitution, because it in turn represents the 
people at large, the aristocracy, and the monarchy, all at the same time 
rather than any one at a time. 
“But, Thanks be to Heaven and our worthy Ancestors, our 
Liberties are better secured.  We have a Constitution, in which 
the People have a large Share:  They are one part of the 
Legislature, and have the sole Power of giving Money; which 
includes in it every thing that they can ask for the publick 
Good; and the Representatives, being neither awed nor 
bribed, will always act for the Country’s Interest; their own 
being so interwoven with the People’s Happiness, that they 
must stand and fall together.”64 
 
 Any form of good government must also be one in which the laws 
are the ultimate power.  Rule of law, rather than rule by any one person or 
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group, is for Trenchard and Gordon an essential aspect of the good 
government the people of Great Britain enjoy. 
“Power is like Fire; it warms, scorches, or destroys, according 
as it is watched, provoked, or increased.  It is as dangerous as 
useful.  Its only Rule is the Good of the People; but because it 
is apt to break its Bounds, in all good Governments nothing, or 
as little as may be, ought to be left to Chance, or the Humors 
of Men in Authority:  All should proceed by fixed and stated 
Rules; and upon any Emergency, new Rules should be made.  
This is the Constitution, and this the Happiness of Englishmen, 
as has been formerly shewn at large in these Letters.”65 
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Chapter Two:  Hamilton and Madison on Slavery 
 I will now compare Hamilton and Madison on a variety of issues, 
beginning with slavery.  I have chosen this issue because slavery was 
spoken of by both over several decades of their lives, and each took a 
quite different approach in responding to the problem of slavery.  Neither 
Hamilton nor Madison was actually in favor of slavery, but as I will show, 
Hamilton was far more active in opposing slavery, and even seeking its 
discontinuation, while Madison was much more equivocal in his response.  
Madison did not speak out publicly in favor of ending slavery until near 
the end of his life, while Hamilton took a far more active, public role as 
early as during the Revolutionary War. 
 From Hamilton we will see an effort during the Revolution, along 
with his friend and fellow Army officer Henry Laurens, to actively recruit 
slaves for the Army, and offer them their freedom in exchange for service.  
He simply did not think that slaves were either better or worse than other 
ordinary people.  That he maintained this point of view throughout the 
remainder of his life we will clearly see by his extremely active involvement 
in the New York Manumission Society up until the time of his duel with 
Aaron Burr. 
 Madison, on the other hand, even though as we will see, found the 
idea of freeing slaves in exchange for military service a good idea, he 
never adopted an active role in ridding the United States of slavery.  Only 
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late in life did he even half-heartedly “recommend” an effort to resettle 
slaves who had been voluntarily freed back in Africa.  Indeed, he 
remained convinced throughout his life that blacks and whites could not 
peacefully and successfully coexist in the United States. 
 Lance Banning speculates that, even though Madison did not take 
action to end slavery during most of his life, he was nevertheless guilt-
ridden by its existence.  Furthermore, Banning argues Madison was 
especially troubled by his own involvement in its continuation. 
 “Madison was fully conscious of the wickedness of slavery, 
probably from the beginning of the war.  Throughout his life - 
and with increasing guilt - he thought of it as an abomination 
absolutely incompatible with his ideals.  Nevertheless, through 
forty years of active public service, he refused to risk his 
usefulness in other urgent causes by identifying with the more 
outspoken, active critics of the institution; and he never freed 
himself from daily, intimate involvement with the evil.  
Attended by a body servant even when he traveled to the 
North, he willed his chattels to his wife and hoped in his 
retirement that a voluntary, gradual emancipation could be 
speeded by permitting slavery's diffusion to the West.  
Trapped by his belief that whites wouldn’t permit equality for 
blacks and that the former slaves would be impoverished and 
dangerous in a state of partial freedom, he could do no 
more, in his old age, than to commit his waning energies and 
great prestige to the leadership of the American Colonization 
Society.  Slavery clamped its fetters even on his mind.”66 
 
In a similar manner, Ron Chernow speculates about the influence of 
Hamilton’s childhood on his perception of slavery, arguing it was the 
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memories of growing up in the midst of slavery in the Caribbean and 
seeing its horrors first-hand that made him an opponent. 
 “The memories of his West Indian childhood left Hamilton with 
a settled antipathy to slavery.  During the war, Hamilton had 
supported John Laurens' futile effort to emancipate southern 
slaves who fought for independence.  He had expressed an 
unwavering belief in the genetic equality of blacks and 
whites - unlike Jefferson, for instance, who regarded blacks as 
innately inferior - that was enlightened for his day.  And he 
knew this from his personal boyhood experience.”67 
 
 The problem with both Banning’s and Chernow’s arguments is not 
their lack of plausibility, but rather that neither actually provides 
documentation showing where Hamilton or Madison specifically 
expressed the sentiment Banning and Chernow attribute to them.  Yes, as 
I will include below, Madison did express a desire to have as little to do 
with slavery himself, but nowhere did he express the guilt Banning 
mentions.  Likewise, Chernow does not point to a statement by Hamilton 
himself identifying the origin of his opposition to slavery as coming from his 
childhood. 
Now, we do know Hamilton clearly opposed slavery from at least 
the time of the Revolutionary War, because he stated such in his 
correspondence.  So, while the points Banning and Chernow raise might 
be valid, I argue it is better to rely on what both Hamilton and Madison 
actually wrote for their views on the subject of slavery. 
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Clearly, Hamilton did not believe Africans were inferior to 
Europeans.   He unequivocally said so as part of the plan he and his friend, 
Lt. Colonel Henry Laurens developed to organize battalions of slave 
soldiers, who would as a result of their service gain their freedom. 
  “Colonel Laurens, who will have the honor of delivering 
you this letter, is on his way to South Carolina, on a project, 
which I think, in the present situation of affairs there, is a very 
good one and deserves every kind of support and 
encouragement.  This is to raise two three or four batalions of 
negroes; with the assistance of the government of that state, 
by contributions from the owners in proportion to the number 
they possess.  . . .  
  It appears to me, that an expedient of this kind, in the 
present state of Southern affairs, is the most rational, that can 
be adopted, and promises very important advantages.  
Indeed, I can hardly see how a sufficient force can be 
collected in that quarter without it; and the enemy's 
operations there are growing infinitely serious and formidable.  
I have not the least doubt, that the negroes will make very 
excellent soldiers, with proper management; and I will 
venture to pronounce, that they cannot be put in better 
hands than those of Mr. Laurens.  He has all the zeal, 
intelligence, enterprise, and every other qualification requisite 
to succeed in such an undertaking.  It is a maxim with some 
great military judges, that with sensible officers soldiers can 
hardly be too stupid; . . . I mention this, because I frequently 
hear it objected to the scheme of embodying negroes that 
they are too stupid to make soldiers.  This is so far from 
appearing to me a valid objection that I think their want of 
cultivation (for their natural faculties are probably as good as 
ours) joined to that habit of subordination which they acquire 
from a life of servitude, will make them sooner become 
soldiers than  our White inhabitants.  Let officers be men of 
sense and sentiment, and the nearer the soldiers approach to 
machines perhaps the better. 
  I foresee that this project will have to combat much 
opposition from prejudice and self-interest.  The contempt we 
have been taught to entertain for the blacks, makes us fancy 
many things that are founded neither in reason nor 
experience; and an unwillingness to part with property of so 
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valuable a kind will furnish a thousand arguments to show the 
impracticability or pernicious tendency of a scheme which 
requires such a sacrifice.  But it should be considered, that if 
we do not make use of them in this way, the enemy probably 
will; and that the best way to counteract the temptations 
they will hold out will be to offer them ourselves.  An essential 
part of the plan is to give them their freedom with their 
muskets.  This will secure their fidelity, animate their courage, 
and I believe will have a good influence upon those who 
remain, by opening a door to their emancipation.  This 
circumstance, I confess, has no small weight in inducing me 
to wish the success of the project; for the dictates of humanity 
and true policy equally interest me in favour of this 
unfortunate class of men.”68 
 
 I realize this is a lengthy quote, but since I am basing my arguments 
entirely on what both Hamilton and Madison actually wrote, in this 
instance its length is necessary.  Here, we see clearly Hamilton’s 
enthusiasm for a way of at least reducing the number of slaves in the 
United States, in part to make use of their services instead of the British, his 
clear opinion that Africans are not inferior to Europeans, and finally his 
emotional preference for the removal of slavery. 
 Madison also thought it a good idea to offer freedom to slaves in 
exchange for military service during the Revolution. 
“I am glad to find the legislature persist in their resolution to 
recruit their line of the army for the war, though without 
deciding on the expediency of the mode under their 
consideration, would it not be as well to liberate and make 
soldiers at once of the blacks themselves as to make them 
instruments for enlisting white Soldiers?  It wd. certainly be 
more consonant to the principles of liberty which ought never 
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to be lost sight of in a contest for liberty, and with white 
officers & a majority of white soldrs. no imaginable danger 
could be feared from themselves, as there certainly could be 
none from the effect of the example on those who should 
remain in bondage:  experience having shown that a 
freedman immediately loses all attachment & sympathy with 
his former fellow slaves.”69 
 
 As I mentioned above, Madison did express a desire to distance 
himself from slavery, at least in his personal life. 
“My wish is if possible to provide a decent & independent 
subsistence, without encountering the difficulties which I 
foresee in that line.  Another of my wishes is to depend as little 
as possible on the labour of slaves.  The difficulty of 
reconciling these views, has brought into my thoughts several 
projects from which advantage seemed attainable.”70 
 
 Nevertheless, he continued to make use of slaves, even when away 
from home, where he had numerous slaves working in various capacities 
on his plantation.  Concerning a slave that had run away, and a slave 
currently in his service, he stated in a letter to his father: 
“The enquiries which I have at different times made of Billey 
concerning Anthony satisfy me that he either knows, or will tell 
nothing of the matter.  It does not appear to me probable 
that all the circumstances mentioned by Anthony with regard 
to his rambles can be true.  Besides other objections which 
occur, there seems to have been scarcely time for all the trips 
which he pretends to have made.  I have not communicated 
to John the suspicions entertained of him.  Whilst he remains 
in my service it will be well for him to suppose that he has my 
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confidence, and that he has a character staked on his good 
behaviour.  He has been very attentive & faithful to me as 
yet, particularly since I left VIrginia.  His misbehaviour in 
Fredericksbg. was followed by some serious reprehensions, & 
threats from me, which have never lost their effect.”71 
 
 One of his reasons for not actively seeking the end of slavery was 
the Union of all the states was more important than ending slavery.  Since 
some states were implacable on the subject of emancipation, he placed 
the maintenance and continuation of the United States as a whole above 
any effort at ending slavery. 
“I should conceive this clause to be impolitic, if it were one of 
those things which could be excluded without encountering 
greater evils.  The southern states would not have entered 
into the union of America, without the temporary permission 
of that trade.  And if they were excluded from the union, the 
consequences might be dreadful to them and to us.”72 
 
Also: 
“Great as the evil is, a dismemberment of the union would be 
worse.  If those states should disunite from the other states, for 
not indulging them in the temporary continuance of this 
traffic, they might solicit and obtain aid from foreign 
powers.”73 
 
 Madison was, however, never actively in favor of extending the 
slave trade any longer than necessary.  Article 1, Section 9 of the 
Constitution, specifically prohibited Congress from outlawing the 
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importation of slaves until 1808, but it did allow Congress to impose a tax 
on such importation in the meantime.  In a speech on the floor of the 
House of Representatives, he said: 
“I conceive the constitution in this particular, was formed in 
order that the government, whilst it was restrained from laying 
a total prohibition, might be able to give some testimony of 
the sense of America, with respect to the African trade.  We 
have liberty to impose a tax or duty upon the importation of 
such persons as any of the states now existing shall think 
proper to admit; and this liberty was granted, I presume, upon 
two considerations - the first was, that until the time arrived 
when they might abolish the importation of slaves, they might 
have an opportunity of evidencing their sentiments, on the 
policy and humanity of such a trade; the other was that they 
might be taxed in due proportion with other articles imported; 
for if the possessor will consider them as property, of course 
they are of value, and ought to be paid for.”74 
 
 And: 
“I do not wish to say anything harsh, to the hearing of 
gentlemen who entertain different sentiments from me, or 
different sentiments from those I represent; but if there is any 
one point in which it is clearly the policy of this nation, so far 
as we constitutionally can, to vary the practice obtaining 
under some of the state governments it is this; therefore, upon 
principle, we ought to discountenance it as far as is in our 
power.”75 
 
 Further, Madison added one of his reasons for opposing the 
continuance of the slave trade, that it would weaken the national security 
of not just the slave states, but of the United States as a whole.  Thus, 
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rather than being a states’ rights issue regarding their internal police, 
further importation of slaves was a threat to the entire United States, and 
given the federal government’s requirement in the Constitution to protect 
each and every state from invasion, this issue became one proper for the 
federal government to take action on.  It would have been interesting to 
see the effect of this if he had been a more public advocate of the effect 
of slavery on national security overriding states’ rights. 
“If I was not afraid of being told that the representatives of 
the several states, are the best able to judge of what is 
proper and conducive to their particular prosperity, I should 
venture to say that it is as much the interest of Georgia and 
South Carolina, as of any in the union.  Every addition they 
receive to their number of slaves, tends to weaken them and 
renders them less capable of self defence; in case of 
hostilities with foreign nations, they will be the means of 
inviting attack instead of repelling invasion.  It is a necessary 
duty of the general government to protect every part of the 
empire against danger, as well internal as external; every 
thing therefore which tends to encrease this danger, though it 
may be a local affair, yet if it involves national expence or 
safety, becomes of concern to every part of the union, and is 
a proper subject for the consideration of those charged with 
the general administration of the government.”76 
 
This is a point both Hamilton and Madison had made during the 
Revolutionary War, and both remembered those lessons learned in their 
later political careers.  As students of the later American Civil War have 
demonstrated, the large slave population was at first a drag on the 
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Confederacy’s war efforts, because so many potential troops had to be 
kept at home rather than on the front lines in order to keep slaves under 
control, but later freed slaves provided essential services, both under arms 
and in other ways, to the Union army.  Clearly, this issue is one on which 
both Hamilton and Madison were prescient, but not in the way either 
expected. 
 Madison did entertain the idea of a more voluntary form of 
emancipation through the settlement of freed slaves in Africa, primarily 
because he did not think people of European descent would ever 
genuinely accept those of African descent.  He simply did not believe 
they could co-exist, in stark contrast to Hamilton.  The only option he ever 
supported, at least in theory, was colonization. 
“Without enquiring into the practicability or the most proper 
means of establishing a Settlement of freed blacks on the 
Coast of Africa, it may be remarked as one motive to the 
benevolent experiment that if such an asylum was provided, 
it might prove a great encouragement to manumission in the 
Southern parts of the U.S. and even afford the best hope yet 
presented of putting an end to the slavery in which not less 
than 600,000 unhappy negroes are now involved.”77 
 
 And: 
“In order to render this change eligible as well to the 
Society as to the Slaves, it would be necessary that a 
compleat incorporation of the latter into the former should 
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result from the act of manumission.  This is rendered impossible 
by the prejudices of the Whites, prejudices which proceeding 
principally from the difference of colour must be considered 
as permanent and insuperable. 
It only remains then that some proper external 
receptacle be provided for the slaves who obtain their liberty.  
The interior wilderness of America, and the Coast of Africa 
seem to present the most obvious alternative.  The former is 
liable to great if not invincible objections.  If the settlement 
were attempted at a considerable distance from the White 
frontier, it would be destroyed by the Savages who have a 
peculiar antipathy to the blacks:  If the attempt were made in 
the neighbourhood of the White Settlements, peace would 
not long be expected to remain between Societies, 
distinguished by such characteristic marks, and retaining the 
feelings inspired by their former relation of oppressors & 
oppressed.  The result then is that an experiment for providing 
such an external establishment for the blacks as might induce 
the humanity of Masters, and by degrees both the humanity 
& policy of the Governments, to forward the abolition of 
slavery in America, ought to be pursued on the Coast of 
Africa or in some other foreign situation.”78 
 
 As I have mentioned above, Madison was equivocal on the issue of 
slavery throughout his life.  He clearly did not approve of slavery itself, but 
was not convinced, as Hamilton was, that it was possible to both end 
slavery and have former slaves live peacefully alongside former slave 
owners and others of European descent.  In contrast to active slave 
advocates, however, he emphatically did not believe slavery to be in any 
way a good influence on society. 
“The Petitions on the subject of Slavery have employed more 
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than a week, and are still before the Committee of the whole.  
The Gentlemen from S. Carolina & Georgia are intemperate 
beyond all example and even all decorum.  They are not 
content with palliating slavery as a deep-rooted abuse, but 
plead for the lawfulness of the African trade itself - nor with 
protesting agst. the object of the Memorials, but lavish the 
most virulent language on the authors of them.  If this folly did 
not reproach the public councils, it ought to excite no regret 
in the patrons of Humanity & freedom.  Nothing could hasten 
more the progress of those reflections & sentiments which are 
secretly undermining the institution which this mistaken zeal is 
laboring to secure agst. the most distant approach of 
danger.”79 
 
 However, Madison also did not think it proper, or possible, for him as 
an elected official to speak out against the institution of slavery as such, 
given the number of his constituents who, like he, owned slaves.  In a letter 
to Robert Pleasants during his time serving in Congress under the Articles 
of Confederation, he stated:   
“The petition relating to the Militia bill contains nothing that 
makes it improper for me to present it.  I shall therefore readily 
comply with your desire on that subject.  I am not satisfied 
that I am equally at liberty with respect to the other petition.  
Animadversions, such as it contains and which the authorized 
object of the petitioners did not require on the slavery existing 
in our country, are supposed by the holders of that species of 
property, to lessen the value by weakening the tenure of it.  
Those from whom I derive my public station are known by me 
to be greatly interested in that species of property, and to 
view the matter in that light.  It would seem that I might be 
chargeable at least with want of candour, if not of fidelity, 
were I to make use of a situation in which their confidence 
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has placed me, to become a volunteer in giving a public 
wound, as they would deem it, to an interest on which they 
set so great a value.”80 
 
 So, what we see from this comparison of Hamilton and Madison on 
the issue of slavery is agreement on the evil of slavery, but wide 
divergence on just what to do about it, given their vastly different 
expectations for whether or not those of European descent could ever 
live peaceably with those of African descent.  Hamilton was again far 
more active in opposing slavery, had essentially an equal view of the 
abilities of blacks versus whites, and continued his efforts from early until 
the end of his life. 
 Madison, on the other hand, while personally deploring slavery, 
never actually took action, either privately or publicly, to oppose the 
institution itself.  He remained a slave owner throughout his life, thought it 
improper to even indirectly associate himself with anti-slavery efforts while 
in political office, and only late in life made even the limited public 
statements regarding slavery that he made.  He just did not think whites 
would ever accept blacks, especially former slaves. 
 This disagreement between Hamilton and Madison is of course 
reflective of the much wider conflict over slavery in the United States, 
which was not resolved until the Civil War ended, and the issue of race 
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relations is one which the United States, like almost every other country, still 
struggles with to this day. 
 As far as their conflicting visions of republicanism, these excerpts 
from the writings of Hamilton and Madison show that, for Hamilton, 
“liberty” meant liberty for everyone, including slaves.  The American 
Revolution was an event Hamilton saw as demanding freedom for all 
Americans, not just those considered “white.”  Hamilton clearly did not 
consider there to be any underlying racial differences of importance 
between blacks and whites, which we saw in his opinion regarding the 
suitability of freed slaves for military service.  Neither better nor worse than 
whites, freed slaves would have been an asset, not a threat to the 
republic.  If nothing else, Hamilton was prescient in arguing that if the 
Americans did not make slaves the offer, the British would.  For Hamilton, 
republicanism did not carry with it any racial component.  Blacks and 
whites were in his estimation equal, and could participate equally in the 
American republic as he envisioned it. 
 Any participation by both free blacks and whites in the American 
republic was, on the other hand, impossible for Madison.  He disliked 
slavery, but made use of slaves throughout his life.  He did not, in contrast 
to some other Founders, ever free his slaves.  Finally, even his belated 
effort of supporting resettling voluntarily freed slaves reflected only his 
unwavering belief that blacks and whites simply could not successfully live 
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together as equals.  For Madison, the American republic did have a racial 
component, whites only, as part of his vision for its success. 
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Chapter Three:  Hamilton and Madison on 
France versus Great Britain 
 
 As I mentioned in discussing the research which has already been 
done on Hamilton and Madison by Elkins and McKitrick in their The Age of 
Federalism, they argue that the later political differences between 
Hamilton and Madison can be explained largely by Hamilton’s Anglophilia 
and Madison’s Anglophobia.  I respectfully disagree, and will argue that 
Hamilton and Madison’s differences in regards to overall foreign policy, 
when each had the opportunity to weigh in on that issue, were not 
attributable to a strong preference by either for the two great powers of 
that time. 
 We will see Hamilton’s focus was on American independence from 
both Great Britain and France, and not on maintaining ties with Great 
Britain at any cost out of some “Anglophilia.”  In each case, when the 
potential of war loomed, first with Great Britain, later with France, he 
counseled the exact same approach:  Prepare for war at home, but first 
try to negotiate a solution before resorting to a declaration of war.  
Hamilton also at first supported the French Revolution, but had doubts all 
along, which were for him confirmed by the Terror and other assorted 
violence, and especially by the execution of Louis XVI.  That did turn him 
away from actively supporting France, but not towards greater support for 
Great Britain in response. 
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 With Madison we will see him of two different minds regarding Great 
Britain and France at various points.  At first, after the Revolution, he did 
clearly favor France, out of both a sense of gratitude for French 
assistance, and also out of a strong antipathy towards Great Britain.  Then, 
when the French Revolution occurred, he did show a continued 
preference for France out of a spirit of worldwide republican revolution.  It 
is only with Napoleon’s takeover that he abandoned France, not in 
preference for Great Britain, but rather towards a much cooler attitude 
towards both countries. 
 The point Elkins and McKitrick argue can be found, attributed in part 
to figures such as Jefferson, in Marshall Smelser’s articles on “The Jacobin 
Phrenzy,” in both its Anglophobic and Gallophobic manifestations during 
the 1790’s.  Ultimately, both sides, including Hamilton and Madison on 
each, were afraid of the influence over the United States of the two great 
powers of the time, France and Great Britain.  Each side suspected the 
other of being too greatly influenced by either France or Great Britain, if 
not in fact traitors plotting to bring the United States under the control of 
their respective patrons. 
 The most influential event leading to this fear by both sides is widely 
regarded to be the French Revolution, with its expansion of the change in 
government to other countries in Europe.  Regarding the attitude 
common amongst Federalists, Smelser writes: 
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“During the first years of the American federal republic, 
Europe was being overrun by French revolutionary forces and 
ideas.  Nation after nation had fallen to the revolutionaries – 
first weakened by propaganda and subversive organizations, 
then subdued by soldiery, finally converted into subordinate 
allies.  Watching these successes, some Americans feared 
that the Atlantic was too narrow to keep revolutionary arms 
and ideology away.  Indeed, the ideology seemed already 
to permeate the country.”81 
 
 Smelser argues this fear amongst Federalists had at least some 
plausibility.  After all, the French revolutionaries had clearly first subverted, 
then taken over other countries.  To those living at that time, this could 
easily seem as a possible future for the United States as well. 
“What they feared might happen here had happened in 
Europe several times – that is, satellite republics (the Batavian, 
Helvetian, and others) had been established in part by 
betrayal to the French from within.  John Quincy Adams and 
others in the foreign service had seen it done and had 
reported in detail to superiors, relatives, and friends.”82 
 
 Jeffersonian Republicans were not immune to this fear, either, 
although their anxiety fixated not on France, especially once it had joined 
the republican revolution movement, but rather Great Britain and the 
specter of aristocracy, monarchy, or both. 
“One group, forming around Jefferson, James Madison, 
James Monroe, Albert Gallatin and like-minded men – now 
called the Republicans – came to suspect that the executive 
officers of government – of the group known as the 
Federalists – were engaged in a vast plot to establish a pro-
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British, tyrannical plutocracy wearing the gaudy cloak of 
monarchy.”83 
 
 Since President Washington himself was beyond direct criticism or 
attack, Smelser states the Jeffersonians’ target was instead Alexander 
Hamilton. 
“By and large the Republicans tried to convince the people 
that the archmiscreant of plutocratic monarchism was the 
Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton.  They could 
not attack Washington.  The President’s popular standing was 
so high and his solid common sense so apparent that the 
leadership of the party concentrated the fire on Hamilton.”84 
 
 Overall, though, the Jeffersonians’ fear, so similar to that of the 
Federalists’, but different in its focus, was grounded on Washington 
Administration policies they perceived as favoring Great Britain over 
France, and thus putting the United States in danger of being, in effect, a 
British satellite. 
“As in the suspected plot to monarchize the country, 
Alexander Hamilton was considered to be the archvillain of 
Anglophilia.  Jefferson had long been recording evidences of 
Hamilton’s pro-British leanings:  opposition to trade 
discriminations against Britain, improper communications with 
the British Minister in Philadelphia, suggestion of a defensive 
treaty of alliance with Britain in 1790, a pro-British position in 
the cabinet discussions at the time of the Neutrality 
Proclamation, a rumor that the British relied more on Hamilton 
than on their resident Minister in the United States – even a 
note of pure fantasy to the effect that asylum in Britain had 
already been arranged for Hamilton in the event of an Anglo-
American war.  Jefferson could not quite believe this last bit 
of ‘derogatory information’ but the remainder of the ‘record’ 
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was sufficient to cause him to doubt Hamilton’s loyalty 
thereafter.”85 
 
 As I mentioned above, though, I disagree with Elkins and McKitrick’s 
argument, and will begin my argument with Hamilton’s views, since as 
Smelser noted he was the centerpiece of the dispute over the feared 
influences of either Great Britain or France, at least according to the 
Jeffersonians. 
 I argue Hamilton had, rather than Anglophilia, a staunch 
commitment to the United States.  His commitment sometimes seems to 
me to be such that only converts to a cause or religion manifest, but that 
can be traced to his birth in the Caribbean rather than in any state.  Thus, 
in comparison with Madison, his credentials as an American were based 
far more on his deeds, rather than simply being part of his identity.  In a 
letter to George Washington during 1783, he stated: 
“We have I fear men <among> us and men in trust who have 
a hankering afte<r> British connection.  We have others 
whose confidence in France savours of credulity.  The 
intrigues of the former and the incautiousness of the latter 
may be both, though in different degrees, injurious to the 
American interests; and make it difficult for prudent men to 
steer a proper course.”86 
 
 So, even before the later conflicts of the 1790’s, Hamilton was 
himself concerned about the possible influence of Great Britain and 
France.  Here, he clearly states his goal is to “steer a proper course,” not 
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as an adherent to either great power, but rather to find an American way 
of proceeding. 
 Further, he was also concerned with European influence in general 
over the United States, and of course wanted to avoid such an 
occurrence.  In another letter to George Washington from 1783, he 
remarked: 
“Your Excellency will before this reaches you have received a 
letter from the Marquis De la Fayette informing you that the 
preliminaries of peace between all the belligerent powers 
have been concluded.  I congratulate your Excellency on this 
happy conclusion of your labours.  It now only remains to 
make solid establishments within to perpetuate our union to 
prevent our being a ball in the hands of European powers 
bandied against each other at their pleasure - in fine to make 
our independence truly a blessing.  This it is to be lamented 
will be an arduous work, for to borrow a figure from 
mechanics, the centrifugal is much stronger than the 
centripetal force in these states - the seeds of disunion much 
more numerous than those of union.”87 
 
 Regarding the French Revolution, Hamilton made it clear in a letter 
to the Marquis de Lafayette during 1789 that he was, at first, quite happy 
with that event, but that he did have fears all along about possible 
outcomes of the Revolution.  He hoped the French would not make too 
many changes, given his assessment of what he considered the French 
“character,” and also what he considered possible, due to his 
understanding of human nature.  Notably, Hamilton also expressed 
concern regarding the influence of French philosophers. 
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“I have seen with a mixture of Pleasure and 
apprehension the Progress of the events which have lately 
taken Place in your Country.  As a friend to mankind and to 
liberty I rejoice in the efforts which you are making to establish 
it while I fear much for the final success of the attempts, for 
the fate of those I esteem who are engaged in it, and for the 
danger in case of success of innovations greater than will 
consist with the real felicity of your Nation.  If your affairs still 
go well, when this reaches you, you will ask why this 
foreboding of ill, when all the appearances have been so 
much in your favor.  I will tell you; I dread disagreements 
among those who are now united (which will be likely to be 
improved by the adverse party) about the nature of your 
constitution; I dread the vehement character of your people, 
whom I fear you may find it more easy to bring on, than to 
keep within Proper bounds, after you have put them in 
motion; I dread the interested refractoriness of your nobles, 
who cannot all be gratified and who may be unwilling to 
submit to the requisite sacrifices.  And I dread the reveries of 
your Philosophic politicians who appear in the moment to 
have great influence and who being mere speculatists may 
aim at more refinement than suits either with human nature or 
the composition of your Nation. 
These my dear Marquis are my apprehensions.  My 
wishes for your personal success and that of the cause of 
liberty are incessant.  Be virtuous amidst the Seductions of 
ambition, and you can hardly in any event be unhappy.”88 
 
 In fact, Hamilton sought parity in trade for the United States with 
both Great Britain and France.  In a letter to Thomas Jefferson during 1791, 
he wrote: 
“I had rather endeavour by a new Treaty of Commerce with 
France to extend reciprocal advantages and fix them on a 
permanent basis.  This would not only be more solid but it 
would perhaps be less likely than apparently gratuitous and 
voluntary exemptions to beget discontents elsewhere; 
especially (as ought to be the case) if each party should be 
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at liberty for equivalent considerations to grant like privileges 
to others.  My commercial system turns very much on giving a 
free course to Trade and cultivating good humour with all the 
world.  And I feel a particular reluctance to hazard any thing 
in the present state of our affairs which may lead to 
commercial warfare with any power; which as far as my 
knowledge of examples extends is commonly productive of 
mutual inconvenience and injury and of dispositions tending 
to a worse kind of warfare.  Exemptions & preferences which 
are not the effect of Treaty are apt to be regarded by those 
who do not partake in them as proofs of an unfriendly temper 
towards them.”89 
   
 For Hamilton, the point, and value, of good relations with Great 
Britain would be the bargaining strength it would give the United States 
with the rest of Europe.  In a letter to Benjamin Goodhue during 1791 he 
mentioned: 
“I would not warrant the issue; but if some liberal 
arrangement with Great Britain should ensue, it will have a 
prodigious effect upon the Conduct of some other parts of 
Europe.  Tis however most wise for us to depend as little as 
possible upon European Caprice & to exert ourselves to the 
utmost to unfold and improve every domestic resource.”90 
  
 In regards to establishing and maintaining a foreign policy based on 
neutrality between warring European powers, Hamilton argued this 
approach would be the best way to retire the Revolutionary War debt as 
fast as possible.  In a letter to George Washington from 1792 he wrote: 
“The public Debt was produced by the late war.  It is not the 
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fault of the present government that it exists; unless it can be 
proved, that public morality and policy do not require of a 
Government an honest provision for its debts.  Whether it is 
greater than can be paid before new causes of adding to it 
will occur is a problem incapable of being solved, but by 
experience; and this would be the case if it were not one 
fourth as much as it is.  If the policy of the Country be 
prudent, cautious and neutral towards foreign nations, there 
is a rational probability, that war may be avoided long 
enough to wipe off the debt.  . . . But whether the public Debt 
shall be extinguished or not within a moderate period 
depends on the temper of the people.  If they are rendered 
dissatisfied by misrepresentations of the measures of the 
government, the Government will be deprived of an efficient 
command of the resources of the community towards 
extinguishing the Debt.  And thus, those who clamour are 
likely to be the principal causes of protracting the existence 
of the debt.”91 
 
 So, far from being based on a preference for relations with Great 
Britain, Hamilton’s policies were aimed at greater strength and stability for 
the United States, in part by paying off its indebtedness as soon as could 
be by staying out of wars as long as possible. 
 Further evidence of Hamilton’s strictly American views can be seen 
in an article he wrote for the Gazette of the United States in 1793. 
“The late War with Great Britain produced three parties 
in the UStates, an English party, a French Party, and an 
American party, if the latter can with propriety be called a 
party.  These parties continue to the present moment.  There 
are persons among us, who appear to be more alive to the 
interests of France, on the one hand, and to those of Great 
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Britain, on the other, than to those of the UStates.  Both these 
dispositions are to be condemned, and will be rejected by 
every true American. 
A dispassionate and virtuous citizen of the UStates will 
scorn to stand on any but purely American ground.  It will be 
his study to render his feeling and affections neutral and 
impartial towards all foreign Nations.  His prayer will be for 
peace, and that his country may be as much as possible kept 
out of the destructive vortex of foreign politics.”92 
 
 In his Defense of the President’s Neutrality Proclamation from May, 
1793, Hamilton first stated what had caused his support for the French 
Revolution to weaken and then disappear.  Also, he indicated again for 
the first time his concern that such “French” influence might even 
negatively affect the United States as well. 
“That zeal for the liberty of mankind, which produced so 
universal a sympathy in the cause of France in the first stages 
of its revolution, and which, it is supposed, has not yet yielded 
to the just reprobation, which a sober temperate and 
humane people, friends of religion, social order, and justice, 
enemies to tumult and massacre, to the wanton and lawless 
shedding of human blood cannot but bestow upon those 
extravagancies excesses and outrages, which have sullied 
and which endanger that cause - that laudable, it is not too 
much to say that holy zeal is intended by every art of 
misrepresentation and deception to be made the instrument 
first of controuling finally of overturning the Government of 
the Union.”93 
 
 When as a result of British attacks on American shipping after the 
outbreak of war with revolutionary France, many called for the United 
States to join the war on France’s side, Hamilton urged President 
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Washington to negotiate first, but also to have the United States prepare 
for war.  Hamilton clearly shows a willingness to go to war if needed, but 
not a desire to avoid war with Great Britain at all costs out of some 
preference for that country.  In a letter to George Washington during 
1794, he argued: 
“A course of accurate observation has impressed on 
my mind a full conviction, that there exist in our councils three 
considerable parties - one decided for preserving peace by 
every effort which shall any way consist with the ultimate 
maintenance of the national honor and rights and disposed 
to cultivate with all nations a friendly understanding - another 
decided for war and resolved to bring it about by every 
expedient which shall not too directly violate the public 
opinion - a third not absolutely desirous of war but solicitious 
at all events to excite and keep alive irritation and ill humour 
between the UStates and Great Britain, not unwilling in the 
pursuit of this object to expose the peace of the country to 
imminent hazards. 
The views of the first party in respect to the questions 
between GBritain and us favour the following course of 
conduct - To take effectual measures of military preparation, 
creating in earnest force and revenue - to vest the President 
with important powers respecting navigation and commerce 
for ulterior contingencies - to endeavour by another effort of 
negotiation confided to hands able to manage it and friendly 
to the object, to obtain reparation for the wrongs we suffer 
and a demarkation of a line of conduct to govern in future - 
to avoid 'till the issue of that experiment all measures of a 
nature to occasion a conflict between the motives which 
might dispose the British Government to do us the justice to 
which we are intitled and the sense of its own dignity - If that 
experiment fails then and not till then to resort to reprisals and 
war.   . . . Prosperous as is truly the situation of this country, 
great as would be the evils of War to it, it would hardly seem 
to admit of a doubt, that no chance for preserving peace 
ought to be lost or diminished, in compliance either with 
resentment or the speculative ideas, which are the 
arguments for a hostile course of conduct. 
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At no moment were the indications of a plan on the 
part of Great Britain to go to War with us sufficiently decisive 
to preclude the hope of averting it by a negotiation 
conducted with prudent energy and seconded by such 
military preparations as should be demonstrative of a 
Resolution eventually to vindicate our rights.  . . . To you, Sir, it 
is unnecessary to urge the extreme precariousness of the 
events of War.  The inference to be drawn is too manifest to 
escape your penetration.  This Country ought not to set itself 
afloat upon an ocean so fluctuating so dangerous and so 
uncertain but in a case of absolute necessity.”94 
 
 Note Hamilton’s main points:  The United States should avoid war if 
possible, but should be ready should there be no other option; Great 
Britain has not itself declared war, and has not shown a clear intention of 
doing so; and finally, war is an extremely uncertain state for any country 
to be in, let alone a young country such as the United States.  His 
concerns do not include maintaining peace with Great Britain at any 
cost, but rather what he conceives the best options for the United States 
to be. 
 He did make his disillusionment with France clear, though, in his work 
The Cause of France, in which he compares the behavior of France’s new 
rulers with that of religious fanatics. 
“The world has been scourged with many fanatical 
sects in religion - who inflamed by a sincere but mistaken zeal 
have perpetuated under the idea of serving God the most 
atrocious crimes.  If we were to call the cause of such men 
the cause of religion, would not every one agree, that it was 
an abuse of terms? 
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The best apology to be made for the terrible scenes (of which 
every new arrival shocks us with the dreadful detail) is the 
supposition, that the ruling party in France is actuated by a 
zeal similar in its nature (though different in its object) to that 
which influences religious fanatics.  Can this political phrenzy 
be dignified with the honorable appellation of the cause of 
Liberty with any greater propriety than the other kind of 
phrenzy would be denominated the cause of religion? 
But even this comparison is too favourable to the ruling 
party in France.  Judging from their acts, we are authorised to 
pronounce the cause in which they are engaged, not the 
cause of Liberty, but the cause of Vice Atheism and 
Anarchy.”95 
   
 Hamilton was clearly one of those who Smelser mentioned as being 
afraid of French influence, and of the United States becoming one of its 
satellites as had several countries in Europe.  In a letter to William Bradford 
in 1795, he complained:  “When shall we cease to consider ourselves as a 
colony to France?”96  He quite clearly did not have such concerns about 
Great Britain, which may very well have contributed to his being 
characterized by his opponents as being in favor of too much influence 
for that country in contrast to France. 
 He was not, though, opposed to at least cordial relations with 
France if possible.  In response to a request from George Washington for 
his thoughts on the recently negotiated Jay Treaty with Great Britain, 
Hamilton argued: 
“But will it give umbrage to France? 
It cannot do it unless France is unreasonable. 
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Because our engagements with her remain unimpaired & 
because she will still be upon as good a footing as Great 
Britain. 
We are in a deplorable situation if we cannot secure 
our peace and promote our own interests by means which 
not only do not de<rogate> from our faith but which leave 
the same advantages to France as to other powers with 
whom we form Treaties.  Equality is all that can be claimed 
from us.”97 
 
 Hamilton is clearly not of the mindset of preferring Great Britain over 
France, at least in commercial matters.  If he had been, he would have 
sought greater trade privileges for Great Britain than France, and there is 
no record of his ever expressing such a desire or goal. 
 When later war with France appeared to be a possibility, Hamilton 
once again advocated policies which mirrored his earlier preferences for 
avoiding war with Great Britain:  preparedness at home, but making every 
possible effort to avoid war first.  He even suggested that any group of 
extraordinary envoys to France include James Madison, whom he had by 
this point known for years to be a critic, in order to show no partiality 
towards Great Britain.  To William Loughton Smith he wrote in 1797: 
“I am clearly of opinion for an extraordinary mission and 
as clearly it should embrace Madison.  I do not think we 
ought to construe the declaration of the Directory against 
receiving a Minister Plenipotentiary as extending to an 
extraordinary mission pro hac vice.  And if it does, it would be 
no reason with me against it.  I would accumulate the proofs 
of French Violence & demonstrate to all our Citizens that 
nothing possible has been omitted.  That a certain party 
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desires it is with me a strong reason for it - since I would disarm 
them of all plea that we have not made every possible effort 
for peace.  The idea is a plausible one that as we sent an 
Envoy Extraordinary to Britain so ought we to send one to 
France.  And plausible ideas are always enough for the 
multitude. 
These and other reasons (and principally to avoid 
Rupture with a political monster with seems destined soon to 
have no Competitor but England) make me even anxious for 
an extraordinary mission.”98 
 
 Again in 1797, Hamilton expressed a desire for, instead of 
preference for either Great Britain or France, a genuinely American way 
of understanding the United States’ standing as regards the various 
European powers.  To George Washington he wrote: 
“We have nothing new here more than our papers contain; 
but are anxiously looking forward to a further development of 
the negotiations in Europe with an ardent desire for general 
accomodation.  It is at the same time agreeable to observe 
that the public mind is adopting more and more sentiments 
truly American and free from foreign tincture.”99 
 
 Hamilton, like Madison, corresponded with the Marquis de 
Lafayette.  It is noteworthy that the Marquis did try to counsel each side in 
the American debate at that time to give each other the benefit of the 
doubt, but neither was willing to listen, unfortunately.  In any case, 
Hamilton did express his views to the Marquis regarding France, its 
revolution, Great Britain, whether or not France was capable of being a 
                                                          
98 Harold C. Syrett, ed., The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, volume XXI:  April 1797 - July 
1798.  New York:  Columbia University Press, 1974, 21. 
99 ibid, 287. 
  
70 
republic like the United States, and the charges against him of 
Anglophilia.  In 1798 he wrote: 
“Your letter implied, as I had before understood, that 
though your engagements did not permit you to follow the 
fortunes of the republic yet your attachments had never 
been separated from them.  In this, I frankly confess, I have 
differed from you.  The suspension of the King and the 
massacre of September (of which events a temporary 
intelligence was received in this Country) cured me of my 
good will for the French Revolution. 
I have never been able to believe that France can 
make a republic and I have believed that the attempt while 
it continues can only produce misfortunes. 
Among the events of this revolution I regret extremely 
the misunderstanding which has taken place between your 
country and ours and which seems to threaten an open 
rupture.  It would be useless to discuss the causes of this state 
of things.  I shall only assure you that a disposition to form an 
intimate connection with Great Britain, which is charged 
upon us forms no part of the real Cause, though it has served 
the purpose of a party to impose its belief of it on france.  I 
give you this assurance on the faith of our former friendship.  
And the effect will prove to you that I am not wrong.  The 
basis of the policy of the party, of which I am, is to avoid 
intimate and exclusive connection with any foreign 
powers.”100 
 
 The case for Madison’s views is much simpler.  Not needing to 
establish himself as a genuine American, having been born and raised in 
Virginia to a prominent family, Madison did not need to make such 
vehement statements of Americanism as did Hamilton.  Nor, however, did 
he display the Francophilia that many attribute to Thomas Jefferson.  As I 
will show below, his attachment to the French Revolution was the product 
of a genuine belief in the overwhelmingly positive benefits to the human 
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race of self-government along republican lines.  When France gave up its 
republican experiment in favor of Napoleon, however, he quickly lost his 
admiration for that country.  Like Hamilton, Madison also reached a 
breaking point regarding events in France. 
 Writing for the National Gazette in 1792, Madison made clear his 
view that the establishment of government through reason, rather than 
force, was the greatest accomplishment of the United States, and also of 
France at that time. 
“In Europe, charters of liberty have been granted by power.  
America has set the example and France has followed it, of 
charters of power granted by liberty.  This revolution in the 
practice of the world, may, with an honest praise, be 
pronounced the most triumphant epoch of its history, and the 
most consoling presage of its happiness.  We look back, 
already, with astonishment, at the daring outrages 
committed by despotism, on the reason and the rights of 
man; We look forward with joy, to the period, when it shall be 
despoiled of all its usurpations, and bound for ever in the 
chains, with which it had loaded its miserable victims.”101 
 
 As I mentioned above, though, once France gave up on 
republicanism, Madison lost his admiration for France.  It became simply 
another foreign country which the United States needed to deal with as 
best it could.  To Thomas Jefferson he wrote in 1800: 
“The spirit manifested in the Senate steadily, & in the other 
House occasionally, however mischevious in its immediate 
effects, cannot fail I think to aid the progress of reflection & 
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change among the people.  In this view our public malady 
may work its own cure, and ultimately rescue the republican 
principle from the imputation brought on it by the 
degeneracy of the public Councils.  Such a demonstration of 
the rectitude & efficacy of popular sentiment, will be the 
more precious, as the late defection of France has left 
America the only Theatre on which true liberty can have a 
fair trial.”102 
 
 Like Hamilton, when it came Madison’s turn to take part in Executive 
branch matters, he also emphasized the desire for the United States to 
involve itself as little as possible in the affairs of Europe.  To Robert 
Livingston he wrote in 1801: 
“Your observations on Neutral rights & the means of 
promoting them are certainly very interesting, & will merit 
consideration.  It is questionable however whether any 
leading arrangements by the U. States during the war, even in 
an eventual form adapted to a state of peace, would be 
free from the danger of entangling us too much in the 
present contests & vicisitudes of Europe; or at least of exciting 
too much the apprehensions of this consequence, among 
our own Citizens.”103 
  
 Further, his ideas regarding dealing with France and Great Britain 
once he was Secretary of State are essentially the same as the advice 
Hamilton provided then-President Washington.  I will come back to this 
later, but I have become convinced the differences between Hamilton 
and Madison, while real, were not as dramatic as each believed.  Both 
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should have followed Lafayette’s advice and given each other the 
benefit of the doubt.  In 1802, Madison wrote to Rufus King: 
“It is I am persuaded the sincere desire of the people of this 
Country, and of every department of its Government, to 
cultivate the most thorough good will, and the most friendly 
commerce with G. Britain; but I do not believe that they will 
purchase either by improper sacrifices. . . . I think with you 
that in our respective stipulations with G.B. & France, it is 
desirable to have them both so shaped as to avoid as much 
as possible collisions between them, which might involve the 
U.S. with one or other of those Nations.”104 
   
 In conclusion, as I stated at the beginning of this chapter, I disagree 
with Elkins and McKitrick’s assessment of the disagreement between 
Hamilton and Madison as stemming from Hamilton’s Anglophilia and 
Madison’s Anglophobia.  I can find no clear statement from either that 
would support that argument.  Rather, what I have found is instead a 
desire by both to establish a clear identity for the nascent United States on 
the world stage, mainly through staying out of the endless conflicts that 
characterized European politics, especially at that time.  
 Hamilton’s view of American republicanism stressed independence 
from all other countries.  He wanted to be a part of creating a unique, 
specifically American, way of acting in the international arena.  For him, it 
was more important for the United States to create an identity separate 
from either of the “superpowers” of the time, Great Britain and France.  
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Especially in his response to the threat he perceived of the United States 
becoming a satellite republic of France, as had happened with the 
Batavian and Helvetic Republics, among others, we see his fear for the 
continued independence of the United States. 
 With Madison we see a much less amount of fear for the 
independence of the United States from France, although he did 
abandon overt support for France in comparison with Great Britain once 
Napoleon took control.  For Madison, there was much less of a pressing 
need for the United States to go out of its way to craft a uniquely 
American approach to dealing with any foreign country.  I argue this is 
due to his, unlike Hamilton, having been a lifelong Virginian and 
American.  He did not have to establish or prove himself worthy of the 
United States.  Madison was much more committed to the idea of 
republicanism as something that could be successfully established in other 
countries than he was a supporter of France.  He did display a strong 
antipathy towards Great Britain, but that did not cause him to abandon 
an idea similar to Hamilton’s, that of the United States involving itself as 
little as possible in the affairs, and especially the wars, of Europe. 
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Chapter Four:  Hamilton and Madison on Constitutional Interpretation 
 
 At the center of Hamilton and Madison’s later conflicts, in spite of 
their earlier collaboration in favor of the Constitution, is precisely their 
varying interpretations of that document, and what powers each thought 
it gave the federal government.  Focus by others has been thus far on 
those disagreements, such as over Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures, 
and also whether or not Publius, in the Federalist, spoke with two different 
voices.  I myself am going to concentrate my efforts elsewhere, because I 
am convinced that, for instance, the Federalist is in many ways not truly 
indicative of either Hamilton or Madison’s essential points of view, being 
written to convince potential convention delegates in New York and 
Virginia to support ratification.  Also, the disagreement which emerged 
over the Report on Manufactures is exactly the sort of conflict I am trying 
to explain the reasons for, so I will not include that here. 
 We will see in the excerpts that follow the very different view 
Hamilton and Madison had all along regarding the issue of Constitutional 
interpretation.  Even before they worked together on The Federalist, they 
had differences of opinion, and my take on why they never discussed this 
or any of the other issues I point to is the extreme time constraints they 
were under while working to write those newspapers articles in support of 
ratifying the Constitution. 
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 With Hamilton we will see his preference for a loose construction, 
because for him one simply cannot spell out all the details regarding 
governmental power in any constitution.  He regarded the issue of how to 
distribute power between the federal and state governments as one of 
“convenience,” rather than of exact definition.  For Hamilton, one simply 
had to set up the governments of the United States on a firm foundation, 
and he thought all one would need thereafter for success would be for 
elected officials to make “prudent” decisions as to how to administer the 
nation as a whole. 
 Madison, however, was very concerned about corruption, about 
the concentration of too much power in any one set of hands.  For him, 
the boundaries between the various branches of the federal government, 
and especially between the federal government and the states, needed 
to be precisely defined in order to prevent overreaching by power-hungry 
individuals bent on tyranny.  He did concede there were ambiguities in 
the Constitution as written, but he thought those were inevitable, and 
would be resolved once and for all before long by the accumulation of 
precedents.  That he reacted so strongly to the decisions made during the 
Washington Administration in carrying out policies preferred by Hamilton 
can be explained by his not wanting “those” precedents to be the way 
Constitutional ambiguities were resolved. 
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 Hamilton clearly showed the point of view which Madison later 
came to loathe during his efforts to secure ratification of the Constitution 
by the state of New York’s convention. 
“It is far from my intention to wound the feelings of any 
gentleman; but I must, in this most interesting discussion, 
speak of things as they are; and hold up opinions in the light 
of which they ought to appear:  and I maintain, that all that 
has been said of corruption, of the purse and the sword, and 
of the danger of giving powers, is not supported by principle 
or fact - That it is mere verbage, and idle declamation.  The 
true principle of government is this - Make the system 
compleat in its structure; give a perfect proportion and 
balance to its parts; and the powers you give it will never 
affect your security.  The question then, of the division of 
powers between the general and state governments, is a 
question of convenience:  It becomes a prudential enquiry, 
what powers are proper to be reversed to the latter; and this 
immediately involves another enquiry into the proper objects 
of the two governments.  This is the criterion, by which we 
shall determine the just distribution of powers.”105 
   
 Corruption was very much on the mind of Madison, whose response 
to Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures included the argument that basing 
actions taken by the federal government on the general welfare of the 
nation would leave the federal government with no limits whatsoever on 
its powers.  But, as we see here, Hamilton was much less concerned with 
corruption, and clearly felt much more comfortable with the power given 
to the federal government.  Especially, though, note his argument that the 
division of powers between the states and the federal government is a 
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“question of convenience.”  This shows the preference we will see in 
further quotes I will include below that Hamilton had for the federal 
government over the states. 
 We see this in Hamilton’s desire for more powerful law enforcement 
in the hands of the federal government.  He bemoaned the federal 
government having to rely on the states to enforce laws.  To George 
Washington he wrote in 1791: 
“It is to be lamented that our system is such as still to leave the 
public peace of the Union at the mercy of each state 
Government.  This is not only the case as it regards direct 
interferences, but as it regards the inability of the National 
Government in many particulars to take those direct 
measures for carrying into execution its views and 
engagements which exigencies require.”106 
 
 Hamilton was genuinely surprised when Madison began to oppose 
his policy proposals as Treasury Secretary.  He had considered Madison to 
have the same preference for federal power over state power, but as we 
have seen this was not really the case.  The Constitution was, by 11 out of 
the 13 states, ratified by 1789.  By 1792, Hamilton and Madison’s conflict 
had become apparent to both.  To Edward Carrington, Hamilton wrote in 
1792: 
“When I accepted the Office, I now hold, it was under 
a full persuasion, that from similarity of thinking, conspiring 
with personal goodwill, I should have the firm support of Mr. 
Madison, in the general course of my administration.  Aware 
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of the intrinsic difficulties of the situation and of the powers of 
Mr. Madison, I do not believe I should have accepted under 
a different supposition. 
I have mentioned the similarity of thinking between that 
Gentleman and myself.  This was relative not merely to the 
general principles of National Policy and Government but to 
the leading points which were likely to constitute questions in 
the administration of the finances.  I mean 1 the expediency 
of funding the debt 2 the inexpediency of discrimination 
between original and present holders 3 The expediency of 
assuming the state Debts.”107 
 
 Not only was this a difference of opinion for either man:  each 
considered the ideas the other had as not only mistaken, but dangerous, 
even bordering on treasonous.  I have mentioned this before, and will 
explore this more fully later, but this is one of the most important aspects of 
their disagreement.  Just like today, neither side in the first political 
conflicts under the Constitution could consider the other side as 
legitimate.  For both, it was their way of understanding the Constitution, 
and no other.  Also to Edward Carrington from 1792: 
“It was not 'till the last session that I became unequivocally 
convinced of the following truth – ‘That Mr. Madison 
cooperating with Mr. Jefferson is at the head of a faction 
decidedly hostile to me and my administration, and actuated 
by views in my judgment subversive of the principles of good 
government and dangerous to the union, peace and 
happiness of the Country.’”108 
 
 One example of Hamilton’s expansive vision for interpreting the 
Constitution, and thus the powers of the federal government, is his plan to 
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fund, and eventually pay off, the Revolutionary War debt.  Hamilton is 
sometimes portrayed as being in favor of a perpetual debt.  That is simply 
mistaken.  His efforts were all focused on paying off that debt, as I have 
already shown in regards to his support for American neutrality between 
France and Great Britain.  Yet more from his letter to Edward Carrington in 
1792: 
“Whatever the original merits of the funding system, 
after having been so solemnly adopted, & after so great a 
transfer of property under it, what would become of the 
Government should it be reversed?  What of the National 
Reputation?  Upon what system of morality can so atrocious a 
doctrine be maintained?  In me, I confess it excites 
indignation & horror! 
What are we to think of those maxims of Government 
by which the power of a Legislature is denied to bind the 
Nation by a Contract in an affair of property for twenty four 
years?  For this is precisely the case of the debt.  What are to 
become of all the legal rights of property, of all charters to 
corporations, nay, of all grants to a man his heirs & assigns for 
ever, if this doctrine be true?  What is the term for which a 
government is in capacity to contract?  Questions might be 
multiplied without end to demonstrate the perniciousness & 
absurdity of such a doctrine. 
In almost all the questions great & small which have 
arisen, since the first session of Congress, Mr. Jefferson & Mr. 
Madison have been found among those who were disposed 
to narrow the Federal authority.  The question of a National 
Bank is one example.”109 
  
 This quote shows another aspect of Hamilton’s concern with giving 
the federal government more power.  He clearly wanted to protect 
                                                          
109 ibid, 437. 
  
81 
property rights, and was afraid of the tendency in the states towards 
negating such rights through debt relief, paper money, etc.  Thus, he 
argued in favor of the above mentioned power to contract for extensive 
periods of time, which of course would bind subsequent administrations, 
Congresses, and even later voters. 
 Hamilton’s underlying reason for interpreting the Constitution as he 
did was his fear that the federal government would not prove strong 
enough to control the states, which would, in his estimation, eventually 
lead to a dissolution of the Union, and perhaps even civil war.  Because of 
his desire for a stronger federal government than, say, Madison wanted, 
some accused him of secretly desiring a return to a monarchical form of 
government.  As Hamilton stated in that letter to Edward Carrington from 
1792: 
“A word on another point.  I am told that serious 
apprehensions are disseminated in your state as to the 
existence of a Monarchical party meditating the destruction 
of State & Republican Government.  If it is possible that so 
absurd an idea can gain ground it is necessary that it should 
be combatted.  I assure you on my private faith and honor as 
a Man that there is not in my judgment a shadow of 
foundation of it.  A very small number of men indeed may 
entertain theories less republican than Mr. Jefferson & Mr. 
Madison; but I am persuaded there is not a Man among 
them who would not regard as both criminal & visionary any 
attempt to subvert the republican system of the Country.  
Most of these men rather fear that it may not justify itself by its 
fruits, than feel a predilection for a different form; and their 
fears are not diminished by the factions & fanatical politics 
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which they find prevailing among a certain set of Gentlemen 
and threatening to disturb the tranquility and order of the 
Government. 
As to the destruction of State Governments, the great 
and real anxiety is to be able to preserve the National from 
the too potent and counteracting influence of those 
Governments.  As to my own political Creed, I give it to you 
with the utmost sincerity.  I am affectionately attached to the 
Republican theory.  I desire above all things to see the 
equality of political rights exclusive of all hereditary distinction 
firmly established by a practical demonstration of its being 
consistent with the order and happiness of society. 
As to State Governments, the prevailing byass of my 
judgment is that if they can be circumscribed within bounds 
consistent with the preservation of the National Government 
they will prove useful and salutary.  If the States were all the 
size of Connecticut, Maryland or New Jersey, I should 
decidedly regard the local Governments as both safe & 
useful.  As the thing is, however, I acknowledge the most 
serious apprehensions that the Government of the U States 
will not be able to maintain itself against their influence.  I see 
that influence already penetrating into the National Councils 
& perverting their direction. 
Hence a disposition on my part towards a liberal 
construction of the powers of the National Government and 
to erect every fence to guard it from depredations, which is, 
in my opinion, consistent with constitutional propriety.”110 
 
 Hamilton and John Adams are often lumped in together as being 
indicative of Federalist Party thought, but there are in fact many 
differences between the two, which no doubt contributed to their conflict 
and eventual break during Adams’ term as President.  Note Hamilton’s 
argument above in favor of republicanism without hereditary distinctions 
                                                          
110 ibid, 443. 
  
83 
and in favor of equality of rights.  In contrast to how many have 
interpreted Adams’ A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the 
United States of America, Hamilton here clearly indicates he does not see 
any need for different orders in society written into the Constitution or law.  
This is yet another example of the fears both Hamilton and Madison had 
regarding the other that obscured their similarities. 
 Another aspect of Hamilton’s view of the proper way to interpret 
the Constitution was his argument that one could never spell out all the 
details necessary for actually carrying governing into practice.  This shows 
why he favored use of notions such as the “general welfare” as warrant 
for the policies he wanted to carry out.  Madison considered this method 
dangerous, though, arguing it would lead to no limits whatsoever on what 
the federal government could do.  Regardless, as Hamilton wrote to 
William Heth in 1791: 
“My opinion is that there is and necessarily must be a 
great number of undefined particulars incident to the general 
duty of every officer, for the requiring of which no special 
warrant is to be found in any law.   . . . What law could ever 
define the details of the duty of a Secretary of the Treasury?  
It is evident these must be an endless variety of things 
unexpressed which are incident to the nature of his station & 
which he is bound in duty to perform at the call of the 
President.  . . . If it be said the law should then require this, I 
answer that the detail would be endless.  And surely it would 
not answer to say in respect to any officer that he must do 
whatever he is required to do.  And if all that he is to do is to 
be defined the Statutes of the United States must be more 
voluminous than those of any Country in the world. 
There is a large chapter of duties between Executive 
Officers which grow out of the Nature of Executive power 
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and which the natural relations of things can alone 
determine.”111 
   
 Thus, neither the Constitution itself, nor even laws, can have all the 
details spelled out in advance according to Hamilton.  It is up to those 
who administer both the laws and the Constitution to provide the vast 
majority of the details.  We have seen this Hamiltonian notion carried out 
in great measure in recent decades by Congress’ delegation to the 
bureaucracy the power to write the actual regulations which provide 
much of the detail for administering laws. 
 Overall, Hamilton’s method of interpreting the Constitution, and thus 
his understanding of the way government officials should act, can be 
accurately characterized by a comment he made to Rufus King in 1798: 
“You know also how widely different the business of 
Government is from the speculation of it, and the energy of 
the imagination, dealing in general propositions, from that of 
execution in detail.”112 
 
 James Madison, on the other hand, had all along some important 
differences from Hamilton in both his understanding of the importance of 
the new Constitution, and how it should be put into practice.  First of all, 
he did not display Hamilton’s tendency towards a radical break with the 
approach to governing under the Articles of Confederation, and he 
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certainly did not entertain as much limitation on the powers of the states.  
To Edmund Randolph, Madison wrote in 1787: 
“I think with you that it will be well to retain as much as 
possible of the old Confederation, tho' I doubt whether it may 
not be best to work the valuable articles into the new System, 
instead of engrafting the latter on the former.  I am also 
perfectly of your opinion that in framing a system, no material 
sacrifices ought to be made to local or temporary prejudices.  
. . .  I hold it for a fundamental point that an individual 
independence of the States, is utterly irreconcileable with the 
idea of an aggregate sovereignty.  I think at the same time 
that a consolidation of the States into one simple republic is 
not less unattainable than it would be inexpedient.  Let it be 
tried then whether any middle ground can be taken which 
will at once support a due supremacy of the national 
authority, and leave in force the local authorities so far as 
they can be subordinately useful.”113 
 
 Even with Madison’s most famous attempt to give power to the 
federal government over the states, that is, his desire for Congress to have 
a veto on state legislation, he conceived of it not as a replacement of the 
states by the federal government, but rather a way of providing stability 
to both governments. 
“Let the national Government be armed with a positive 
& compleat authority in all cases where uniform measures are 
necessary.  As in trade &c. &c.  Let it also retain the powers 
which it now possesses. 
Let it have a negative in all cases whatsoever on the 
Legislative Acts of the States as the K. of G.B. heretofore had.  
This I conceive to be essential and the least possible 
abridgement of the State Sovereignties.  Without such a 
defensive power, every positive power that can be given on 
paper will be unavailing.  It will also give internal stability to 
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the States.  There has been no moment since the peace at 
which the federal assent wd have been given to paper 
money &c. &c.”114 
 
 Notice Madison’s emphasis that the federal government should 
have “compleat authority” only in cases where “uniform measures are 
necessary.”  This is a very different conception of the relationship between 
the federal and state governments than Hamilton had.  Instead of an 
overwhelming fear of the states, Madison argued that only in certain 
areas would they need to be restricted, and power instead given to the 
federal government. 
 The problem of interpreting the Constitution, and thus how to put it 
into effect, was on Madison’s mind from the very first.  He clearly 
understood that it contained many ambiguities, but he thought those 
would be removed over time as more and more precedents were 
established.  We can clearly see here the source of Madison’s concern 
with Hamilton’s policy proposals, as if these became the precedents on 
which later practice was to be based, then a way of understanding the 
Constitution contrary to his own would become the norm.  As he stated in 
1790, ”Among other difficulties, the exposition of the Constitution is 
frequently a copious source, and must continue so until its meaning on all 
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great points shall have been settled by precedents.”115  
 Much more so than Hamilton, Madison all along expressed 
concerns about the federal government becoming too powerful.  
However, his primary fear at the beginning of the new federal 
government was with the power of Congress, no doubt in part because of 
the criticisms he had had of the behavior of state legislatures under the 
Articles of Confederation. 
“In truth the Legislative power is of such a nature that it 
scarcely can be restrained either by the Constitution or by 
itself.  And if the federal Government should lose its proper 
equilibrium within itself, I am persuaded that the effect will 
proceed from the Encroachments of the Legislative 
department.  If the possibility of encroachments on the part 
of the Ex. or the Senate were to be compared, I should 
pronounce the danger to lie rather in the latter than the 
former.”116 
 
 Madison did express some concern over the power of the state 
governments, but specifically in regards to civil rights.  During the debates 
in Congress over the then-proposed amendments to the Constitution 
which became the Bill of Rights, Madison was in favor of extending some 
of the protections therein to restrict the power of the states.  Far before 
the incorporation of the Bill of Rights through the 14th Amendment by the 
Supreme Court, Madison was in favor of limiting the states’ abilities to 
violate certain rights.  When a fellow member of the House of 
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Representatives moved to strike out "No state shall infringe the equal rights 
of conscience, nor the freedom of speech, or of the press, nor of the right 
of trial by jury in criminal cases,” Madison responded with this argument, 
according to the record: 
“Mr. Madison Conceived this to be the most valuable 
amendment on the whole list; if there was any reason to 
restrain the government of the United States from infringing 
upon these essential rights, it was equally necessary that they 
should be secured against the state governments; he thought 
if they provided against the one, it was as necessary to 
provide against the others, and was satisfied that it would be 
equally grateful to the people.”117 
 
 Madison even, in part, agreed with Hamilton’s assessment that one 
could never specify the powers of the federal government in advance 
through the Constitution.  He argued implied powers were inevitable.  In 
response to another House member’s proposal to add the word 
“expressly” just before the word “delegated” in what has become known 
as the 10th Amendment’s phrase where it says, "The powers not delegated 
by this Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively," Madison’s response was: 
“Mr. Madison Objected to this amendment, because it was 
impossible to confine a government to the exercise of express 
powers.  There must necessarily be admitted powers by 
implication, unless the constitution descended to recount 
every minutiae.  He remembered the word "expressly" had 
been moved in the convention of Virginia, by the opponents 
to the ratification, and after full and fair discussion was given 
up by them, and the system allowed to retain its present 
                                                          
117 ibid, 344. 
  
89 
form.”118 
 
 When Hamilton began to propose various measures for actually 
putting the Constitution into practice, however, Madison realized just how 
different his and his former collaborator’s ideas truly were.  As I mentioned 
above with Hamilton, Madison also considered ideas which differed from 
his own as not only being simply mistaken, but as being subversive and 
quite possibly even treasonous.  It is surprising, as many have noted, just 
how quickly individuals that knew each other, and had worked together 
for years and even decades, could so abruptly alter their assessments of 
each other to conclude that each was up to the worst possible things 
they could imagine.  To Henry Lee, Madison wrote in 1792: 
“With respect to the general spirit of the administration you 
already know how far my ideas square with yours.  You know 
also how extremely offensive some particular measures have 
been; & I will frankly own, (though the remark is for yourself 
alone at present) that if they should be followed by the 
usurpation of power recommended in the report on 
manufactures, I shall consider the fundamental & 
characteristic principle of the Govt. as subverted.  It will no 
longer be a Govert. possessing special powers taken from the 
General Mass, but one possessing the genl. mass with special 
powers reserved out of it.  And this change will take place in 
defiance of the true & universal construction, & of the sense in 
which the instrument is known to have been proposed, 
advocated & ratified.  Whether the people of this country will 
submit to a constitution not established by themselves, but 
imposed on them by their rulers, is a problem to be solved by 
the event alone.  It must unquestionably be the wish of all 
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who are friendly to their rights, that their situation should be 
understood by them, & that they should have as fair an 
opportunity as possible of judging for themselves.”119 
 
 Here we see clearly Madison’s essential disagreement with 
Hamilton.  For Madison, the federal government had only the specific 
powers given to it by the Constitution, and not the extensive powers 
proposed by Hamilton.  Now, this is clearly is contrast to his earlier 
statement above that not all the powers of any government could be 
completely specified in advance.  However, I argue Madison’s idea 
regarding implied powers was that the actual powers mentioned in the 
Constitution could not be completely specified in advance, and thus his 
disagreement with Hamilton was that powers not specifically mentioned 
there could not be claimed for the federal government.  They needed to 
be left to, if anywhere, the states.  Note also his argument that there was a 
clear understanding by those who proposed the Constitution regarding 
what it meant.  I will return to this point below. 
 Madison elaborated on this point in a letter to Edmund Pendleton, 
also from 1792: 
“If Congress can do whatever in their discretion can be done 
by money, and will promote the general welfare, the 
Government is no longer a limited one possessing 
enumerated powers, but an indefinite one subject to 
particular exceptions.  It is to be remarked that the phrase out 
of which this doctrine is elaborated, is copied from the old 
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articles of Confederation, where it was always understood as 
nothing more than a general caption to the specified 
powers, and it is a fact that it was preferred in the new 
instrument for that very reason as less liable than any other to 
misconstruction.”120 
 
 Madison claimed many times that Hamilton’s proposals were in 
violation of the understanding those who proposed the Constitution had 
in mind when they created the document, and also that those who 
accepted the Constitution had in mind as well.  This is the main point on 
which I criticize Madison, as I claim this is a classic example of “begging 
the question,” the well-known logical fallacy.  If, as is clear, Hamilton had 
a rather different understanding of that document, and the powers it 
gave the new government, how could Madison claim to speak 
authoritatively for ALL those who had proposed it? 
 For instance, we know, from his own notes taken at the 
Constitutional Convention, that the Constitution was itself the result of 
extensive debate and disagreement.  Many, if not most, proposals that 
were accepted were agreed to only on close votes.  It is clear that even 
the individuals who themselves took part in writing the Constitution had 
different opinions, and this point is further supported by the sides those 
who had attended the Constitutional Convention took during the 
debates of the 1790’s.  One need look no further for examples than 
Hamilton and Madison themselves, although they are far from the only 
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ones. 
 Further, to state that he knew without a doubt how those who had 
accepted the Constitution had conceived of it is even more subject to 
criticism.  Madison himself knew what every member of every state 
convention that accepted the Constitution had in mind when voting in 
favor of it?  This is stretching credulity way beyond what can reasonably 
be expected, as Madison could not have been sure even of the other 
members of Virginia’s ratifying convention, let alone people in other states 
he never even met. 
 This weakness in Madison’s arguments can be most clearly seen in 
his Virginia Resolution, where he went so far as to claim the final say in 
interpreting the Constitution for the individual states.  Where once he had 
wanted: “To give the new system its proper energy it will be desirable to 
have it ratified by the authority of the people, and not merely by that of 
the Legislatures,”121 he altered his argument to claim that the states, and 
not the people, were the partners in the social contract that had created 
the Constitution. 
“That this Assembly doth explicitly and peremptorily declare, 
that it views the powers of the federal government, as 
resulting from the compact to which the states are parties; as 
limited by the plain sense and intention of the instrument 
constituting that compact; as no farther valid than they are 
authorised by the grants enumerated in that compact, and 
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that in case of a deliberate, palpable and dangerous 
exercise of other powers not granted by the said compact, 
the states who are parties thereto have the right, and are in 
duty bound, to interpose for arresting the pro<gress> of the 
evil, and for maintaining within their respective limits, the 
authorities, rights and liberties appertaining to them.”122 
 
 In conclusion, I have argued in this chapter that the disagreements 
which characterized Hamilton and Madison’s later careers, after once 
closely collaborating on the Federalist, occurred because each had, all 
along, distinctly different ideas as to how much power it would be 
necessary to give to the federal government created by the Constitution 
they both worked so hard to create and achieve.  That they were both 
surprised by the disagreements they had once they had secured the 
Constitution shows that there never really has been a single way of 
understanding the role of the Constitution and the federal government in 
the United States, nor has there been a single way of “defining the 
republic.” 
 As regards the issue of republicanism, we once again see just how 
widely different preferences on what a republican government should be 
like can be held by individuals living at the same time and in the same 
country.  For Hamilton, the difficulty in creating the kind of republic that 
could survive was what he saw as the centrifugal influence of the states.  
The states had too much power in his estimation, and people were far 
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more loyal to them than to the United States as a whole.  In order for that 
to succeed, the power of the federal government needed to be 
increased, very specifically taking power, and citizen loyalty, away from 
the states.  States “could” play a useful role in his vision of the United 
States, but their influence needed to be as limited as possible.  One 
specific issue he especially feared state influence on was property rights.  
The states, with their tendencies toward debt relief, paper money, etc., 
would undermine the kind of order he saw as necessary for any human 
society to continue to exist.  Thus, the Constitution needed to be 
interpreted in such ways as to allow the federal government to do the 
many things he saw as necessary for creating a lasting, successful, 
powerful, and especially “great” country. 
 Madison was much less fearful of state power.  Yes, he did see a 
need to give the federal government more power, but he did not see any 
need for a radical break from the principles of the Articles of 
Confederation.  Greater state power and state sovereignty were realities 
he had lived with for far longer than Hamilton, so they posed less of a 
problem in his mind.  All the federal government needed were a few, well-
defined group of powers, in order to assure the success of the federal 
government, and the United States as a whole.  For Madison, the goal 
was the “least possible abridgement of state sovereignties.”  As far as the 
need to resolve Constitutional ambiguities through accumulation of 
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precedent, he preferred a United States where such ambiguities led not 
to greater power for the federal government, but greater assignment of 
certain powers and duties to the state governments.  For Madison, the 
United States was far more a collection of individual states, and an entire 
nation only secondarily.  He saw no reason why such a situation could not 
succeed.  Hamilton, on the other hand, was of the exact opposite 
opinion.  In order to succeed, the United States needed to stress its 
common identity, and not its continued existence as a collection of 
states, where the individual citizen’s primary identification was with their 
state. 
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Chapter Five:  Hamilton and Madison on Religion 
 Hamilton and Madison did not differ greatly in their opinions on 
religion, at least as regards the official role of government.  Madison, as is 
well known, opposed much more openly and consistently, any attempt to 
create or support an official religion for the United States as a whole.  He 
even, as I will show below, wanted to extend the protection of freedom of 
conscience to apply to the states as well, which would have conflicted 
with some state laws at the time. 
 As I have mentioned before, though, my goal in writing this 
dissertation is to show the underlying differences between Hamilton and 
Madison, rather than concentrating specifically the views of either.  That 
sort of work has been done extensively already, and does not need to be 
repeated here.  It is the underlying differences which I argue they had all 
along that led to their eventual political rivalry, and one of the topics on 
which they differed was religion, albeit not as sharply as in other areas. 
 Hamilton did display an underlying religious bent all of his life, far less 
so at the beginning, but nevertheless growing in intensity as he aged.  
There are few references to religion in Hamilton’s early years, but that 
number increased dramatically towards the end of his life.  For Hamilton, 
the importance of religion stemmed from his conviction that it provided a 
sense of order and continuity in life that could be found nowhere else.  
Thus we will see his quite visceral horrified reaction to the atheism of the 
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French Revolution.  That, and the violence I mentioned above in Chapter 
Three, is what turned him away from supporting the French Revolution. 
 Madison did not display any overt religiosity in any of his writings 
throughout his life.  He did, however, show a consistent, and strong, belief, 
in the necessity for religious freedom from any official religion, either in 
Virginia or the United States as a whole.  His was an ongoing suspicion of 
religion, and indeed a great fear of any kind of official religion.  Unlike 
Hamilton, Madison showed no disapproval of the atheism of the French 
Revolution.  It just did not seem to bother him at all.  Religion was just not 
necessary for order in society in his view. 
 One piece of research on Hamilton I do agree shows us an 
important aspect of his thought is Clement Fatovic’s “Reason and 
Experience in Alexander Hamilton’s Science of Politics.  Fatovic argues 
Hamilton followed David Hume in emphasizing the limitations of human 
reason. 
“I argue that even Hamilton’s most far-reaching reforms were 
grounded in a Humean understanding of the limits of human 
rationality in explaining and controlling the world with the kind 
of certainty and mastery sought by many other 
Enlightenment-era thinkers.  The Humean foundations of 
Hamilton’s ‘science of politics’ suggest that an epistemology 
grounded in concrete experience is not necessarily 
committed to the status quo.  In fact, because this science of 
politics is not wedded to any fixed ideas about what works 
best in politics, it can actually be open to significant 
innovation and experimentation.”123 
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 Fatovic includes as part of this argument an early work from 
Hamilton, which I will also discuss below, regarding a hurricane which 
struck the island he was living on.  For Fatovic, this work is indicative of 
Hamilton’s conviction from very early on in his life of the limitations humans 
live with. 
“In one of his earliest writings, an uncharacteristically 
overwrought first-hand account of a deadly hurricane that 
ripped through his native St. Croix, Hamilton exhibited that 
characteristic sensitivity to the contingency of human life that 
would pervade his more mature reflections on politics.  After 
describing the devastation inflicted by the storm in vivid terms 
sure to arouse the imagination, the young West Indian 
reflected on his own smallness and diffidence when 
confronted with so much ‘ruin and confusion on every side.’  . 
. . In calling upon the aid and mercy of God, the frightened 
youth was not simply making a flamboyant display of his 
piety.  He was also expressing a developing awareness of the 
limits of human understanding.”124 
 
 While as I said above, I agree with Fatovic’s view of Hamilton as 
regards the limitations of human reason, the reason I will include the same 
early work of Hamilton’s he discusses is that for me, it will begin the 
presentation of the underlying greater amount of preference for 
Christianity and its importance for supplying meaning and purpose to life I 
am convinced Hamilton had all along.  Madison was not hostile to religion 
as such, but rather he was much less given over to religious sentiments 
than Hamilton, and was far more concerned, due to the established 
church in his home of Virginia, with religious freedom. 
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 Michael J. Rosano focuses more on Hamilton’s overall view of 
human nature, and the effect it had on his political thought. 
“This analysis, by contrast, seeks to understand Hamilton on his 
own terms by interpreting and synthesizing his basic 
observations about human nature so as to define his 
conception of human nature and its vital relation to his 
political thought.  His conception is predominately and even 
radically liberal, but it also reflects key features of Christian 
and classical republican thought.  The relation between those 
conflicting aspects, in effect, defines his thought, reveals its 
assumptions, and poses urgent philosophical, moral, and 
political problems.”125 
 
 Rosano argues Hamilton’s views are the result of a complex mix of 
influences, ultimately fashioned into a unique whole in pursuit of his own 
goals for the United States. 
“The Constitution is a republican solution to complex moral 
and political problems rooted in human nature and displayed 
throughout the history of government.  Hamilton rejects 
classical republican and Christian principles in favor of 
Machiavelli's effectual truth, Hobbes's concept of power, 
Lockean liberty, and his own science of politics. Hamilton's 
liberal conception of human nature as passionately self-
interested grounds his political science. But Hamilton's 
synthesis of alternatives in modern political thought displays its 
limits by depending on nobility and philanthropy. Classical 
and Christian virtues thus infuse his conception of human 
nature and bolster the Republic. Whether the spirits of liberty, 
nobility, philanthropy, and power can continue to harmonize 
as a chorus of the better angels of our nature is an open 
question. Americans have the right to alter their government 
according to the principles that seem likely to secure their 
happiness. But safeguarding the rights of individuals marching 
to the beat of their own drum requires more than vigilance. 
Civic deliberation about the best principles for today in the 
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light of the principles that made government by the 
deliberation and choice of the people possible remains a 
condition of liberty.”126 
 
 As I mentioned above, Madison was not as concerned with religion 
himself throughout his life.  I have read the collected writings of both and 
there just is not the same underlying religiosity with Madison as there is with 
Hamilton.  As we will see, Madison was not horrified by the atheism 
espoused as part of the French Revolution as Hamilton was.  He was, 
however, consistently throughout his life an opponent of official state 
religion, for reasons I will show below. 
 Thomas Lindsay argues, in regards to Madison’s “Memorial and 
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,” that it reflects not only 
Madison’s concern for religious freedom, but also that it shows his hostility 
to religion itself. 
“I argue that the Memorial’s explicit religious appeals are 
better understood as rhetoric than as expressions of 
Madison’s conviction that politics is ‘subordinate’ to God’s 
‘commands.’  Moreover, I find Madison’s thought hostile not 
only to religious establishments (as is well known) but also – 
contrary to the language of the Memorial and to its 
consensus interpretation – hostile, in important aspects, to 
revealed religion itself.”127 
 
 I myself do not find the same hostility to religion itself as Lindsay, but 
the point is Madison just did not express the same kind of faith in 
Christianity that Hamilton had. 
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 Vincent Munoz argues a slightly different point regarding Madison 
on religion than I do.  For him, Madison’s thought on the relationship 
between government and religion is one in which the government is 
supposed to not take any notice of religion or religious belief when 
interacting with citizens. 
“I argue that Madison champions a ‘religion-blind’ 
constitution, a constitution that prohibits the state from taking 
cognizance of religion.  The state, in Madison’s view, may not 
classify citizens on the basis of religious beliefs or religious 
affiliation, which means that the state may neither privilege 
nor penalize religious institutions, religious citizens, or religiously 
motivated conduct as such.”128 
 
 While I do not disagree with Munoz, the point I will make below in 
regards to Madison is in connection with his overall expectation for the 
United States as a whole, not just as to how government treats religion in a 
legal sense. 
 I now turn to the writings of Hamilton and Madison themselves.  As I 
mentioned above, as I have read the writings of both I have found a far 
greater expressed religiosity, albeit in different forms, throughout the 
writings of Hamilton than Madison.  Like so many people, Hamilton did not 
overtly express his religious preferences throughout most of his life.  Rather, 
they were part of his underlying understanding of what existence is like, 
and provided him with a sense of meaning and purpose for life itself.  This 
greater religiosity can clearly be seen in the first excerpts from Hamilton’s 
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works, a reflection following a hurricane which struck St. Croix, published in 
The Royal Danish American Gazette on September 6, 1772. 
“Let the Earth rend. Let the planets forsake their course. 
Let the Sun be extinguished and the Heavens burst asunder. 
Yet what have I to dread? My staff can never be broken—in 
Omnip[o]tence I trusted. 
He who gave the winds to blow, and the lightnings to 
rage—even him have I always loved and served. His precepts 
have I observed. His commandments have I obeyed—and his 
perfections have I adored. He will snatch me from ruin. He will 
exalt me to the fellowship of Angels and Seraphs, and to the 
fullness of never ending joys.” 129 
 
And: 
 
“Our distressed, helpless condition taught us humility 
and contempt of ourselves. The horrors of the night, the 
prospect of an immediate, cruel death—or, as one may say, 
of being crushed by the Almighty in his anger—filled us with 
terror. And every thing that had tended to weaken our 
interest with him, upbraided us in the strongest colours, with 
our baseness and folly. That which, in a calm unruffled 
temper, we call a natural cause, seemed then like the 
correction of the Deity. Our imagination represented him as 
an incensed master, executing vengeance on the crimes of 
his servants. The father and benefactor were forgot, and in 
that view, a consciousness of our guilt filled us with despair. 
But see, the Lord relents. He hears our prayer. The 
Lightning ceases. The winds are appeased. The warring 
elements are reconciled and all things promise peace. The 
darkness is dispell’d and drooping nature revives at the 
approaching dawn. Look back Oh! my soul, look back and 
tremble. Rejoice at thy deliverance, and humble thyself in the 
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presence of thy deliverer. “130 
  
 As I mentioned above, Hamilton was not an overtly religious person 
throughout most of his life, but one can see again and again the sort of 
religious references with him that one simply does not find with Madison.  
The event which does seem to have aroused his greatest amount of 
reflection on the importance of religion was the French Revolution.  
Hamilton was horrified by not only the violence and bloodshed which took 
place, but also by the proclamations of atheism that were prominent 
amongst those who led the Revolution.  In a letter to an unknown 
correspondent from 1793, Hamilton expressed this negative, indeed 
visceral, reaction regarding this French undermining of the importance of 
religion. 
“The cause of France is compared with that of America 
during its late revolution. Would to Heaven that the 
comparison were just. Would to heaven that we could 
discern in the Mirror of French affairs, the same humanity, the 
same decorum, the same gravity, the same order, the same 
dignity, the same solemnity, which distinguished the course of 
the American Revolution. Clouds & Darkness would not then 
rest upon the issue as they now do.”131 
   
And: 
 
“When I find the doctrines of Atheism openly 
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advanced in the Convention and heared with loud 
applauses—When I see the sword of fanaticism extended to 
force a political creed upon citizens who were invited to 
submit to the arms of France as the harbingers of Liberty—
When I behold the hand of Rapacity outstretched to 
prostrate and ravish the monuments of religious worship 
erected by those citizens and their ancestors. When I 
perceive passion tumult and violence usurping those seats, 
where reason and cool deliberation ought to preside— 
I acknowlege, that I am glad to believe, there is no real 
resemblance between what was the cause of America & 
what is the cause of France—that the difference is no less 
great than that between Liberty & Licentiousness. I regret 
whatever has a tendency to confound them, and I feel 
anxious, as an American, that the ebullitions of inconsiderate 
men among us may not tend to involve our Reputation in the 
issue.”132  
  
 One sees here Hamilton’s connection of religion with social order 
and reason.  Now, as I will argue below, Hamilton did not argue for any 
sort of official religion on the part of the United States, but rather for an 
ongoing understanding of, and reference to, religion as part of even 
official government activity.  He was not exclusionary in terms of which 
specific religion, or at least we have no evidence of that, but rather he 
equated atheism, that is, a lack of religion, especially Christianity, as part 
of public life, with chaos and barbarism. 
 Further evidence of his rejection of the French Revolution comes 
from an essay he wrote regarding “The War in Europe” in 1796.  For 
Hamilton, Christianity had reduced the level of violence and destruction 
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practiced in early wars, such as those fought by the Roman Empire.  For 
him, French rejection of Christianity was tantamount to a return to Roman 
barbarism and destruction. 
“Every step of the progress of the present war in Europe 
has been marked with horrors. If the perpetration of them was 
confined to those who are the acknowleged instruments of 
despotic Power, it would excite less surprize—but when they 
are acted by those who profess themselves to be the 
Champions of the rights of man, they naturally occasion both 
wonder and regret. Passing by the extreme severities which 
the French have exercised in Italy, what shall we think of the 
following declaration of Jourdan to the inhabitants of 
Germany 
Good God! is it then a crime for men to defend their 
own Government and Country? Is it a punishable offence in 
the Germans that they will not accept from the French what 
they offer as liberty, at the point of the bayonet? This is to 
confound all ideas of morality and humanity; it is to trample 
upon all the rights of man and nations. It is to restore the ages 
of Barbarism. According to the laws and practice of modern 
war, the peasantry of a Country, if they remain peaceably at 
home, are protected from other harm than a contribution to 
the necessities of the invading army. Those who join the 
armies of their Country and fight with them are considered 
and treated as other soldiers. But the present French Doctrine 
is, that they are to be treated as Rebels and Criminals. 
German patriotism is a heinous offence in the eyes of French 
Patriots. How are we to solve this otherwise than by observing 
that the French are influenced by the same spirit of 
Domination which governed the antient Romans! These 
considered themselves as having a right to be the Masters of 
the World and to treat the rest of mankind as their vassals. 
How clearly is it proved <by> all <–> that the praise of a 
<–> world is justly due to Christianity. War, by the influence of 
the humane principles of that Religion, had been stripped of 
half its terrors. The French renounce christianity & they relapse 
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into Barbarism. War resumes the same hideous and savage 
form, which it wore in the ages of Roman and Gothic 
Violence.”133  
  
 Hamilton was far more comfortable with official public events 
involving religion than Madison.  He even went so far to advocate, on 
more than one occasion, public proclamations and displays by 
government officials as a means of expressing, or at least trying to 
influence, the overall sense of the public will.  When the French Directory 
refused to receive Charles Cotesworth Pinckney in 1797, Hamilton wrote to 
Timothy Pickering what he thought the United States should do. 
“It is now ascertained that Mr Pinckney has been 
refused and with circumstances of indignity. What is to be 
done? The share I have had in the public administration 
added to my interest as a Citizen make me extremely anxious 
that at this delicate Crisis a course of conduct exactly proper 
may be adopted. I offer to your consideration without 
ceremony what appears to me such a course. 
First. I would appoint a day of humiliation and prayer. In 
such a crisis this appears to me proper in itself and it will be 
politically useful to impress our nation that there is a serious 
state of things—to strengthen religious ideas in a contest 
which in its progress may require that our people may 
consider themselves as the defenders of their Country against 
Atheism conquest & anarchy. It is far from evident to me that 
the progress of the war may not call on us to defend our fire 
sides & our altars. And any plan which does not look forward 
to this as possible will in my opinion be a superficial one.”134 
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 In his speech writing duties for President Washington, Hamilton also 
displayed his comfort with a public role for the President in 
acknowledging and even promoting religiosity among American citizens.  
Below is a draft he wrote for President Washington in 1795.  Note how 
Hamilton argues the United States should specifically be grateful to God 
for its favorable situation.  For Hamilton, it is God’s good will towards the 
United States that is responsible for the nation’s well-being, and thus the 
nation as a whole should publicly give thanks.  However, note the lack 
reference to any one kind of religion.  It is simply that religious groups are 
“recommended,” not commanded, to take part on a specific day. 
“Amidst the calamities which afflict so many other nations 
[and trouble the sources of individual quiet security and 
happiness,] the present condition of the UStates affords much 
matter of consolation and satisfaction. Our exemption hitherto 
from the evils of foreign war, an increasing prospect of the 
continuance of that precious exemption—the great degree of 
internal tranquillity we have enjoyed, the recent confirmation 
of that tranquillity by the suppression of an insurrection which 
so wantonly threatened it—the happy course of our public 
affairs in general—the unexampled prosperity of all classes of 
our citizens—are circumstances which peculiarly mark our 
situation with [peculiar] indications of the Divine beneficence 
towards us. In such a state of things it becomes us in an 
especial manner as a People, with devout reverence and 
affectionate gratitude to bow down before the Majesty of the 
Almighty to acknowlege our numerous obligations to him & to 
implore under a deep sense of his past goodness a 
continuance and confirmation of the blessings we experience. 
Deeply penetrated with this sentiment I George Washington 
President of the Ustates do recommend to all religious 
societies and denominations and to all persons whomsoever 
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within the U States to set apart and observe Thursday the 19th 
day of Feby next as a day of public thanksgiving and prayer 
and on that day to meet together & render their sincere and 
hearty thanks to the Great Ruler of Nations, for the manifold 
and signal mercies which distinguish our lot as a Nation; 
particularly for the possession of Constitutions of Government 
which unite & by their union establish Liberty with Order for the 
preservation of our peace foreign and domestic, for the 
seasonable check which has been given to a spirit of disorder 
in the suppression of the late Insurrection, and generally for the 
prosperous course of our affairs public and private; and at the 
same time humbly and fervently to beseech the kind Author of 
these blessings graciously to prolong them to us—to imprint on 
our hearts a deep and solemn sense of our obligations to him 
for them—to teach us rightly to estimate their immense 
value—to preserve us from the wantonness of prosperity, from 
jeopardizing the advantages we enjoy by culpable or delusive 
projects—to dispose us to merit the continuance of his favours, 
by not abusing them, by our gratitude for them, and by a 
correspondent conduct as citizens and as men to render this 
country more & more a secure & propitious asylum for the 
unfortunate of other countries—to diffuse among us true & 
useful knowlege to diffuse and establish habits of sobriety, 
order, morality and Piety and finally to impart all the blessings 
we possess or ask for ourselves to the whole family of Mankind, 
that so Men may be happy & God glorified throughout the 
Earth.”135 
 
 Even Hamilton’s sense of public duty, and I argue even the quest for 
fame that Douglass Adair and Martin Harvey noted,136 was in part 
motivated by his conviction of the absolute importance of religion for 
                                                          
135 Harold C. Syrett, ed., and Jacob E. Cooke, assoc. ed., The Papers of Alexander 
Hamilton, volume XVIII:  January 1795 - July 1795.  New York:  Columbia University Press, 
1973, 2-3. 
136 Douglass Adair and Martin Harvey, “Was Alexander Hamilton a Christian Statesman?” 
The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series 12, No. 2 (1955), 308-329. 
  
109 
organized civil society.  Without it, society would fall apart, in his 
estimation.  This is why, to the end of his life, he refrained from intentionally 
engaging in public behavior which might disqualify him for public service.  
I say “intentionally” because I am convinced his public letter attacking 
President John Adams was a blunder he did not fully appreciate the 
effect of until after he had issued it.  Prior to that, though, including during 
the Quasi-War era, his thoughts explicitly included the need to keep 
himself available for public service, in part to defend religion.  In 1795, he 
wrote to Robert Troup: 
“Because there must be some public fools who 
sacrifice private to public interest at the certainty of 
ingratitude and obloquy—because my vanity whispers I 
ought to be one of those fools and ought to keep myself in a 
situation the best calculated to render service—because I 
dont want to be rich and if I cannot live in splendor in Town, 
with a moderate fortune moderately acquired, I can at least 
live in comfort in the country and I am content to do so.b  . . .  
The game to be played may be a most important one. 
It may be for nothing less than true liberty, property, order, 
religion and of course heads. I will try Troupe if possible to 
guard yours & mine.  . . .  
You are good enough to offer to stand between me 
and ostensibility. I thank you with all my soul. You cannot 
doubt that I should have implicit confidence in you but it has 
been the rule of my life to do nothing for my own emolument 
under<cover—what> I would not promulge I would avoid. This 
may be too great refinement. I know it is pride. But this pride 
makes it part of my plan to appear truly what I am.  . . .  
God bless you. Always Affectionately Yrs.137” 
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 Note how Hamilton equates “true liberty” with not only “property,” 
but also “order, religion,” and even “heads.”  For Hamilton, his lifelong 
religiosity manifested itself in a conviction that disavowal of religion and 
religiosity by any nation was a recipe for disaster.  Note also his use of 
“God bless you,” something one simply does not find anywhere near as 
often with Madison.   
 Even more clear evidence of Hamilton’s connection of the French 
Revolution with chaos because of the violence and rejection of 
Christianity came during the Quasi-War, and Hamilton’s published series of 
articles entitled, “The Stand.”  In number 3, written in 1798, he says: 
“In reviewing the disgusting spectacle of the French 
revolution, it is difficult to avert the eye entirely from those 
features of it which betray a plan to disorganize the human 
mind itself, as well as to undermine the venerable pillars that 
support the edifice of civilized society. The attempt by the 
rulers of a nation to destroy all religious opinion, and to 
pervert a whole people to Atheism, is a phenomenon of 
profligacy reserved to consummate the infamy of the 
unprincipled reformers of France. The proofs of this terrible 
design are numerous and convincing. 
The animosity to the Christian system is demonstrated 
by the single fact of the ridiculous and impolitic establishment 
of the decades, with the evident object of supplanting the 
Christian Sabbath. The inscription by public authority on the 
tombs of the deceased, affirming death to be an eternal 
sleep, witness the desire to discredit the belief of the 
immortality of the soul. The open profession of Atheism in the 
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Convention, received with acclamations; the honorable 
mention on its journals of a book professing to prove the 
nothingness of all religion;† the institution of a festival to offer 
public worship to a courtezan decorated with the pompous 
[title] of “Goddess of Reason;” the congratulatory reception 
of impious children appearing in the hall of the Convention to 
lisp blasphemy against the King of Kings; are among the 
dreadful proofs of a conspiracy to establish Atheism on the 
ruins of Christianity—to deprive mankind of its best 
consolations and most animating hopes—and to make a 
gloomy desert of the universe.”138  
  
 As I mentioned above, though, even while stressing the importance 
of religion for civilized society, Hamilton did not show any strong 
preference for one form of religion over another, at least as far as public 
policy was concerned.  His statements show a marked preference for 
religiosity among the citizenry, but not any kind of bigotry within the forms 
of organized religion.  While not his own words, a letter written in 1794 from 
his sister-in-law Angelica shows a type of open-mindedness towards an 
otherwise quite unpopular, in England, variant of Christianity, Unitarianism.  
This, by the way, is a point of agreement between Hamilton and Madison, 
as we will see below. 
“You will have the pleasure to receive this letter by Dr. 
Priestly, a man dear to virtue and to science. Without the 
advantage and satisfaction of his acquaintance, I revere him 
for his works, and take a particular interest that he should be 
well received in America. That happy country which seems 
reserved by Providence as an Assylum from the crimes and 
persecutions which make Europe the pity and disgrace of the 
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age. 
You my dear Brother will receive with distinguished 
kindness this worthy stranger, (if he whose breast teems with 
the love of mankind may anywhere be called a stranger) 
and make our country so dear to him as to cause him to 
forget that which he leaves at an advanced period of Life 
and which he has most ably served.”139 
 
 Hamilton further emphasized the importance of religion during his 
service as Inspector General for the Army.  At first, he did not think 
Congress had authorized chaplains, and so wrote the Secretary of War to 
recommend Congress add them. 
“There is no provision in the law for Chaplains. I am 
nevertheless deeply impressed with the importance of divine 
service among the troops, and have written on the subject to 
the S of War.”140  
  
 However, later, he did discover that Congress had authorized 
chaplains, and expressed the importance of filling these positions, not 
merely because he was simply carrying out the will of Congress, but also 
because he himself considered provision for religion as important even in 
the military. 
“Application has been made to me on the Subject of 
Chaplains. I find by recurrence to the laws that four of these 
characters are provided for. This will furnish one to each 
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brigade. I doubt not you will feel with me strong motives 
which recommend the speedily going into these 
appointments. The Revd. Mr. Hill has been proposed by Col. 
Parker and I now offer him to you as a Candidate. It appears 
from the letter of Col. Parker that this Gentleman has been 
officiating in the character of Chaplain for some time.”141  
  
 Hamilton did consider there to be some limits on what kind of 
religion would be appropriate.  In a letter to William S. Smith in 1800, he 
objected to a potential chaplain candidate due to that individual’s 
“enthusiasm.”  This is quite similar to his objection to the French Revolution 
as having gone out of control due to excessive human emotion. 
“I can not say any thing relative to the claim of Captain 
White, having never been able to obtain from the S of War a 
definitive rule on the subject. I have just renewed my 
application relative to the point. The result as soon as known 
shall be communicated to you. Enthusiasm is certainly a very 
good thing, but religious enthusiasm is at least a dangerous 
instrument. From this, and some other circumstances which 
have come to my knowledge, I must decline authorizing you 
to employ the person you mention.”142 
 
 But when George Washington died, in addition to the military 
honors one would expect an Inspector General would arrange for a 
former President and Commanding General, Hamilton specifically wanted 
to include the services of a minister.  To William North he wrote: 
“I enclose to you some regulations relative to the 
funeral honors to be paid to our departed chief. They will 
govern generally in the celebration, altho’ I have not 
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definitively adopted them. 
The ceremonies will be performed in this city on 
Thursday next, and I should wish them to be performed in 
New York at the same time. If this is practicable you will 
immediately make the necessary arrangements for the 
purpose. You will draw the companies from the island, leaving 
only a sufficient number of men to manage the guard and 
concert measures with General Clarkson for bringing forward 
the uniform corps of volunteers and militia to take part in the 
scene. It will be proper likewise that the city should form part 
of the procession, and you will do what shall appear to you 
proper in reference to that idea. The half hour guns will be 
fired on the island, and the minute guns from the battery. The 
time is not sufficient for preparing a regular oration, but I 
should be happy if you could prevail on Doctor Moore or 
some other Clergyman to deliver a discourse suited to the 
occasion.”143 
 
 It is in his private life, though, that one can most clearly see his 
religious sentiments expressed, and just how important they were for his 
life, even if he did not express them publicly.  His letters to his wife, 
Elizabeth, are especially full of the religious expressions which simply do 
not occur in similar letters by Madison.  In 1797, his father-in-law, Philip 
Schuyler, had a bout of ill health, and so Hamilton wrote to her: 
“I pray you, don’t alarm yourself for you know how dangerous 
it will be in your situation and how much it is a duty should his 
case ever take a worse turn than we now apprehend to arm 
ourselves with Christian fortitude and resignation.”144 
 
 Also in 1797, when his eldest son Philip also was in bad health, he 
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wrote: 
“I am arrived here My Dear Eliza in good health but very 
anxious about my Dear Philip. I pray heaven to restore him 
and in every event to support you.  . . . God bless my beloved 
and all My Dear Children.”145 
 
 One essential aspect of Hamilton’s religious beliefs, already 
mentioned in regards to the negative influence he believed the French 
Revolution’s emphasis on atheism would have on civilization, is the belief 
in an afterlife, which he clearly considered provided not only meaning 
and purpose, but also comfort and consolation, to human life. After one 
of his wife’s sisters died in 1801, he wrote to Elizabeth: 
“On Saturday, My Dear Eliza, your sister took leave of 
her sufferings and friends, I trust, to find repose and happiness 
in a better country. 
Viewing all that she had endured for so long a time, I 
could not but feel a relief in the termination of the scene. She 
was sensible to the last and resigned to the important 
change. 
Your father and mother are now calm. All is as well as it 
can be; except the dreadful ceremonies which custom 
seems to have imposed as indispensable in this pla<ce>, and 
which at every instant open anew the closing wounds of 
bleeding hearts. Tomorrow the funeral takes place. The day 
after I hope to set sail for N York. 
I long to come to console and comfort you my darling 
Betsey. Adieu my sweet angel. Remember the duty of 
Christian Resignation.   Ever Yrs.”146 
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 This idea of “Christian resignation” was one he used again and 
again in his correspondence with Elizabeth Hamilton.  It is an aspect of his 
religiosity that appeared well before his son Philip was killed in a duel in 
1801, but was clearly evident in his letters to people from whom he had 
received condolences after Philip’s death.  To John Dickinson he wrote: 
“I was not, My Dear Sir, insensible to the kind attention 
shewn me by your letter of the 30th. of November last. But till 
very lately the subject has been so extremely painful to me, 
that I have been under a necessity of flying from it as much 
as possible. Time and effort and occupation have at length 
restored the tranquillity of my mind, sufficiently to permit me 
to acknowlege the kindness of those friends who were good 
enough to manifest their sympathy in my misfortune. 
Be assured, Sir, that consolation from you on such an 
occasion was particularly welcome to me, and that I shall 
always remember it with a grateful sense. The friendship of 
the wise and good rises in value, in proportion as we learn to 
form a just estimate of human character and opinion. 
That estimate too has a tendency to reconcile us to the 
departure of those, who are dear to us, from a world, which 
holds out to virtue many snares, few very few supports or 
recompences. I do assure you, Sir, that as soon as the calm of 
Reason returned, this consideration had no small influence in 
disposing me to resign, with diminished regret, the eldest and 
brightest hope of my family. Happy those who deduce from it 
motives to seek in earnest a higher, and far more substantial, 
bliss, than can ever be found in this chequered, this ever 
varying scene!”147 
 
To Benjamin Rush he wrote, also on March 29, 1802: 
 
“I felt all the weight of the obligation which I owed to 
you and to your amiable family, for the tender concern they 
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manifested in an event, beyond comparison, the most 
afflicting of my life. But I was obliged to wait for a moment of 
greater calm, to express my sense of the kindness. 
My loss is indeed great. The highest as well as the eldest 
hope of my family has been taken from me. You estimated 
him rightly—He was truly a fine youth. But why should I repine? 
It was the will of heaven; and he is now out of the reach of 
the seductions and calamities of a world, full of folly, full of 
vice, full of danger—of least value in proportion as it is best 
known. I firmly trust also that he has safely reached the haven 
of eternal repose and felicity. 
You will easily imagine that every memorial of the 
goodness of his heart must be precious to me. You allude to 
one recorded in a letter to your son. If no special reasons 
forbid it, I should be very glad to have a copy of that 
letter.”148 
 
 Among those few expressions of his religious beliefs that we have in 
his papers to anyone other than immediate family, is his letter to Martha 
Washington after George Washington’s death. 
“I did not thing it proper, Madam, to intrude amidst the 
first effusions of your grief. But I can no longer restrain my 
sensibility from conveying to you an imperfect expression of 
my affectionate sympathy in the sorrows you experience. No 
one, better than myself, knows the greatness of your loss, or 
how much your excellent heart is formed to feel it in all its 
extent. Satisfied that you cannot receive consolation, I will 
attempt to offer none. Resignation to the will of Heaven, 
which the practice of your life ensures, can alone alleviate 
the sufferings of so heart-rending an affliction. 
There can be few, who equally with me participate in 
the loss you deplore. In expressing this sentiment, I may 
without impropriety allude to the numerous and distinguished 
marks of confidence and friendship, of which you have 
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yourself been a Witness; but I cannot say in how many ways 
the continuance of that confidence and friendship was 
necessary to me in future relations. 
Vain, however, are regrets. From a calamity, which is 
common to a mourning nation, who can expect to be 
exempt? Perhaps it is even a privilege to have a claim to a 
larger portion of it than others.”149 
 
 Even when faced with possible death, Hamilton expressed how he 
intended to behave based on his Christian beliefs.  Now, the expressions 
he made did show a difference in the preparations he made and the 
sentiments he recorded between his upcoming duel with Aaron Burr and 
the earlier preparations he had made for other possible duels.  One of 
Hamilton’s flaws, perhaps his greatest, was his extraordinary concern for 
his personal honor.  It is only a guess to say they were based on his family 
background (parents of uncertain marriage status), and lack of 
established family connections, but nevertheless the concern was there.  
We have several incidents recorded amongst his own papers where he 
felt the possibility of fighting a duel was his only choice.  However, it is only 
with the last, his duel with Burr, that we have any strong religious 
sentiments tied directly to the upcoming event. 
 In a statement regarding the upcoming “interview,” Hamilton wrote 
he was not eager to participate, due to the possibility of harming another 
human being, which he deplored due to his Christian beliefs. 
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“My religious and moral principles are strongly opposed to the 
practice of Duelling, and it would even give me pain to be 
obliged to shed the blood of a fellow creature in a private 
combat forbidden by the laws.”150 
 
To Elizabeth Hamilton he wrote: 
“This letter, my very dear Eliza, will not be delivered to 
you, unless I shall first have terminated my earthly career; to 
begin, as I humbly hope from redeeming grace and divine 
mercy, a happy immortality. 
If it had been possible for me to have avoided the 
interview, my love for you and my precious children would 
have been alone a decisive motive. But it was not possible, 
without sacrifices which would have rendered me unworthy 
of your esteem. I need not tell you of the pangs I feel, from 
the idea of quitting you and exposing you to the anguish 
which I know you would feel. Nor could I dwell on the topic 
lest it should unman me. 
The consolations of Religion, my beloved, can alone 
support you; and these you have a right to enjoy. Fly to the 
bosom of your God and be comforted. With my last idea; I 
shall cherish the sweet hope of meeting you in a better 
world.”151 
 
 When, after the duel, Hamilton realized he was a dying man, his 
thoughts were of making a final expression of his religious beliefs.  As is well 
known, he requested two different clergymen to give him communion as 
a final statement regarding his beliefs.  I am including Benjamin Moore’s 
statement to William Coleman so as to provide documentation of 
Hamilton’s deep-seated beliefs.  Much as the statement of a dying person 
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is taken quite seriously in the law, Hamilton’s intention at this point of his life 
shows the intensity of his beliefs. 
“Mr. Coleman, 
The public mind being extremely agitated by the melancholy 
fate of that great man, Alexander Hamilton, I have thought it 
would be grateful to my fellow-citizens, would provide against 
misrepresentation, and, perhaps, be conducive to the 
advancement of the cause of religion, were I to give a 
narrative of some facts which have fallen under my own 
observation, during the time which elapsed between the 
fatal duel and his departure out of this world. 
Yesterday morning, immediately after he was brought 
from Hoboken to the house of Mr. Bayard, at Greenwich, a 
message was sent informing me of the sad event, 
accompanied by a request from General Hamilton, that I 
would come to him for the purpose of administering the holy 
communion. I went; but being desirous to afford time for 
serious reflection, and conceiving that under existing 
circumstances, it would be right and proper to avoid every 
appearance of precipitancy in performing one of the most 
solemn offices of our religion, I did not then comply with his 
desire. At one o’clock I was again called on to visit him. Upon 
my entering the room and approaching his bed, with the 
utmost calmness and composure he said, ‘My dear Sir, you 
perceive my unfortunate situation, and no doubt have been 
made acquainted with the circumstances which led to it. It is 
my desire to receive the communion at your hands. I hope 
you will not conceive there is any impropriety in my request.’ 
He added, ‘It has for some time past been the wish of my 
heart, and it was my intention to take an early opportunity of 
uniting myself to the church, by the reception of that holy 
ordinance.’ I observed to him, that he must be very sensible 
of the delicate and trying situation in which I was then 
placed; that however desirous I might be to afford 
consolation to a fellow mortal in distress; still, it was my duty as 
a minister of the gospel, to hold up the law of God as 
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paramount to all other law; and that, therefore, under the 
influence of such sentiments, I must unequivocally condemn 
the practice which had brought him to his present unhappy 
condition. He acknowledged the propriety of these 
sentiments, and declared that he viewed the late transaction 
with sorrow and contrition. I then asked him, ‘Should it please 
God, to restore you to health, Sir, will you never be again 
engaged in a similar transaction? and will you employ all your 
influence in society to discountenance this barbarous 
custom?’ His answer was, ‘That, Sir, is my deliberate intention.’ 
I proceeded to converse with him on the subject of his 
receiving the Communion; and told him that with respect to 
the qualifications of those who wished to become partakers 
of that holy ordinance, my inquiries could not be made in 
language more expressive than that which was used by our 
Church. ‘Do you sincerely repent of your sins past? Have you 
a lively faith in God’s mercy through Christ, with a thankful 
remembrance of the death of Christ? And are you disposed 
to live in love and charity with all men?’ He lifted up his hands 
and said, ‘With the utmost sincerity of heart I can answer 
those questions in the affirmative—I have no ill will against 
Col. Burr. I met him with a fixed resolution to do him no harm. I 
forgive all that happened.’ I then observed to him, that the 
terrors of the divine law were to be announced to the 
obdurate and impenitent: but that the consolations of the 
Gospel were to be offered to the humble and contrite heart: 
that I had no reason to doubt his sincerity, and would 
proceed immediately to gratify his wishes. The Communion 
was then administered, which he received with great 
devotion, and his heart afterwards appeared to be perfectly 
at rest. I saw him again this morning, when with his last 
faltering words, he expressed a strong confidence in the 
mercy of God through the intercession of the Redeemer. I 
remained with him until 2 o’clock this afternoon, when death 
closed the awful scene—he expired without a struggle, and 
almost without a groan. 
By reflecting on this melancoly event, let the humble 
believer be encouraged ever to hold fast that precious faith 
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which is the only source of true consolation in the last 
extremity of nature. Let the Infidel be persuaded to abandon 
his opposition to that gospel which the strong, inquisitive, and 
comprehensive mind of a Hamilton embraced, in his last 
moments, as the truth from heaven. Let those who are 
disposed to justify the practice of duelling, be induced, by this 
simple narrative, to view with abhorrence that custom which 
has occasioned in irreparable loss to a worthy and most 
afflicted family: which has deprived his friends of a beloved 
companion, his profession of one of its brightest ornaments, 
and his country of a great statesman and a real patriot.  With 
great respect,   I remain   your friend and ser’t, 
Benjamin Moore.”152 
  
 So, all well and good.  Hamilton had an underlying sense of religion 
that we can document from his earliest to his last days.  He was 
convinced not only of the importance of religion in his own life, but also 
for the good of civilization as a whole.  How did this affect his views of 
what the United States should be and become?  This we can clearly see 
in his plan, expressed to James Bayard in 1802, for a “Christian 
Constitutional Society,” in response to the threat he perceived of an 
American version of French Jacobinism and atheism. 
“Neither are you to infer that any revolutionary result is 
contemplated. In my opinion the present Constitution is the 
standard to which we are to cling. Under its banners, bona 
fide must we combat our political foes—rejecting all changes 
but through the channel itself provides for amendments. By 
these general views of the subject have my reflections been 
guided. I now offer you the outline of the plan which they 
have suggested. Let an Association be formed to be 
denominated, “The Christian Constitutional Society.” It’s 
objects to be 
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1st  The support of the Christian Religion. 
2nd  The support of the Constitution of the United States.  
. . . 
Its Means. 
1st  The diffusion of information. For this purpose not only the 
Newspapers but pamphlets must be la[r]gely employed & to 
do this a fund must be created. 5 dollars annually for 8 years, 
to be contributed by each member who can really afford it, 
(taking care not to burden the less able brethren) may afford 
a competent fund for a competent time. It is essential to be 
able to disseminate gratis useful publications. Whenever it 
can be done, & there is a press, clubs should be formed to 
meet once a week, read the newspapers & prepare essays 
paragraphs &ct. 
2nd  The use of all lawful means in concert to promote the 
election of fit men. A lively correspondence must be kept up 
between the different Societies. 
3rd  The promoting of institutions of a charitable & useful 
nature in the management of Fœderalists. The populous cities 
ought particularly to be attended to. Perhaps it will be well to 
institute in such places 1st Societies for the relief of 
Emigrants—2nd. Academies each with one professor for 
instructing the different Classes of Mechanics in the principles 
of Mechanics 
especially confidential  & Elements of Chemistry. The cities 
have been employed by the Jacobins to give an impulse to 
the country. And it is believed to be an alarming fact, that 
while the question of Presidential Election was pending in the 
House of Rs. parties were organized in several of the Cities, in 
the event of there being no election, to cut off the leading 
Fœderalists & sieze the Government.”153 
 
 Notice the means mentioned by Hamilton.  This is not an attempt to 
impose a nation-wide, official church or religion on all citizens.  Nor is it an 
attempt to make laws for the mind, something we will see Madison was 
concerned with below.  Rather, it is an attempt to influence the 
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population at large from a Christian-based point of view.  Not only does it 
include dissemination of ideas Hamilton would have found acceptable, 
but it also includes charitable efforts to help the less fortunate.  The goal 
here is to inculcate in the minds of the population an association between 
the Christian religion and not only good order, but also good acts. 
 What Madison would have thought of all this we do not know.  As I 
have mentioned before, and will document below, his concerns were 
with preventing the imposition of any one form of religion, Christian or 
otherwise, on those who did not accept or want it.  This is understandable 
due to his growing up in Virginia, with its established, tax-supported, 
church.  I am saying nothing that has not already been well-documented 
before when I note that Madison loathed having an established church.  
It was a threat not only to freedom of thought, but political freedom as 
well.  To William Bradford he wrote in 1774: 
“If the Church of England had been the established and 
general Religion in all the Northern Colonies as it has been 
among us here and uninterrupted tranquility had prevailed 
throughout the Continent, It is clear to me that slavery and 
Subjection might and would have been gradually insinuated 
among us.  Union of Religious Sentiments begets a surprizing 
confidence and Ecclesiastical Establishments tend to great 
ignorance and Corruption all of which facilitate the Execution 
of mischevious Projects.”154  
  
Not only did an established church prevent freedom of though and 
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political freedom, it also had a negative effect on the people themselves, 
in Madison’s estimation.  The lethargy it created in personal matters 
manifested itself in ethical and moral decline, not the positive effects 
those, such as Patrick Henry, argued having an established church would 
create. 
“Poverty and Luxury prevail among all sorts:  Pride ignorance 
and Knavery among the Priesthood and Vice and 
Wickedness among the Laity.  This is bad enough But It is not 
the worst I have to tell you.  That diabolical Hell conceived 
principle of persecution rages among some and to their 
eternal Infamy the Clergy can furnish their Quota of Imps for 
such business.  This vexes me the most of any thing whatever.  
There are at this [time?] in the adjacent County not less than 
5 or 6 well meaning men in close Gaol for publishing their 
religious Sentiments which in the main are very orthodox.   I 
have neither patience to hear talk or think of any thing 
relative to this matter, for I have squabbled and scolded 
abused and ridiculed so long about it, [to so lit]tle purpose 
that I am without common patience.  So I l[leave you] to pity 
me and pray for Liberty of Conscience [to revive among 
us.]”155  
  
 In fact, Madison argued not imposing any one type of religion on 
the population through an established church would create the positive 
effects proponents of an established church wanted.  Also to William 
Bradford, who was from Pennsylvania, a state with no one established 
religion, he wrote in 1774: 
“You are happy in dwelling in a Land where those inestimable 
privileges are fully enjoyed and public has long felt the good 
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effects of their religious as well as Civil Liberty.  Foreigners 
have been encouraged to settle amg. you.  Industry and 
Virtue have been promoted by mutual emulation and mutual 
Inspection, Commerce and the Arts have flourished and I can 
not help attributing those continual exertions of Gen[i]us 
which appear among you to the inspiration of Liberty and 
that love of Fame and Knowledge which always accompany 
it.  Religious bondage shackles and debilitates the mind and 
unfits it for every noble enterprize every expanded 
prospect.”156 
 
Madison’s “A Memorial and Remonstrance” contains his main 
thoughts and points regarding how he envisioned the United States should 
be regarding religion.  His thought, as I have mentioned, centered on 
religious freedom, but there are multiple points he raises in that document 
that deserve especial attention and comment. 
“Because we hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, 
‘that Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and 
the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason 
and conviction, not by force or violence.’ The Religion then 
of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience 
of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as 
these may dictate. This right is in its nature an unalienable 
right.”157 
 
  The American Revolution was fought, in part, to defend the 
“unalienable rights” of the colonists.  Madison here adds to Jefferson’s 
“Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness” freedom of religion.  This 
Lockean estimation of religion as among the rights which are unalienable 
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because doing so would negate the very reason for the existence of 
government, is in this instance Madison’s addition to Locke’s “Life, Liberty 
and Property” formulation for the basis of organized society. 
“It is unalienable, because the opinions of men, depending 
only on the evidence contemplated by their own minds 
cannot follow the dictates of other men: It is unalienable also, 
because what is here a right towards men, is a duty towards 
the Creator. It is the duty of every man to render to the 
Creator such homage and such only as he believes to be 
acceptable to him. This duty is precedent, both in order of 
time and in degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil 
Society. Before any man can be considered as a member of 
Civil Society, he must be considered as a subject of the 
Governour of the Universe: And if a member of Civil Society, 
who enters into any subordinate Association, must always do 
it with a reservation of his duty to the General Authority; much 
more must every man who becomes a member of any 
particular Civil Society, do it with a saving of his allegiance to 
the Universal Sovereign.”158 
 
 The right to freely choose what religion to follow and support is a 
duty which exists even before any government has been created, one 
which every human owes to the Creator.  Madison here argues that 
governments that try to establish any one religion, and enforce 
recognition of it by the citizenry, are in fact trespassing on something 
owed to God, and not to any human government. 
“We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no 
mans right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society and 
that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance. True it is, 
that no other rule exists, by which any question which may 
divide a Society, can be ultimately determined, but the will of 
the majority; but it is also true that the majority may trespass 
on the rights of the minority.  
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  Because if Religion be exempt from the authority of the 
Society at large, still less can it be subject to that of the 
Legislative Body. The latter are but the creatures and 
vicegerents of the former. Their jurisdiction is both derivative 
and limited: it is limited with regard to the co-ordinate 
departments, more necessarily is it limited with regard to the 
constituents.”159 
  
 By definition, then, religion is beyond the ability of government to 
legislate.  Government cannot legislate in matters concerning God or 
religion, because those are superior to government. 
“The preservation of a free Government requires not merely, 
that the metes and bounds which separate each 
department of power be invariably maintained; but more 
especially that neither of them be suffered to overleap the 
great Barrier which defends the rights of the people. The 
Rulers who are guilty of such an encroachment, exceed the 
commission from which they derive their authority, and are 
Tyrants. The People who submit to it are governed by laws 
made neither by themselves nor by an authority derived from 
them, and are slaves.”160 
 
 Just as preservation of freedom and rights necessitates the division 
of power between the branches of government, so they depend on a 
division of power between the government and the rights of the people.  
Further, any attempt by government to legislate on religion turns the 
individuals responsible into dictators. 
“Because it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on 
our liberties. We hold this prudent jealousy to be the first duty 
of Citizens, and one of the noblest characteristics of the late 
Revolution. The free men of America did not wait till usurped 
power had strengthened itself by exercise, and entangled 
the question in precedents. They saw all the consequences in 
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the principle, and they avoided the consequences by 
denying the principle. We revere this lesson too much soon to 
forget it. Who does not see that the same authority which 
can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, 
may establish with the same ease any particular sect of 
Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects? that the same 
authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence 
only of his property for the support of any one establishment, 
may force him to conform to any other establishment in all 
cases whatsoever?”161 
 
 Hearkening back to the Revolution again, and the reasons why 
Americans chose to fight, Madison compares this Remonstrance with the 
efforts to respond to what the colonists considered British threats to their 
rights.  Just as the colonists had objected to British efforts, so those who 
object to this attempt to establish a church are following the same path. 
“Because the Bill violates that equality which ought to be the 
basis of every law, and which is more indispensible, in 
proportion as the validity or expediency of any law is more 
liable to be impeached. If ‘all men are by nature equally free 
and independent,’ all men are to be considered as entering 
into Society on equal conditions; as relinquishing no more, 
and therefore retaining no less, one than another, of their 
natural rights. Above all are they to be considered as 
retaining an ‘equal title to the free exercise of Religion 
according to the dictates of Conscience.’ Whilst we assert for 
ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess and to observe 
the Religion which we believe to be of divine origin, we 
cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose minds have 
not yet yielded to the evidence which has convinced us. If 
this freedom be abused, it is an offence against God, not 
against man: To God, therefore, not to man, must an 
account of it be rendered.”162 
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The only one who need be concerned with enforcing “correct” 
religious belief is God, not any government or government official, and in 
fact is an example of government intruding on matters only God can 
adequately judge. 
“Because the Bill implies either that the Civil Magistrate is a 
competent Judge of Religious Truth; or that he may employ 
Religion as an engine of Civil policy. The first is an arrogant 
pretension falsified by the contradictory opinions of Rulers in 
all ages, and throughout the world: the second an 
unhallowed perversion of the means of salvation.”163 
 
 Further, Christianity specifically has always considered itself as “not 
of this world,” and separate from secular authorities.  So, having an 
established, government-approved and supported, church contradicts 
the faith of those who do profess it, and creates the impression amongst 
those who do not that Christianity would not survive without official 
sanction. 
“Because the establishment proposed by the Bill is not 
requisite for the support of the Christian Religion. To say that it 
is, is a contradiction to the Christian Religion itself, for every 
page of it disavows a dependence on the powers of this 
world: it is a contradiction to fact; for it is known that this 
Religion both existed and flourished, not only without the 
support of human laws, but in spite of every opposition from 
them, and not only during the period of miraculous aid, but 
long after it had been left to its own evidence and the 
ordinary care of Providence. Nay, it is a contradiction in 
terms; for a Religion not invented by human policy, must have 
pre-existed and been supported, before it was established by 
human policy. It is moreover to weaken in those who profess 
this Religion a pious confidence in its innate excellence and 
the patronage of its Author; and to foster in those who still 
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reject it, a suspicion that its friends are too conscious of its 
fallacies to trust it to its own merits.”164 
 
   Madison also calls attention to the history of official churches.  They 
do not have a good track record as regards individual rights.  In fact, they 
have often been the sources of oppression.  Not only that, once again 
Madison argues they have a negative effect on individual ethics and 
morality, not the positive effects argued for by supporters of official 
religions. 
“Because experience witnesseth that ecclesiastical 
establishments, instead of maintaining the purity and efficacy 
of Religion, have had a contrary operation. During almost 
fifteen centuries has the legal establishment of Christianity 
been on trial. What have been its fruits? More or less in all 
places, pride and indolence in the Clergy, ignorance and 
servility in the laity, in both, superstition, bigotry and 
persecution. Enquire of the Teachers of Christianity for the 
ages in which it appeared in its greatest lustre; those of every 
sect, point to the ages prior to its incorporation with Civil 
policy. Propose a restoration of this primitive State in which its 
Teachers depended on the voluntary rewards of their flocks, 
many of them predict its downfall. On which Side ought their 
testimony to have greatest weight, when for or when against 
their interest?”165 
 
 One of the enticements to emigrate to Virginia has been, 
Madison argues, the freedom to worship as one chose.  If that is 
taken away, Virginia will lose that attractiveness to potential 
immigrants, and will also tend to drive away people who currently 
do live in Virginia, thus weakening the state in each way. 
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“Because the proposed establishment is a departure 
from that generous policy, which, offering an Asylum to the 
persecuted and oppressed of every Nation and Religion, 
promised a lustre to our country, and an accession to the 
number of its citizens. What a melancholy mark is the Bill of 
sudden degeneracy? Instead of holding forth an Asylum to 
the persecuted, it is itself a signal of persecution. It degrades 
from the equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions in 
Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative authority. 
Distant as it may be in its present form from the Inquisition, it 
differs from it only in degree. The one is the first step, the other 
the last in the career of intolerance. The magnanimous 
sufferer under this cruel scourge in foreign Regions, must view 
the Bill as a Beacon on our Coast, warning him to seek some 
other haven, where liberty and philanthrophy in their due 
extent, may offer a more certain repose from his Troubles.   
Because it will have a like tendency to banish our 
Citizens. The allurements presented by other situations are 
every day thinning their number. To superadd a fresh motive 
to emigration by revoking the liberty which they now enjoy, 
would be the same species of folly which has dishonoured 
and depopulated flourishing kingdoms.”166 
 
Madison argues religious conflicts all-too-easily become violent, and 
so every effort needs to be made to avoid them, especially by not 
establishing one religion as official, because that would by definition put 
all the others in a subservient situation. 
 “Because it will destroy that moderation and harmony which 
the forbearance of our laws to intermeddle with Religion has 
produced among its several sects. Torrents of blood have 
been spilt in the old world, by vain attempts of the secular 
arm, to extinguish Religious discord, by proscribing all 
difference in Religious opinion. Time has at length revealed 
the true remedy. Every relaxation of narrow and rigorous 
policy, wherever it has been tried, has been found to assuage 
the disease. The American Theatre has exhibited proofs that 
equal and compleat liberty, if it does not wholly eradicate it, 
sufficiently destroys its malignant influence on the health and 
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prosperity of the State. If with the salutary effects of this 
system under our own eyes, we begin to contract the bounds 
of Religious freedom, we know no name that will too severely 
reproach our folly. At least let warning be taken at the first 
fruits of the threatened innovation. The very appearance of 
the Bill has transformed ‘that Christian forbearance, love and 
charity,’ which of late mutually prevailed, into animosities and 
jealousies, which may not soon be appeased. What mischiefs 
may not be dreaded, should this enemy to the public quiet 
be armed with the force of a law?”167 
 
 He also argues laws which are unpopular and unacceptable to 
large groups of citizens, even if they do not constitute a majority of the 
population, weaken overall respect for laws in general.  Such a law would 
be resented by many, who would then learn to treat other laws with 
contempt as well.  This would lead to contempt for government itself, and 
create far more difficulty than it is worth. 
“Because attempts to enforce by legal sanctions, acts 
obnoxious to so great a proportion of Citizens, tend to 
enervate the laws in general, and to slacken the bands of 
Society. If it be difficult to execute any law which is not 
generally deemed necessary or salutary, what must be the 
case, where it is deemed invalid and dangerous? And what 
may be the effect of so striking an example of impotency in 
the Government, on its general authority?”168 
 
    Finally, a violation of the right of freedom of religion is a violation of 
all other rights, at least in essence.  If the right to a free choice regarding 
religion can be violated, what cannot?  All rights must be protected, lest 
any of them be transgressed.  Just as it is necessary to protect the 
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freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and other liberties, so it is 
necessary to protect freedom of religion. 
“Because finally, “the equal right of every citizen to the free 
exercise of his Religion according to the dictates of 
conscience” is held by the same tenure with all our other 
rights. If we recur to its origin, it is equally the gift of nature; if 
we weigh its importance, it cannot be less dear to us; if we 
consult the ‘Declaration of those rights which pertain to the 
good people of Virginia, as the basis and foundation of 
Government,’ it is enumerated with equal solemnity, or rather 
studied emphasis. Either then, we must say, that the Will of the 
Legislature is the only measure of their authority; and that in 
the plenitude of this authority, they may sweep away all our 
fundamental rights; or, that they are bound to leave this 
particular right untouched and sacred: Either we must say, 
that they may controul the freedom of the press, may abolish 
the Trial by Jury, may swallow up the Executive and Judiciary 
Powers of the State; nay that they may despoil us of our very 
right of suffrage, and erect themselves into an independent 
and hereditary Assembly or, we must say, that they have no 
authority to enact into law the Bill under consideration.”169 
 
Madison noted in a letter to Thomas Jefferson, in which he enclosed 
the Remonstrance, that clergy opposition to the proposed establishment 
had already occurred among those whose religion was not made official.  
Madison approved of this, not because of the envy and fear it showed 
between the sects, but rather because it was a convenient, and effective 
means of preventing passage of the bill. 
“The opposition to the general assessment gains ground.  At 
the instance of some of its adversaries I drew up the 
remonstrance herewith inclosed.  It has been sent thro' the 
medium of confidential persons in a number of the upper 
county[s] and I am told will be pretty extensively signed.  The 
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presbyterian clergy have at length espoused the side of the 
opposition, being moved either by a fear of their laity or a 
jealousy of the episcopalians.  The mutual hatred of these 
sects has been much inflamed by the late act incorporating 
the latter.  I am far from being sorry for it as a coalition 
between them could alone endanger our religious rights and 
a tendency to such an event had been suspected.”170  
  
During the debate over ratifying the Constitution in Virginia’s 
ratifying convention, Madison argued that the lack of a bill of rights 
specifically enumerating the freedom of religion was not necessary, 
ironically in response to criticism regarding such a lack from Patrick Henry, 
who had been a supporter of the establishment bill Madison had 
opposed.  What good would a bill of rights do against a majority, Madison 
argued.  What was needed was what the United States already had, a 
multiplicity of different religions and sects, each of whom could be 
counted upon to oppose any efforts to establish one or another of them 
as official. 
“The honorable member has introduced the subject of 
religion.  Religion is not guarded - there is no bill of rights 
declaring that religion should be secure.  Is a bill of rights a 
security for religion?  would the bill of rights in this state 
exempt the people from paying for the support of one 
particular sect, if such sect were exclusively established by 
law?  If there were a majority of one sect, a bill of rights would 
be a poor protection for liberty.  Happily for the states, they 
enjoy the utmost freedom of religion.  This freedom arises from 
that multiplicity of sects, which pervades America, and which 
is the best and only security for religious liberty in any society.  
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For where there is such a variety of sects, there cannot be a 
majority of any one sect to oppress and persecute the rest.  
Fortunately for this commonwealth, a majority of the people 
are decidely against any exclusive establishment - I believe it 
to be so in the other states.  There is not a shadow of right in 
the general government to intermeddle with religion.  Its least 
interference with it would be a most flagrant usurpation.  I 
can appeal to my uniform conduct on this subject, that I 
have warmly supported religious freedom.  It is better that this 
security should be depended upon from the general 
legislature, than from one particular state.  A particular state 
might concur in one religious project.  But the United States 
abound in such a variety of sects, that it is a strong security 
against religious persecution, and is sufficient to authorise a 
conclusion, that no one sect will ever be able to out-number 
or depress the rest.”171 
   
 Now of course Madison did eventually see the need to add a Bill of 
Rights to the Constitution, and was instrumental in their writing and 
passage.  Further, we have several of his comments in the House of 
Representatives by which to gauge his understanding of, most importantly 
on the subject of religion, the 1st Amendment. 
“Mr. Madison said he apprehended the meaning of the 
words to be, that congress should not establish a religion, and 
enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to 
worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience;”172  
   
 In addition to protection from the federal government for religious 
freedom, Madison wanted state governments to be similarly prohibited.  
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As the minutes of the House of Representatives from August 17, 1789 note: 
“Tucker moved to strike out, ‘No state shall infringe the 
equal rights of conscience, nor the freedom of speech, or of 
the press, nor of the right of trial by jury in criminal cases.’ 
MR. MADISON Conceived this to be the most valuable 
amendment on the whole list; if there was any reason to 
restrain the government of the United States from infringing 
upon these essential rights, it was equally necessary that they 
should be secured against the state governments; he thought 
that if they provided against the one, it was as necessary to 
provide against the other, and was satisfied that it would be 
equally grateful to the people.”173 
 
 Madison was, like Hamilton, accepting of other religions besides 
Protestant Christianity, and not hostile to them.  Just as Hamilton 
welcomed Unitarians, so did Madison.  As he wrote to George Nicholas in 
1793: 
“Mr. Toulmin will either hand you this, or see you in 
consequence of it.  He is lately from England, and very 
warmly recommended to me by Mr. Maury our Consul at 
Liverpool as meriting particular attention.  His primary object 
in visiting Kentucky is to procure a knowledge of the Country 
for the information of his friends in England who have an eye 
to America as a more eligible portion of the Earth than their 
native spot is at present.  His next object is of a more personal 
nature.  His partiality to our Country makes him anxious to 
settle in it:  and as he is not likely to find a Religious Society 
with which he could connect himself as a Minister professing 
the Unitarian System taught by Priestly & others, he wishes to 
see if there be any prospect of his establishing himself an an 
instructor of youth in classical knowledge and other branches 
of liberal education; for which he is probably well qualified.  
Any friendly offices you may find it convenient to render him 
will be of much service to him in his plans, and will moreover 
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be acknowledged by Dear Sir Your mo: Obedt. hble servt.”174  
  
 Further, he was also accepting of Roman Catholics, and saw them 
as no threat to republican government.  In a speech in the House of 
Representatives on January 1, 1795, he is noted as saying: 
“He did not approve the ridicule attempted to be thrown out 
on the Roman Catholics.  In their religion, there was nothing 
inconsistent with the purest republicanism.  In Switzerland, 
about one half of the Cantons were of the Roman Catholic 
persuasion.  Some of the most democratical Cantons were 
so; Cantons, where every man gave his vote for a 
Representative.  Americans had no right to ridicule Catholics.  
They had, many of them, proved good citizens, during the 
revolution.”175 
 
 So, as regards religion, how do Hamilton and Madison compare?  I 
do not see any overt conflict in the writings we have, although it does 
appear possible that Hamilton’s “Christian Constitutional Society” idea 
might have, had he lived longer, and had such idea even taken off, been 
the source of potential conflict.  Hamilton did not specifically call for any 
official recognition of Christianity, though, but rather simply for the 
dissemination of ideas which would no doubt have supported a religious, 
rather than an atheistic, approach to public life. 
 Both were, as I have noted, accepting of religious groups outside of 
the majority Protestant sects.  What differentiates the two is the much 
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greater religious sense that Hamilton had throughout his life, and his much 
greater negative response to the French Revolution because of its 
disavowal of religion.  Madison did not turn against France until after 
Napoleon had taken power, and thus turned France away from the 
republican experiment. 
 Hamilton, while not showing any preference for an official church of 
any kind, nevertheless believed strongly, at least towards the end of his 
life, that religion was an absolute necessity for the success of the 
American republic.  He saw no trouble at all having religion in 
government, such as military chaplains, and official calls for days of 
religious expression by even the President himself.  Too much religious 
“enthusiasm” was a bad thing, though, and he did not show any support 
for non-standard, or extreme, varieties of religion.  Religion was an 
essential support of order, continuity, meaning and purpose for all 
humans, and even a republic such as the United States needed to have 
religion as part of its public life, although an official church was never 
mentioned as essential by him. 
 Madison was convinced religion was best left up to the individual 
sects, both in terms of the success of the United States as a whole, and 
also as a means of keeping religion from having too much influence in 
public life.  He had, after all, grown up in a colony, later state, which had 
had an official religion, and so was far more concerned with the negative 
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effects he saw official religions as having.  For Madison, the danger was 
not in a lack of religion in public life, as with Hamilton, but rather one of 
official religions as a barrier to political freedom, and thus the success of a 
republic built on freedom.  Madison wanted religion left up to the reason 
and conscience of each individual, and saw no reason to have it 
included in official public life.  It could only be a danger to the success of 
the American republic, and not an asset, again in stark contrast to 
Hamilton. 
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Chapter Six:  Hamilton and Madison on  
Federal Government Involvement in the Economy 
 Of all the areas on which Hamilton and Madison came into conflict 
beginning in the 1790’s, the issue of whether, and how much, the federal 
government should involve itself in the economy is one of the more clear 
examples of how, as I argue, they had underlying differences of opinion 
all along.  Both Hamilton and Madison displayed their later preferences 
regarding economic involvement well before the Constitution was in 
place, as I will document below.  I am convinced the differences we will 
see regarding the economy were issues they simply did not discuss before 
their eventual break. 
 For Hamilton, we will see it is not only appropriate, but indeed 
essential, that specifically the federal government take an active role in 
the economy.  There is for him a danger in not having the federal 
government involve itself in the economy, as only the federal government 
can take the actions he sees as necessary for the survival and success of 
the United States.  A strictly free market is neither desirable nor possible for 
Hamilton, as individual initiative will just not lead to the successful 
economy that can provide the people of the United States with the 
wealth that will convince them to continue support the American 
republican experiment. 
 Madison also valued a role for the federal government in the 
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economy, but not in the same ways, and not to the same degree, as 
Hamilton.  One area in which he saw a drastically different role for the 
federal government in the economy was to use economic relations with 
other countries as a weapon, especially through the use of embargoes 
against countries he felt the United States had legitimate grievances with.  
The role Madison saw as a valuable addition to the eventual success of 
the United States was, as I will show below, was in encouraging 
agriculture, not manufacturing, as Hamilton wanted.   
 I mentioned in Chapter Four that I would not discuss Hamilton’s 
Report on Manufactures as part of the issue of Constitutional 
interpretation, but such a discussion is of course essential when dealing 
with the question of the economy.  So, I will include that below, but the 
differences of opinion between Hamilton and Madison are evident before 
that document came to light.  Well before the Constitution was written, 
Hamilton argued for the appropriateness, indeed necessity, of 
government involvement in the economy through regulation.  In The 
Continentalist No. V, from 1782, he wrote:     
“The vesting Congress with the power of regulating 
trade ought to have been a principal object of the 
confederation for a variety of reasons. It is as necessary for 
the purposes of commerce as of revenue. There are some, 
who maintain, that trade will regulate itself, and is not to be 
benefitted by the encouragements, or restraints of 
government. Such persons will imagine, that there is no need 
of a common directing power. This is one of those wild 
speculative paradoxes, which have grown into credit among 
us, contrary to the uniform practice and sense of the most 
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enlightened nations. Contradicted by the numerous 
institutions and laws, that exist every where for the benefit of 
trade, by the pains taken to cultivate particular branches and 
to discourage others, by the known advantages derived from 
those measures, and by the palpable evils that would attend 
their discontinuance—it must be rejected by every man 
acquainted with commercial history. Commerce, like other 
things, has its fixed principles, according to which it must be 
regulated; if these are understood and observed, it will be 
promoted by the attention of government, if unknown, or 
violated, it will be injured—but it is the same with every other 
part of administration. 
To preserve the ballance of trade in favour of a nation 
ought to be a leading aim of its policy.” 176 
 
 Clearly this is not an argument in favor of laissez faire, nor even of 
the much more free market options preferred by Adam Smith.  Just as with 
government, Hamilton argues there are laws which govern the economy.  
Also, Hamilton did not want to leave the issue of regulation to the state 
governments, as that was precisely one of the main problems he saw with 
the Articles of Confederation.  The United States needs specific federal 
government involvement in the economy in order to achieve the best 
results.  The states are only parts of a whole. 
“Perhaps it may be thought, that the power of 
regulation will be left placed in the governments of the 
several states, and that a general superintendence is 
unnecessary. If the states had distinct interests, were 
unconnected with each other, their own governments would 
then be the proper and could be the only depositaries of 
such a power; but as they are parts of a whole with a 
common interest in trade, as in other things, there ought to 
be a common direction in that as in all other matters. It is easy 
to conceive, that many cases may occur, in which it would 
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be beneficial to all the states to encourage, or suppress a 
particular branch of trade, while it would be detrimental to 
either to attempt it without the concurrence of the rest, and 
where the experiment would probably be left untried for fear 
of a want of that concurrence. 
No mode can be so convenient as a source of revenue 
to the United States. It is agreed that imposts on trade, when 
not immoderate, or improperly laid, is one of the most eligible 
species of taxation. They fall in a great measure upon articles 
not of absolute necessity, and being partly transferred to the 
price of the commodity, are so far imperceptibly paid by the 
consumer. It is therefore that mode which may be exercised 
by the fœderal government with least exception or disgust. 
Congress can easily possess all the information necessary to 
impose the duties with judgment, and the collection can 
without difficulty be made by their own officers. 
They can have no temptation to abuse this power, 
because the motive of revenue will check its own 
extremes.”177  
 
 Hamilton does agree with Madison that the most convenient form 
of taxation is tariffs.  However, he shows he was consistent throughout his 
political life in the United States in having an overriding preference for the 
United States’ well-being as a whole, rather than that of any one state.  
For him, the states are rather like jealous siblings, afraid someone will get 
more than they.  Hamilton’s goals for the United States did include 
“greatness,” one of his departures from classical republican thought, and 
a “great” people thinks beyond the narrow self-interest of any one sector 
to reach for more than mere survival or mediocrity.  I am convinced this 
was the result of his not growing up in one state or another, but rather the 
Caribbean. 
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“It is too much characteristic of our national temper to be 
ingenious in finding out and magnifying the minutest 
disadvantages, and to reject measures of evident utility even 
of necessity to avoid trivial and sometimes imaginary evils. We 
seem not to reflect, that in human society, there is scarcely 
any plan, however salutary to the whole and to every part, 
by the share, each has in the common prosperity, but in one 
way, or another, and under particular circumstances, will 
operate more to the benefit of some parts, than of others. 
Unless we can overcome this narrow disposition and learn to 
estimate measures, by their general tendency, we shall never 
be a great or a happy people, if we remain a people at 
all.”178  
  
 Hamilton argued there were dangers inherent in a lack of federal 
government oversight of the economy.  There would be a lack of money 
that might otherwise be available.  The government itself would not have 
the power and revenue necessary for any government to exist, and this 
would be an ongoing threat to the continuation of the Union between the 
states.  Overall, he argued that government oversight of the economy 
would lead to increased prosperity for all Americans. 
“Let us see what will be the consequences of not 
authorising the Fœderal Government to regulate the trade of 
these states. 
Besides the want of revenue and of power, besides the 
immediate risk to our independence, the danger of all the 
future evils of a precarious union, besides the deficiency of a 
wholesome concert and provident superintendence to 
advance the general prosperity of trade, the direct 
consequence will be, that the landed interest and the 
labouring poor will in the first place fall a sacrifice to the 
trading interest, and the whole eventually to a bad system of 
policy, made necessary by the want of such regulating 
power.”179 
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 Further, the people of the United States need protection which only 
the federal government can provide, specifically the poor and those 
whose primary wealth consists in land.  They need protection, Hamilton 
argued, precisely from “the trading interest.”  As we will see below, this is 
quite similar to a point Madison raised as well.  Hamilton saw a need for 
regulation to protect workers and farmers.  Overall, a lack of regulation 
would, in Hamilton’s estimation, have negative effects for the United 
States as a whole.  The states are not even mentioned as possible sources 
of this protection.  Only the federal government can do this, across the 
entirety of the United States. 
“The influence of these evils will be, to render landed property 
fluctuating and less valuable, to oppress the poor by raising 
the prices of necessaries, to injure commerce by 
encouraging the consumption of foreign luxuries, by 
encreasing the value of labor, by lessening the quantity of 
home productions, enhancing their prices at foreign markets, 
of course, obstructing their sale and enabling other nations to 
supplant us.”180 
 
However, government oversight of the economy, especially 
through taxation, requires keeping in mind the good of the entirety of 
society, and not privileging any one or more sector to the detriment of the 
rest.  Taxation needs to be apportioned well, in order to create good 
order.  Also, anyone who thinks taxation can be avoided simply does not, 
according to Hamilton, have a good understanding of the realities of 
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human life.  Human life requires government, government requires well-
compensated people to administer it, and administration requires 
revenue, which can only be obtained through taxation.  Taxation will 
bring benefits, though, such as increased safety from attack, both at 
home from other countries, and also increased safety abroad for the 
United States’ trade with foreign lands.  Both are absolutely necessary in 
Hamilton’s estimation, and the need for both will never cease. 
“The great art is to distribute the public burthens well 
and not suffer them, either first, or last, to fall too heavily upon 
parts of the community; else distress and disorder must ensue. 
A shock given to any part of the political machine vibrates 
through the whole.” 
. . .  
“But perhaps the class is more numerous than those, 
who not unwilling to bear their share of public burthens, are 
yet averse to the idea of perpetuity, as if there ever would 
arrive a period, when the state would cease to want 
revenues and taxes become unnecessary. It is of importance 
to unmask this delusion and open the eyes of the people to 
the truth. It is paying too great a tribute to the idol of 
popularity to flatter so injurious and so visionary an 
expectation. The error is too gross to be tolerated any where, 
but in the cottage of the peasant; should we meet with it in 
the senate house, we must lament the ignorance or despise 
the hypocrisy, on which it is ingrafted. Expence is in the 
present state of things entailed upon all governments. Though 
if we continue united, we shall be hereafter less exposed to 
wars by land, than most other countries; yet while we have 
powerful neighbours on either extremity, and our frontier is 
embraced by savages, whose alliance they may without 
difficulty command, we cannot, in prudence, dispense with 
the usual precautions for our interior security. As a 
commercial people, maritime power must be a primary 
object of our attention, and a navy cannot be created or 
maintained without ample revenues. The nature of our 
popular constitutions requires a numerous magistracy, for 
whom competent provision must be made; or we may be 
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certain our affairs will always be committed to improper 
hands; and experience will teach us, that no government 
costs so much as a bad one. 
We may preach till we are tired of the theme, the 
necessity of disinterestedness in republics, without making a 
single proselyte. The virtuous declaimer will neither persuade 
himself nor any other person to be content with a double 
mess of porridge, instead of a reasonable stipend for his 
services. We might as soon reconcile ourselves to the Spartan 
community of goods and wives, to their iron coin, their long 
beards, or their black broth. There is a total dissimulation in the 
circumstances, as well as the manners, of society among us; 
and it is as ridiculous to seek for models in the simple ages of 
Greece and Rome, as it would be to go in quest of them 
among the Hottentots and Laplanders.  
The public, for the different purposes, that have been 
mentioned, must always have large demands upon its 
constituents, and the only question is whether these shall be 
satisfied by annual grants perpetually renewed—by a 
perpetual grant once for all or by a compound of permanent 
and occasional supplies. The last is the wisest course. The 
Fœderal Government should neither be independent nor too 
much dependent. It should neither be raised above 
responsibility or controul, nor should it want the means of 
maintaining its own weight, authority, dignity and credit. To 
this end permanent funds are indispensable, but they ought 
to be of such a nature and so moderate in their amount, as 
never to be inconvenient. Extraordinary supplies can be the 
objects of extraordinary grants; and in this salutary medium 
will consist our true wisdom.”181 
 
Hamilton even argued that there should be differences in taxation 
according to overall wealth, something which is still contentious even 
today.  Nevertheless, the idea does appear in his sentiments regarding 
“the rich” again and again throughout his life. 
“The rich must be made to pay for their luxuries; which is the 
only proper way of taxing their superior wealth.”182 
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As always with Hamilton, he expressed his concern for strengthening 
and preserving the Union.  He argued again and again for the need to 
support and emphasize the importance of the federal government.  For 
Hamilton, the danger was NOT an overly-powerful federal government, 
but rather the centrifugal effects of, in his estimation, overly-powerful 
states.  The United States needs to create a sense of national loyalty, NOT 
state-centered loyalties.  Greatness, including safety and prosperity, is 
possible for Hamilton ONLY in the Union, and not in smaller republics, such 
as individual states, or the smaller confederations others had called for the 
United States to split into in the years prior to ratification of the 
Constitution.  Only a federal government with sufficient power can 
achieve these worthwhile ends, which Hamilton argues will benefit 
everyone across the United States. 
“The reason of allowing Congress to appoint its own 
officers of the customs, collectors of taxes, and military 
officers of every rank, is to create in the interior of each state 
a mass of influence in favour of the Fœderal Government. 
The great danger has been shown to be, that it will not have 
power enough to defend itself and preserve the union, not 
that it will ever become formidable to the general liberty. A 
mere regard to the interests of the confederacy will never be 
a principle sufficiently active to curb the ambition and 
intrigues of different members. Force cannot effect it: A 
contest of arms will seldom be between the common 
sovereign and a single refractory member; but between 
distinct combinations of the several parts against each other. 
A sympathy of situations will be apt to produce associates to 
the disobedient. The application of force is always 
disagreeable, the issue uncertain. It will be wise to obviate 
the necessity of it, by interesting such a number of individuals 
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in each state in support of the Fœderal Government, as will 
be counterpoised to the ambition of others; and will make it 
difficult for them to unite the people in opposition to the just 
and necessary measures of the union. 
There is something noble and magnificent in the 
perspective of a great Fœderal Republic, closely linked in the 
pursuit of a common interest, tranquil and prosperous at 
home, respectable abroad; but there is something 
proportionably diminutive and contemptible in the prospect 
of a number of petty states, with the appearance only of 
union, jarring, jealous and perverse, without any determined 
direction, fluctuating and unhappy at home, weak and 
insignificant by their dissentions, in the eyes of other nations. 
Happy America! if those, to whom thou hast intrusted the 
guardianship of thy infancy, know how to provide for thy 
future repose; but miserable and undone, if their negligence 
or ignorance permits the spirit of discord to erect her banners 
on the ruins of thy tranquility!183  
 
 While not an official part of his visions for the federal government 
itself, Hamilton did help propose a “manufacturing society.”  For him, 
increasing manufacturing in the United States was central to his goals of 
American independence and greatness.  Improving the diversity of 
occupations and kinds of business would also help pay off the Public 
Debt, which all-too-often he has been erroneously accused of wanting to 
make permanent.  For Madison, however, manufacturing was an evil he 
expected to eventually make its way to the United States, but he feared 
and dreaded it as a threat to republican simplicity and virtue.  Hamilton 
displayed no such apprehensions, though.  To William Duer he wrote in 
1791: 
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“I send you herewith a plan for a manufacturing 
Society in conformity to the Ideas we have several times 
conversed about.  
. . .  
The more I have considered the thing, the more I feel 
persuaded that it will equally promote the Interest of the 
adventurers & of the public and will have an excellent effect 
on the Debt.”184 
 
In the Prospectus of the Society for Establishing Useful Manufactures, 
Hamilton stressed the need for the United States to focus on prosperity.  
While not necessarily opposed to virtue, prosperity was for Hamilton vital 
for the continued existence of the United States.  For political perfection to 
be attained in the United States, Hamilton argued wealth was necessary, 
and the United States needed manufacturing in order to acquire wealth.  
He did mention the usefulness, at the time, of the public debt as a 
resource, a source of capital, to help in expanding and diversifying the 
economy through encouraging manufacturing. 
“The establishment of Manufactures in the United States 
when maturely considered will be fo<und> to be of the 
highest importance to their prosperity. It <is> an almost self 
evident proposition that that com<muni>ty which can most 
completely supply its own w<ants> is in a state of the highest 
political perfection. <And> both theory and experience 
conspire to prove that a nation (unless from a very 
peculiar coincidence of circumstances) cannot possess 
much active wealth but as the result of extensive 
manufactures. 
. . .  
The last objection disappears in the eye of those who 
are aware how much may be done by a proper application 
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of the public Debt. Here is the resource which has been 
hitherto wanted. And while a direction of it to this object may 
be made a mean of public prosperity and an instrument of 
profit to adventurers in the enterprise, it, at the same time, 
affords a prospect of an enhancement of the value of the 
debt; by giving it a new and additional employment and 
utility.”185 
 
 Of all of Hamilton’s thoughts and works on economic matters, his 
massive Report on the Subject of Manufactures is the most important, not 
only because of the breadth of subjects he covers, but also because it is 
his single most comprehensive statement regarding what he thought was 
right for the United States.  That it provoked yet another conflict with 
Madison shows us yet again the differences in expectations between 
these two vital Founders to understand. 
 From the beginning of the Report, he stresses several points he 
considers to be reasons why the United States needs to add 
manufacturing to what was then an overwhelmingly agricultural 
economy.  Again, the goal behind his policy proposals is the continued 
independence of the United States through increasing its overall power by 
adding manufacturing to its economy.  Having an economy based 
primarily on agricultural exports to other countries is a weakness, and the 
United States should increase its domestic market in order to improve its 
economy.   
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“The Secretary of the Treasury in obedience to the 
order of ye House of Representatives, of the 15th day of 
January 1790, has applied his attention, at as early a period 
as his other duties would permit, to the subject of 
Manufactures; and particularly to the means of promoting 
such as will tend to render the United States, independent on 
foreign nations, for military and other essential supplies. And 
he there [upon] respectfully submits the following Report. 
The expediency of encouraging manufactures in the 
United States, which was not long since deemed very 
questionable, appears at this time to be pretty generally 
admitted. The embarrassments, which have obstructed the 
progress of our external trade, have led to serious reflections 
on the necessity of enlarging the sphere of our domestic 
commerce: the restrictive regulations, which in foreign 
markets abrige the vent of the increasing surplus of our 
Agricultural produce, serve to beget an earnest desire, that a 
more extensive demand for that surplus may be created at 
home: And the complete success, which has rewarded 
manufacturing enterprise, in some valuable branches, 
conspiring with the promising symptoms, which attend some 
less mature essays, in others, justify a hope, that the obstacles 
to the growth of this species of industry are less formidable 
than they were apprehended to be; and that it is not difficult 
to find, in its further extension; a full indemnification for any 
external disadvantages, which are or may be experienced, 
as well as an accession of resources, favourable to national 
independence and safety.”186 
 
Manufacturing is a source of outlets for agricultural products, so the 
two are not incompatible.  Agriculture is pre-eminent, of course, but there 
is no reason not to add manufacturing.  Hamilton’s statements regarding 
agriculture do show the same republican virtue emphasis that Madison 
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stressed in his arguments, but for Hamilton, manufacturing is not the threat 
Madison feared. 
“It ought readily to be conceded, that the cultivation 
of the earth—as the primary and most certain source of 
national supply—as the immediate and chief source of 
subsistence to man—as the principal source of those 
materials which constitute the nutriment of other kinds of 
labor—as including a state most favourable to the freedom 
and independence of the human mind—one, perhaps, most 
conducive to the multiplication of the human species—
has intrinsically a strong claim to pre-eminence over every 
other kind of industry. 
But, that it has a title to any thing like an exclusive 
predilection, in any country, ought to be admitted with great 
caution. That it is even more productive than every other 
branch of Industry requires more evidence, than has yet been 
given in support of the position. That its real interests, precious 
and important as without the help of exaggeration, they truly 
are, will be advanced, rather than injured by the due 
encouragement of manufactures, may, it is believed, be 
satisfactorily demonstrated. And it is also believed that the 
expediency of such encouragement in a general view may 
be shewn to be recommended by the most cogent and 
persuasive motives of national policy. 
It has been maintained, that Agriculture is, not only, the 
most productive, but the only productive species of industry. 
The reality of this suggestion in either aspect, has, however, 
not been verified by any accurate detail of facts and 
calculations; and the general arguments, which are 
adduced to prove it, are rather subtil and paradoxical, than 
solid or convincing.”187 
  
Manufacturing is, for Hamilton, just as productive as agriculture, 
which differentiated Hamilton from many other thinkers of his time. 
“The foregoing suggestions are not designed to 
inculcate an opinion that manufacturing industry is more 
productive than that of Agriculture. They are intended rather 
to shew that the reverse of this proposition is not ascertained; 
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that the general arguments which are brought to establish it 
are not satisfactory; and consequently that a supposition of 
the superior productiveness of Tillage ought to be no obstacle 
to listening to any substantial inducements to the 
encouragement of manufactures, which may be otherwise 
perceived to exist, through an apprehension, that they may 
have a tendency to divert labour from a more to a less 
profitable employment. 
It is extremely probable, that on a full and accurate 
devellopment of the matter, on the ground of fact and 
calculation, it would be discovered that there is no material 
difference between the aggregate productiveness of the 
one, and of the other kind of industry; and that the propriety 
of the encouragements, which may in any case be proposed 
to be given to either ought to be determined upon 
considerations irrelative to any comparison of that nature.”188 
 
There is a need for society to have, as Hamilton argues, a proper 
division of labor in order to have the best possible economy. 
“It has justly been observed, that there is scarcely any thing of 
greater moment in the œconomy of a nation, than the 
proper division of labour. The seperation of occupations 
causes each to be carried to a much greater perfection, 
than it could possible acquire, if they were blended.”189  
 
Having manufacturing will help the United States in another way, 
through attracting immigrants. 
“If it be true then, that it is the interest of the United States to 
open every possible [avenue to] emigration from abroad, it 
affords a weighty argument for the encouragement of 
manufactures; which for the reasons just assigned, will have 
the strongest tendency to multiply the inducements to it.”190 
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Increasing the number of occupations is beneficial, because it 
leads to greater innovation throughout society. 
“The spirit of enterprise, useful and prolific as it is, must 
necessarily be contracted or expanded in proportion to the 
simplicity or variety of the occupations and productions, 
which are to be found in a Society. It must be less in a nation 
of mere cultivators, than in a nation of cultivators and 
merchants; less in a nation of cultivators and merchants, than 
in a nation of cultivators, artificers and merchants.”191 
 
The United States does need to take care to be self-sufficient as 
regards its food supply, and also its raw materials used in the 
manufacturing sector Hamilton wants. 
“It is a primary object of the policy of nations, to be able to 
supply themselves with subsistence from their own soils; and 
manufacturing nations, as far as circumstances permit, 
endeavor to procure, from the same source, the raw 
materials necessary for their own fabrics. This disposition, 
urged by the spirit of monopoly, is sometimes even carried to 
an injudicious extreme. It seems not always to be recollected, 
that nations, who have neither mines nor manufactures, can 
only obtain the manufactured articles, of which they stand in 
need, by an exchange of the products of their soils; and that, 
if those who can best furnish them with such articles are 
unwilling to give a due course to this exchange, they must of 
necessity make every possible effort to manufacture for 
themselves, the effect of which is that the manufacturing 
nations abrige the natural advantages of their situation, 
through an unwillingness to permit the Agricultural countries 
to enjoy the advantages of theirs, and sacrifice the interests 
of a mutually beneficial intercourse to the vain project 
of selling every thing and buying nothing.”192  
 
Reliance solely on agriculture, though, has been a disadvantage for 
the United States thus far, and will only continue to be so if manufacturing 
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is not added.  Demand for agricultural products overseas is not reliable 
and is thus not a good source of money which can be relied upon at all 
times. 
“But it is also a consequence of the policy, which has 
been noted, that the foreign demand for the products of 
Agricultural Countries, is, in a great degree, rather casual and 
occasional, than certain or constant. To what extent injurious 
interruptions of the demand for some of the staple 
commodities of the United States, may have been 
experienced, from that cause, must be referred to the 
judgment of those who are engaged in carrying on the 
commerce of the country; but it may be safely assumed, that 
such interruptions are at times very inconveniently felt, and 
that cases not unfrequently occur, in which markets are so 
confined and restricted, as to render the demand very 
unequal to the supply. 
Independently likewise of the artificial impediments, 
which are created by the policy in question, there are natural 
causes tending to render the external demand for the surplus 
of Agricultural nations a precarious reliance. The differences 
of seasons, in the countries, which are the consumers make 
immense differences in the produce of their own soils, in 
different years; and consequently in the degrees of their 
necessity for foreign supply. Plentiful harvests with them, 
especially if similar ones occur at the same time in the 
countries, which are the furnishers, occasion of course a glut 
in the markets of the latter.”193 
 
 Especially given how fast the United States population is growing, if 
it continues to rely solely on agriculture, that vast increase of people, all 
working in farming, will only lead to an ever greater supply, which will 
eventually lead to an over-abundance.  Manufacturing will help ease 
that by providing an outlet other than exports for American farm 
products. 
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“Considering how fast and how much the progress of 
new settlements in the United States must increase the surplus 
produce of the soil, and weighing seriously the tendency of 
the system, which prevails among most of the commercial 
nations of Europe; whatever dependence may be placed on 
the force of natural circumstances to counteract the effects 
of an artificial policy; there appear strong reasons to regard 
the foreign demand for that surplus as too uncertain a 
reliance, and to desire a substitute for it, in an extensive 
domestic market. 
To secure such a market, there is no other expedient, 
than to promote manufacturing establishments. 
Manufacturers who constitute the most numerous class, after 
the Cultivators of land, are for that reason the principal 
consumers of the surplus of their labour.”194 
  
 Hamilton further argues manufacturing will actually help give 
farmers an incentive to improve their lands, since they will have to find 
ways to deal with the movement of workers from farming to industry. 
“This idea of an extensive domestic market for the surplus 
produce of the soil is of the first consequence. It is of all things, 
that which most effectually conduces to a flourishing state of 
Agriculture. If the effect of manufactories should be to 
detatch a portion of the hands, which would otherwise be 
engaged in Tillage, it might possibly cause a smaller quantity 
of lands to be under cultivation but by their tendency to 
procure a more certain demand for the surplus produce of 
the soil, they would, at the same time, cause the lands which 
were in cultivation to be better improved and more 
productive. And while, by their influence, the condition of 
each individual farmer would be meliorated, the total mass of 
Agricultural production would probably be increased. For this 
must evidently depend as much, if not more, upon the 
degree of improvement; than upon the number of acres 
under culture.”195 
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  Manufacturing also leads to different, new, industries, such as 
mining, thus providing even more diversification and strength to the 
economy overall. 
“It merits particular observation, that the multiplication 
of manufactories not only furnishes a Market for those articles, 
which have been accustomed to be produced in 
abundance, in a country; but it likewise creates a demand 
for such as were either unknown or produced in 
inconsiderable quantities. The bowels as well as the surface of 
the earth are ransacked for articles which were before 
neglected. Animals, Plants and Minerals acquire an utility and 
value, which were before unexplored.  
The foregoing considerations seem sufficient to 
establish, as general propositions, That it is the interest of 
nations to diversify the industrious pursuits of the individuals, 
who compose them—That the establishment of manufactures 
is calculated not only to increase the general stock of useful 
and productive labour; but even to improve the state of 
Agriculture in particular; certainly to advance the interests of 
those who are engaged in it. There are other views, that will 
be hereafter taken of the subject, which, it is conceived, will 
serve to confirm these inferences.”196 
 
  Hamilton and Madison did both, at various points in their careers, 
mention a preference for free trade among all nations.  However, both 
also noted that other countries, such as Great Britain, did not follow that 
practice, so both argued that the United States could not rely on free 
trade at that time.   The United States was simply not on equal terms with 
any country in Europe at that point. 
“If the system of perfect liberty to industry and 
commerce were the prevailing system of nations—the 
arguments which dissuade a country in the predicament of 
the United States, from the zealous pursuits of manufactures 
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would doubtless have great force. It will not be affirmed, that 
they might not be permitted, with few exceptions, to serve as 
a rule of national conduct. In such a state of things, each 
country would have the full benefit of its peculiar advantages 
to compensate for its deficiencies or disadvantages. If one 
nation were in condition to supply manufactured articles on 
better terms than another, that other might find an abundant 
indemnification in a superior capacity to furnish the produce 
of the soil. And a free exchange, mutually beneficial, of the 
commodities which each was able to supply, on the best 
terms, might be carried on between them, supporting in full 
vigour the industry of each. And though the circumstances 
which have been mentioned and others, which will be 
unfolded hereafter render it probable, that nations merely 
Agricultural would not enjoy the same degree of opulence, in 
proportion to their numbers, as those which united 
manufactures with agriculture; yet the progressive 
improvement of the lands of the former might, in the end, 
atone for an inferior degree of opulence in the mean time: 
and in a case in which opposite considerations are pretty 
equally balanced, the option ought perhaps always to be, in 
favour of leaving Industry to its own direction. 
But the system which has been mentioned, is far from 
characterising the general policy of Nations. [The prevalent 
one has been regulated by an opposite spirit.] 
The consequence of it is, that the United States are to a 
certain extent in the situation of a country precluded from 
foreign Commerce. They can indeed, without difficulty obtain 
from abroad the manufactured supplies, of which they are in 
want; but they experience numerous and very injurious 
impediments to the emission and vent of their own 
commodities. Nor is this the case in reference to a single 
foreign nation only. The regulations of several countries, with 
which we have the most extensive intercourse, throw serious 
obstructions in the way of the principal staples of the United 
States. 
In such a position of things, the United States cannot 
exchange with Europe on equal terms; and the want of 
reciprocity would render them the victim of a system, which 
should induce them to confine their views to Agriculture and 
refrain from Manufactures. A constant and encreasing 
necessity, on their part, for the commodities of Europe, and 
only a partial and occasional demand for their own, in return, 
could not but expose them to a state of impoverishment, 
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compared with the opulence to which their political and 
natural advantages authorise them to aspire.”197 
 
  Hamilton further mentions an issue which would continue to be 
controversial throughout most of the history of the United States, that of 
“internal improvements,” but in a way which shows he completely 
approved of them.  Internal improvements, like manufacturing, would in 
his estimation, only make things better for Americans.  He also argued the 
sooner the United States was independent of Europe economically, the 
better. 
“Remarks of this kind are not made in the spirit of 
complaint. ’Tis for the nations, whose regulations are alluded 
to, to judge for themselves, whether, by aiming at too much 
they do not lose more than they gain. ’Tis for the United States 
to consider by what means they can render themselves least 
dependent, on the combinations, right or wrong of foreign 
policy. 
It is no small consolation, that already the measures 
which have embarrassed our Trade, have accelerated 
internal improvements, which upon the whole have bettered 
our affairs. To diversify and extend these improvements is the 
surest and safest method of indemnifying ourselves for any 
inconveniences, which those or similar measures have a 
tendency to beget. If Europe will not take from us 
the products of our soil, upon terms consistent with our 
interest, the natural remedy is to contract as fast as possible 
our wants of her.”198 
 
 Hamilton did show an influence from classical republican thought in 
his estimation that even if manufacturing is encouraged by government, 
most people will nevertheless still desire to be farmers, due to the 
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independence of that occupation which was taken for granted at that 
time. 
“But it does, by no means, follow, that the progress of new 
settlements would be retarded by the extension of 
Manufactures. The desire of being an independent proprietor 
of land is founded on such strong principles in the human 
breast, that where the opportunity of becoming so is as great 
as it is in the United States, the proportion will be small of 
those, whose situations would otherwise lead to it, who would 
be diverted from it towards Manufactures. And it is highly 
probable, as already intimated, that the accessions of 
foreigners, who originally drawn over by manufacturing views 
would afterwards abandon them for Agricultural, would be 
more than equivalent for those of our own Citizens, who 
might happen to be detached from them.”199 
 
 Overall, for Hamilton there is an ongoing need for government 
involvement in the economy.  Laissez faire is simply not possible in his view 
of human nature.  Government involvement is necessary for the 
improvement of society, as, for instance, habit and imitation all-too-often 
lead to a fear of innovation.  People will often simply not risk their own 
resources in order to make improvements, and so government needs to 
step in and provide the source of innovation.  This is for Hamilton a never-
ending positive role for government, as a means of improving the 
economy over time.  Government involvement leads to risk-taking that 
would not otherwise occur. 
 Plus, the United States had an especially strong need for 
government at its beginning, because it needed to overcome already 
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established industries in other countries.  Nascent industries in the United 
States simply could not effectively compete with much more established 
manufacturers elsewhere, if for no other reason than the support those 
industries already received from their own governments.  Thus, the United 
States needed to do the same.  Government support of manufacturing in 
other countries was, in Hamilton’s estimation, the single greatest barrier to 
growth of industry in the United States. 
“The remaining objections to a particular 
encouragement of manufactures in the United States now 
require to be examined. 
One of these turns on the proposition, that Industry, if 
left to itself, will naturally find its way to the most useful and 
profitable employment: whence it is inferred, that 
manufactures without the aid of government will grow up as 
soon and as fast, as the natural state of things and the 
interest of the community may require.  
Against the solidity of this hypothesis, in the full latitude 
of the terms, very cogent reasons may be offered. These 
have relation to—the strong influence of habit and the spirit 
of imitation—the fear of want of success in untried 
enterprises—the intrinsic difficulties incident to first essays 
towards a competition with those who have previously 
attained to perfection in the business to be attempted—the 
bounties premiums and other artificial encouragements, with 
which foreign nations second the exertions of their own 
Citizens in the branches, in which they are to be rivalled. 
Experience teaches, that men are often so much 
governed by what they are accustomed to see and 
practice, that the simplest and most obvious improvements, 
in the [most] ordinary occupations, are adopted with 
hesitation, reluctance and by slow gradations. The 
spontaneous transition to new pursuits, in a community long 
habituated to different ones, may be expected to be 
attended with proportionably greater difficulty. When former 
occupations ceased to yield a profit adequate to the 
subsistence of their followers, or when there was an absolute 
deficiency of employment in them, owing to the 
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superabundance of hands, changes would ensue; but these 
changes would be likely to be more tardy than might consist 
with the interest either of individuals or of the Society. In many 
cases they would not happen, while a bare support could be 
ensured by an adherence to ancient courses; though a resort 
to a more profitable employment might be practicable. To 
produce the desireable changes, as early as may be 
expedient, may therefore require the incitement and 
patronage of government.  
The apprehension of failing in new attempts is perhaps 
a more serious impediment. There are dispositions apt to be 
attracted by the mere novelty of an undertaking—but these 
are not always those best calculated to give it success. To 
this, it is of importance that the confidence of cautious 
sagacious capitalists both citizens and foreigners, should be 
excited. And to inspire this description of persons with 
confidence, it is essential, that they should be made to see in 
any project, which is new, and for that reason alone, if, for no 
other, precarious, the prospect of such a degree of 
countenance and support from government, as may be 
capable of overcoming the obstacles, inseperable from first 
experiments.  
The superiority antecedently enjoyed by nations, who 
have preoccupied and perfected a branch of industry, 
constitutes a more formidable obstacle, than either of those, 
which have been mentioned, to the introduction of the same 
branch into a country, in which it did not before exist. To 
maintain between the recent establishments of one country 
and the long matured establishments of another country, a 
competition upon equal terms, both as to quality and price, is 
in most cases impracticable. The disparity in the one, or in the 
other, or in both, must necessarily be so considerable as to 
forbid a successful rivalship, without the extraordinary aid and 
protection of government.  
But the greatest obstacle of all to the successful 
prosecution of a new branch of industry in a country, in which 
it was before unknown, consists, as far as the instances apply, 
in the bounties premiums and other aids which are granted, 
in a variety of cases, by the nations, in which the 
establishments to be imitated are previously introduced. It is 
well known (and particular examples in the course of this 
report will be cited) that certain nations grant bounties on the 
exportation of particular commodities, to enable their own 
workmen to undersell and supplant all competitors, in the 
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countries to which those commodities are sent. Hence the 
undertakers of a new manufacture have to contend not only 
with the natural disadvantages of a new undertaking, but 
with the gratuities and remunerations which other 
governments bestow. To be enabled to contend with 
success, it is evident, that the interference and aid of their 
own government are indispensible.”200 
 
 Individual initiative, while lauded by Hamilton, was for the reasons 
he mentioned above, just not enough, given the particular circumstances 
the United States found itself in at the time he submitted his report to 
Congress.  The only resource available was for the United States to mimic 
the business-encouraging behavior of Europeans. 
“Whatever room there may be for an expectation that the 
industry of a people, under the direction of private interest, 
will upon equal terms find out the most beneficial 
employment for itself, there is none for a reliance, that it will 
struggle against the force of unequal terms, or will of itself 
surmount all the adventitious barriers to a successful 
competition, which may have been erected either by the 
advantages naturally acquired from practice and previous 
possession of the ground, or by those which may have sprung 
from positive regulations and an artificial policy. This general 
reflection might alone suffice as an answer to the objection 
under examination; exclusively of the weighty considerations 
which have been particularly urged.”201 
 
In a time of primary reliance on specie for use as money, and given 
its general scarcity in the United States, what options were available to 
provide the capital essential for the creation and maintenance of a 
manufacturing economy?  The public debt, specifically the securities of 
the United States, can be used as money, due to the reliable value 
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Hamilton argued such securities would have in the minds of those 
exchanging them. 
“Public Funds answer the purpose of Capital, from the 
estimation in which they are usually held by Monied men; 
and consequently from the Ease and dispatch with which 
they can be turned into money. This capacity of prompt 
convertibility into money causes a transfer of stock to be in a 
great number of Cases equivalent to a payment in coin. And 
where it does not happen to suit the party who is to receive, 
to accept a transfer of Stock, the party who is to pay, is never 
at a loss to find elsewhere a purchaser of his Stock, who will 
furnish him in lieu of it, with the Coin of which he stands in 
need. Hence in a sound and settled state of the public funds, 
a man possessed of a sum in them can embrace any scheme 
of business, which offers, with as much confidence as if he 
were possessed of an equal sum in Coin.”202 
 
 Hamilton emphasized the “utility” of making such use of the debt.  
However, again in contrast to a common misunderstanding of Hamilton, 
he did not argue that the more debt, existing in perpetuity, the better.  
This was for him only a temporary measure, to provide a means by which 
greater economic exchange across the United States could be 
encouraged in the short-term.  He very clearly argues not only for an 
eventual reduction in the debt, but also for its eventual retirement.  His 
arguments echo classical republican virtue in decrying the accumulation 
of too much debt over time. 
“There are respectable individuals, who from a just 
aversion to an accumulation of Public debt, are unwilling to 
concede to it any kind of utility, who can discern no good to 
alleviate the ill with which they suppose it pregnant; who 
cannot be persuaded that it ought in any sense to be viewed 
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as an increase of capital lest it should be inferred, that the 
more debt the more capital, the greater the burthens the 
greater the blessings of the community. 
But it interests the public Councils to estimate every 
object as it truly is; to appreciate how far the good in any 
measure is compensated by the ill; or the ill by the good, 
Either of them is seldom unmixed. 
Neither will it follow, that an accumulation of debt is 
desireable, because a certain degree of it operates as 
capital. There may be a plethora in the political, as in the 
Natural body; There may be a state of things in which any 
such artificial capital is unnecessary. The debt too may be 
swelled to such a size, as that the greatest part of it may 
cease to be useful as a Capital, serving only to pamper the 
dissipation of idle and dissolute individuals: as that the sums 
required to pay the Interest upon it may become oppressive, 
and beyond the means, which a government can employ, 
consistently with its tranquility, to raise them; as that the 
resources of taxation, to face the debt, may have been 
strained too far to admit of extensions adequate to 
exigencies, which regard the public safety. 
Where this critical point is, cannot be pronounced, but 
it is impossible to believe, that there is not such a point. 
And as the vicissitudes of Nations beget a perpetual 
tendency to the accumulation of debt, there ought to be in 
every government a perpetual, anxious and unceasing effort 
to reduce that, which at any time exists, as fast as shall be 
practicable consistently with integrity and good faith. 
Reasonings on a subject comprehending ideas so 
abstract and complex, so little reducible to precise 
calculation as those which enter into the question just 
discussed, are always attended with a danger of runing into 
fallacies. Due allowance ought therefore to be made for this 
possibility. But as far as the Nature of the subject admits of it, 
there appears to be satisfactory ground for a belief, that the 
public funds operate as a resource of capital to the Citizens 
of the United States, and, if they are a resource at all, it is an 
extensive one.”203 
 
Hamilton was not an advocate for government control of the 
economy, though.  That much is clear from his statements.  For him, the 
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free competition between businesses would have many desirable 
outcomes, such as the elimination of monopolies, and the reduction in 
price of commodities to the lowest point possible.  So, Hamilton argued 
government encouragement, but not control, of manufacturing would in 
the long run benefit the people at large.  Even agriculture, often seen as 
antagonistic to manufacturing, would benefit, as lower prices for 
manufactured goods would result in increased personal wealth even for 
farmers.  This is a consistent theme with Hamilton, that government exists 
for the benefit of the people.   
“The internal competition, which takes place, soon 
does away every thing like Monopoly, and by degrees 
reduces the price of the Article to the minimum of a 
reasonable profit on the Capital employed. This accords with 
the reason of the thing and with experience. 
Whence it follows, that it is the interest of a community 
with a view to eventual and permanent oeconomy, to 
encourage the growth of manufactures. In a national view, a 
temporary enhancement of price must always be well 
compensated by a permanent reduction of it. 
It is a reflection, which may with propriety be indulged 
here, that this eventual diminution of the prices of 
manufactured Articles; which is the result of internal 
manufacturing establishments, has a direct and very 
important tendency to benefit agriculture. It enables the 
farmer, to procure with a smaller quantity of his labour, the 
manufactured produce of which he stan<ds> in need, and 
consequently increases the value of his income and 
property.”204 
 
 Hamilton also echoed the sentiments of many of his 
contemporaries, as well as people today, in expressing concern for the 
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United States’ balance of trade with other countries.  Showing a more 
mercantilist aspect to his thought, he emphasized that manufacturing 
would lead to a richer nation overall, and a better (i.e., positive) balance 
of trade with other countries.  Agriculture alone cannot supply this benefit 
to the United States, though. 
“From these circumstances collectively, two important 
inferences are to be drawn, one, that there is always a higher 
probability of a favorable balance of Trade, in regard to 
countries in which manufactures founded on the basis of a 
thriving Agriculture flourish, than in regard to those, which are 
confined wholly or almost wholly to Agriculture; the other 
(which is also a consequence of the first) that countries of the 
former description are likely to possess more pecuniary 
wealth, or money, than those of the latter.”205 
 
 In stark contrast to an emphasis on a lack of wealth being 
necessary for republican virtue, as found in other writers, Hamilton stressed 
the need for wealth in order to achieve the best possible sort of political 
arrangements.  In order for the supply of specie in the United States to 
increase, there would need to exist a more well-rounded economy than 
what was current.  Manufacturing would lead to wealth, and wealth to 
strengthened independence and security from other nations.   
He pointed to the United States’ inability to supply itself during the 
Revolutionary War as illustrative of the problems the country would 
continue to face if it did not develop manufacturing as soon as possible.  
For Hamilton, the United States had been altogether too reliant on 
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supplies and other forms of assistance from France in gaining its 
independence from Great Britain.  Specifically, the United States needed 
a Navy, which unfortunately, following classical republican doctrine, had 
been completely disbanded after the end of the Revolution.  In any case, 
it is historically the case that French victories at sea enabled joint 
French/American victories on land such as Yorktown. 
“But the uniform appearance of an abundance of 
specie, as the concomitant of a flourishing state of 
manufacture<s> and of the reverse, where they do not 
prevail, afford a strong presumption of their favourable 
operation upon the wealth of a Country. 
Not only the wealth; but the independence and 
security of a Country, appear to be materially connected 
with the prosperity of manufactures. Every nation, with a view 
to those great objects, ought to endeavour to possess within 
itself all the essentials of national supply. These comprise the 
means of Subsistence habitation clothing and defence. 
The possession of these is necessary to the perfection of 
the body politic, to the safety as well as to the welfare of the 
society; the want of either, is the want of an important organ 
of political life and Motion; and in the various crises which 
await a state, it must severely feel the effects of any such 
deficiency. The extreme embarrassments of the United States 
during the late War, from an incapacity of supplying 
themselves, are still matter of keen recollection: A future war 
might be expected again to exemplify the mischiefs and 
dangers of a situation, to which that incapacity is still in too 
great a degree applicable, unless changed by timely and 
vigorous exertion. To effect this change as fast as shall be 
prudent, merits all the attention and all the Zeal of our Public 
Councils; ’tis the next great work to be accomplished. 
The want of a Navy to protect our external commerce, 
as long as it shall Continue, must render it a peculiarly 
precarious reliance, for the supply of essential articles, and 
must serve to strengthen prodigiously the arguments in favour 
of manufactures.”206 
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Why is this important for the United States?  Why encourage 
manufacturing?  Because doing so will help “establish substantial and 
permanent order.”  Again and again with Hamilton we see an overriding 
emphasis on, and concern with, the tenuous nature of the continued 
existence of the United States.  This recommendation regarding 
manufacturing is only one means by which Hamilton is convinced the 
United States will succeed in the long run. 
“It is a truth as important as it is agreeable, and one to which 
it is not easy to imagine exceptions, that every thing tending 
to establish substantial and permanent order, in the affairs of 
a Country, to increase the total mass of industry and 
opulence, is ultimately beneficial to every part of it. On the 
Credit of this great truth, an acquiescence may safely be 
accorded, from every quarter, to all institutions & 
arrangements, which promise a confirmation of public order, 
and an augmentation of National Resource.”207 
 
Now is a critical moment for Hamilton.  The United States needs to 
act immediately if it is to survive.  Doing so will also lead to an increase in 
foreign investment in the United States, which will lead to an increased 
supply of specie, and improvement in the wealth of all Americans. 
“If then, it satisfactorily appears, that it is the Interest of the 
United states, generally, to encourage manufactures, it merits 
particular attention, that there are circumstances, which 
Render the present a critical moment for entering with Zeal 
upon the important business. The effort cannot fail to be 
materially seconded by a considerable and encreasing influx 
of money, in consequence of foreign speculations in the 
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funds—and by the disorders, which exist in different parts of 
Europe.”208 
 
In an argument once again quite similar to one of Madison’s, as we 
will see below, the government of the United States must act to create a 
domestic market, because other nations’ governments already do this.  
The goal of this policy is again the well-being of the American people. 
“Considering a monopoly of the domestic market to its own 
manufacturers as the reigning policy of manufacturing 
Nations, a similar policy on the part of the United states in 
every proper instance, is dictated, it might almost be said, by 
the principles of distributive justice; certainly by the duty of 
endeavouring to secure to their own Citizens a reciprocity of 
advantages.”209 
 
One way to achieve these goals is to impose tariffs on foreign 
goods, which need to be higher in the case of goods from some foreign 
competitor to domestic manufacturers. 
“The true way to conciliate these two interests, is to lay a duty 
on foreign manufactures of the material, the growth of which 
is desired to be encouraged, and to apply the produce of 
that duty by way of bounty, either upon the production of the 
material itself or upon its manufacture at home or upon both. 
In this disposition of the thing, the Manufacturer commences 
his enterprise under every advantage, which is attainable, as 
to quantity or price, of the raw material: And the Farmer if the 
bounty be immediately to him, is enabled by it to enter into a 
successful competition with the foreign material; if the bounty 
be to the manufacturer on so much of the domestic material 
as he consumes, the operation is nearly the same; he has a 
motive of interest to prefer the domestic Commodity, if of 
equal quality, even at a higher price than the foreign, so long 
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as the difference of price is any thing short of the bounty 
which is allowed upon the article.”210 
 
  Another option is to pay bounties for certain goods, although this 
option is much more problematic for Hamilton than tariffs.  They are 
beneficial only when an industry is very young, and are frequently a 
source of jealousy.  Still, there are benefits to the country as a whole from 
bounties, in his estimation.  I myself am of the opinion that Hamilton shows 
here in his opinions on bounties that he himself was far more high-minded, 
and personally focused on the common good rather than his own self-
interest, than other people were then, or now.  He just never shows the 
malevolent calculation so many have characterized him as having.  That 
bounties could be a source of corruption seems not to have even 
occurred to him. 
“The continuance of bounties on manufactures long 
established must almost always be of questionable policy: 
Because a presumption would arise in every such Case, that 
there were natural and inherent impediments to success. But 
in new undertakings, they are as justifiable, as they are 
oftentimes necessary. 
There is a degree of prejudice against bounties from an 
appearance of giving away the public money, without an 
immediate consideration, and from a supposition, that they 
serve to enrich particular classes, at the expence of the 
Community. 
But neither of these sources of dislike will bear a serious 
examination. There is no purpose, to which public money can 
be more beneficially applied, than to the acquisition of a 
new and useful branch of industry; no Consideration more 
valuable than a permanent addition to the general stock of 
productive labour. 
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As to the second source of objection, it equally lies 
against other modes of encouragement, which are admitted 
to be eligible. As often as a duty upon a foreign article makes 
an addition to its price, it causes an extra expence to the 
Community, for the benefit of the domestic manufacturer. A 
bounty does no more: But it is the Interest of the society in 
each case, to submit to a temporary expence, which is more 
than compensated, by an increase of industry and Wealth, 
by an augmentation of resources and independence; & by 
the circumstance of eventual cheapness, which has been 
noticed in another place.”211 
 
 It is with his argument in favor of the Constitutionality of his proposals 
that we come to the heart of the disagreement between Hamilton and 
Madison on the question of government involvement in the economy.  
There is an enormous divide between the two on this issue, and each 
individual’s arguments on this point show a continuation of his preferences 
prior to the existence of the Constitution.  For Hamilton, one cannot 
include all the details of what the federal government is permitted to do 
within the Constitution itself.  This is once again indicative of his willingness 
to construe far, far more latitude into the Constitution regarding the 
powers of the federal government.   
It is his appeal to the “general welfare” clause as the source for the 
Constitutionality of his proposals which so infuriated Madison, as we shall 
see below.   Hamilton argues, in response to objections like Madison’s, that 
this is not a power for the federal government to just do whatever it wants.  
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There is a limit, and it is that only actions may be taken that benefit the 
United States as a whole, and not any one part or state. 
 It is important to note, though, that Hamilton makes essentially the 
same argument as Madison, that “all” those who wrote the Constitution 
were in agreement, and had clear, unambiguous expectations as to how 
it would be interpreted and carried out, since as he says, it is “doubtless” 
that his interpretation is the correct one.  This argument has been 
commented on frequently in Madison’s case, but we see the same claim 
with Hamilton as well.  I find the claim by both to be dubious at best.  
Neither can legitimately claim to have known the minds of all the other 
individuals who took part in writing the Constitution.  Neither can lay claim 
to exclusive expertise in determining, once and for all, the meaning of its 
many passages which admit of more than one interpretation.  I argue 
both had clear ideas of his own, but could not possibly be the one, final, 
source regarding the expectations all the other authors had. 
“A Question has been made concerning the 
Constitutional right of the Government of the United States to 
apply this species of encouragement, but there is certainly no 
good foundation for such a question. The National Legislature 
has express authority “To lay and Collect taxes, duties, 
imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for 
the Common defence and general welfare” with no 
other qualifications than that ‘all duties, imposts and excises, 
shall be uniform throughout the United states, that no 
capitation or other direct tax shall be laid unless in proportion 
to numbers ascertained by a census or enumeration taken on 
the principles prescribed in the Constitution,’ and that ‘no tax 
or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state.’ 
These three qualifications excepted, the power to raise 
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money is plenary, and indefinite; and the objects to which it 
may be appropriated are no less comprehensive, than the 
payment of the public debts and the providing for the 
common defence and “general Welfare.” The terms ‘general 
Welfare’ were doubtless intended to signify more than was 
expressed or imported in those which Preceded; otherwise 
numerous exigencies incident to the affairs of a Nation would 
have been left without a provision. The phrase is as 
comprehensive as any that could have been used; because 
it was not fit that the constitutional authority of the Union, to 
appropriate its revenues shou’d have been restricted within 
narrower limits than the ‘General Welfare’ and because this 
necessarily embraces a vast variety of particulars, which are 
susceptible neither of specification nor of definition. 
It is therefore of necessity left to the discretion of the 
National Legislature, to pronounce, upon the objects, which 
concern the general Welfare, and for which under that 
description, an appropriation of money is requisite and 
proper. And there seems to be no room for a doubt that 
whatever concerns the general Interests of learning of 
Agriculture of Manufactures and of Commerce are within the 
sphere of the national Councils as far as regards an 
application of Money.  The only qualification of the 
generallity of the Phrase in question, which seems to be 
admissible, is this—That the object to which an appropriation 
of money is to be made be General and not local; its 
operation extending in fact, or by possibility, throughout the 
Union, and not being confined to a particular spot. 
No objection ought to arise to this construction from a 
supposition that it would imply a power to do whatever else 
should appear to Congress conducive to the General 
Welfare. A power to appropriate money with this latitude 
which is granted too in express terms would not carry a power 
to do any other thing, not authorised in the constitution, either 
expressly or by fair implication.”212 
  
In bemoaning the influence of state-centered opinions and 
loyalties, Hamilton as always displays his much-more national focus for the 
United States.  
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“Here, however, as in some other cases, there is cause 
to regret, that the competency of the authority of the 
National Government to the good, which might be done, is 
not without a question. Many aids might be given to industry; 
many internal improvements of primary magnitude might be 
promoted, by an authority operating throughout the Union, 
which cannot be effected, as well, if at all, by an authority 
confined within the limits of a single state. 
But if the legislature of the Union cannot do all the 
good, that might be wished, it is at least desirable, that all 
may be done, which is practicable. Means for promoting the 
introduction of foreign improvements, though less 
efficaciously than might be accomplished with more 
adequate authority, will form a part of the plan intended to 
be submitted in the close of this report.”213 
 
Hamilton had even more in mind for federal government 
involvement in the economy.  Beyond encouraging manufacturing, he 
wanted for the federal government, taking a cue from a step already 
taken by individual states, to have a role in inspecting goods to ensure 
their quality.  Far before the creation of the federal government agencies 
we take for granted today, Hamilton saw a need for consumer protection 
by the federal government.  These inspections would, in his view, prevent 
fraud, improve quality, and more firmly establish the reputations of 
American goods. 
Also, he argued for a much greater involvement by the federal 
government in financial exchanges, both to make such possible in the first 
place, and also to ease the process by which they would occur.  Hamilton 
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desired an expansion in the supply of money, especially paper money, 
and argued for the need for such paper to be good in every state. 
“Judicious regulations for the inspection of 
manufactured commodities. 
This is not among the least important of the means, by 
which the prosperity of manufactures may be promoted. It is 
indeed in many cases one of the most essential. Contributing 
to prevent frauds upon consumers at home and exporters to 
foreign countries—to improve the quality & preserve the 
character of the national manufactures, it cannot fail to aid 
the expeditious and advantageous Sale of them, and to 
serve as a guard against successful competition from other 
quarters. The reputation of the flour and lumber of some 
states, and of the Pot ash of others has been established by 
an attention to this point. And the like good name might be 
procured for those articles, wheresoever produced, by a 
judicious and uniform system of Inspection; throughout the 
ports of the United States. A like system might also be 
extended with advantage to other commodities. 
The facilitating of pecuniary remittances from place to 
place is a point of considerable moment to trade in general, 
and to manufactures in particular; by rendering more easy 
the purchase of raw materials and provisions and the 
payment for manufactured supplies. A general circulation of 
Bank paper, which is to be expected from the institution lately 
established will be a most valuable mean to this end. But 
much good would also accrue from some additional 
provisions respecting inland bills of exchange. If those drawn 
in one state payable in another were made negotiable, 
everywhere, and interest and damages allowed in case of 
protest, it would greatly promote negotiations between the 
Citizens of different states, by rendering them more secure; 
and, with it the convenience and advantage of the 
Merchants and manufacturers of each.”214 
 
  Internal improvements, especially, were an issue Hamilton regarded 
as needing national supervision.  On their own, each state would focus 
solely on its own good, and their efforts would probably be not only 
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wasteful due to repetition, but also counter-productive by coming into 
conflict with other states’ efforts. 
“The symptoms of attention to the improvement of inland 
Navigation, which have lately appeared in some quarters, 
must fill with pleasure every breast warmed with a true Zeal 
for the prosperity of the Country. These examples, it is to be 
hoped, will stimulate the exertions of the Government and 
the Citizens of every state. There can certainly be no object, 
more worthy of the cares of the local administrations; and it 
were to be wished, that there was no doubt of the power of 
the national Government to lend its direct aid, on a 
comprehensive plan. This is one of those improvements, 
which could be prosecuted with more efficacy by the whole, 
than by any part or parts of the Union. There are cases in 
which the general interest will be in danger to be sacrificed to 
the collission of some supposed local interests. Jealousies, in 
matters of this kind, are as apt to exist, as they are apt to be 
erroneous.”215 
 
 Hamilton showed he was in favor of, and willing to have, the 
Treasury take action to help stabilize the economy when needed.  This is 
yet again indicative of Hamilton’s much greater vision for the federal 
government’s involvement in the economy than Madison.  In regards to a 
potential early bank panic, he wrote to William Seton in 1792 that he was 
willing to have the Treasury assist a prominent bank, in order to fend off 
the effects of what he considered unprincipled economic behavior by 
others.  
“I feel great satisfaction in knowing from yourself, that 
your institution rejects the idea of coalition with the new 
project, or rather Hydra of projects. 
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I shall labour to give what has taken place a turn favourable 
to another Union; the propriety of which is as you say clearly 
illustrated by the present state of things. 
It is my wish that the Bank of New York may, by all 
means, continue to receive deposits from the Collector, in the 
paper of the Bank of the U States, and that they may also 
receive payment for the Dutch Bills in the same paper. This 
paper may either be remitted to the Treasurer or remain in 
the Bank as itself shall deem most expedient. I have explicitly 
directed the Treasurer to forbear drawing on the Bank of New 
York, without special direction from me. And my intention is to 
leave you in possession of all the money you have or may 
receive ’till I am assured that the present storm is effectually 
weathered. 
Every body here sees the propriety of your having 
refused the paper of the Bank of the United States in such a 
crisis of your affairs. 
Be Confidential with me. If you are pressed, whatever 
support may be in my power shall be afforded. I consider the 
public interest as materially involved in aiding a valuable 
institution like yours to withstand the attacks of a 
confederated host of frantic and I fear, in too many 
instances, unprincipled gamblers.”216 
 
Hamilton even had in mind a role for the federal government as 
regards what we now call social programs, when and where those would 
be necessary.  In a report sent to the Speaker of the House from 1792, he 
wrote: 
“The establishment of one or more marine Hospitals in 
the United States is a measure desirable on various accounts. 
The interests of humanity are concerned in it, from its 
tendency to protect from want and misery, a very useful, 
and, for the most part, a very needy class of the Community. 
The interests of navigation and trade are also concerned in it, 
from the protection and relief, which it is calculated to afford 
to the same class; conducing to attract and attach seamen 
to the country. 
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A fund for the purpose may, it is presumed, be most 
conveniently derived from the expedient suggested in the 
above mentioned Memorial, namely, a contribution by the 
mariners and seamen of the United States, out of their wages 
to be regulated by law. 
The rate of the contribution may be ten cents per 
month for each mariner or seamen, to be reserved, pursuant 
to articles, by masters of vessels, and paid to the collectors of 
districts, to which the vessels respectively belong. Effectual 
regulations for this purpose may, without difficulty be devised. 
The benefit of the fund ought to extend, not only to disabled 
and decrepid seamen, but to the widows and children of 
those who may have been killed or drowned, in the course of 
their service as seamen. 
It will probably be found expedient, besides the 
reception and accomodation of the parties entitled, at any 
hospital which may be instituted to authorize the granting 
pensions, in aid of those who may be in condition, partly to 
procure a subsistence from their own labor. There may be 
cases, in which this mode of relief may be more 
accommodating to the individuals, and, at the same time, 
more œconomical.”217 
 
 Notice the suggestion that a tax be levied, out of individual 
incomes, for the benefit of others.  Now, the tax would be paid by those 
within a specific profession for the benefit of others in that profession, but 
this clearly shows that Hamilton thought of roles for the federal 
government that far exceeded the opinions of others of his time.  Some 
people needed to be helped in order to be safe from want and misery, 
help that government could offer.  Not only were the sailors to be 
protected, but also their wives and children.  However, there were limits to 
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what he felt government, and he in his official capacity as Treasury 
Secretary, could do. 
“I regret much every embarassment which is 
experienced by the Mercantile Body—whether arising from 
the public operations, from accidental and unavoidable 
causes, or from a spirit of enterprise beyond the Capital 
which is to support it. That valuable class of Citizens forms too 
important an organ of the general weal not to claim every 
practicable and reasonable exemption and indulgence. 
I do not perceive however that I can at the present 
moment contribute to this end otherwise than by 
encouraging the Bank to continue its aids as liberally as shall 
be consistent with its safety under an assurance that I shall for 
some time to come forbear drafts upon them as much as 
shall be practicable. The deposits of the Government will 
during this period be proportionably considerable. 
In making this declaration, I confide in the prudence of 
the Directors not to overstrain the faculties of the Bank by 
which the Institution and the public Interest might both 
suffer.”218 
 
 Again, the goal for Hamilton behind all of his preferences for 
government involvement in the economy is the good of the people at 
large.  Beyond helping to create better economic conditions, he argued 
government needed to be active to protect the people from various 
dangers, such as the “rich and powerful,” and “caballers, intriguers, and 
demagogues.”  He also showed he was far more concerned about the 
possibility of anarchy than tyranny.  Writing as “Tully” in 1794, he said:  
“If it were to be asked, What is the most sacred duty 
and the greatest source of security in a Republic? the answer 
would be, An inviolable respect for the Constitution and 
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Laws—the first growing out of the last. It is by this, in a great 
degree, that the rich and powerful are to be restrained from 
enterprises against the common liberty—operated upon by 
the influence of a general sentiment, by their interest in the 
principle, and by the obstacles which the habit it produces 
erects against innovation and encroachment. It is by this, in a 
still greater degree, that caballers, intriguers, and 
demagogues are prevented from climbing on the shoulders 
of faction to the tempting seats of usurpation and tyranny. 
Were it not that it might require too lengthy a 
discussion, it would not be difficult to demonstrate, that a 
large and well organized Republic can scarcely lose its liberty 
from any other cause than that of anarchy, to which a 
contempt of the laws is the high road.”219 
 
 In the draft he wrote for George Washington’s address, which I 
include here because the document at this point does reflect only 
Hamilton’s ideas, and not Washington’s,  Hamilton argues it is “natural” to 
have a bureaucracy dedicated to taking care of not just manufacturing, 
but agriculture as well.  Agriculture is so important that government “has” 
to oversee it to ensure the well-being of the country.  Damage could 
potentially be done to agriculture due to a lack of oversight, and further, 
government action would, in Hamilton’s estimation, result in greater 
strength, opulence, and happiness for the country as a whole. 
 I want to call attention to Hamilton’s use of that word, “opulence.”  
He uses it frequently in his writings, and it shows one of the ways in which 
Hamilton departed from a strictly classical understanding of the needs of 
a republic.  In contrast to the classical emphasis on simplicity, even 
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poverty, Hamilton argues for the need for greater wealth among the 
population as a whole in order for the United States to survive and thrive. 
 Hamilton also argues the need for the federal government to have 
a role in education, such as a national university and a national military 
academy.  There are other schools, but he states they simply do not have 
enough money at this point to meet the needs of the nation.  Also, the 
national university would attract students from all over the country, which 
would bring the United States closer together, as the students would 
receive a common education and experience that they would take back 
to their homes, and thus cause that national perspective to be more 
widely diffused throughout the country.  The military academy would also 
provide a national point of view to those who serve in the military, rather 
than retaining a state-centered view, such as with state militia-only 
service. 
He states his fear of a nation “subdivided,” a notion which once 
again shows that he, in marked contrast to so many of his 
contemporaries, understood the United States to be one whole, and not a 
collection of states which just happen to have been gathered into one.  
As became clear over time, the view of the United States as a collection 
of states gathered together, or confederated, was one which persisted for 
decades, and was put to rest (for the most part) only by the Civil War. 
Another point he raises, which proved to be quite controversial, is 
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his call for a United States navy.  After the end of the Revolutionary War, 
the United States had sold off its ships.  However, if the United States wants 
to continue the commerce it has already established with other nations, it 
needs to protect it with a navy.  The United States should remain neutral 
as regards the conflicts between other nations, of course, but nevertheless 
needs its own navy in order to induce other countries to actually respect 
that neutrality, as the United States was already learning in its attempt to 
stay out of the wars between Great Britain and France.  This is yet another 
point on which he and Madison actually agreed more than they 
disagreed. 
 Further, in regards to pay for public servants, Hamilton argues that 
appeals to republican virtue are pointless.  If the United States wants 
qualified individuals, it has to pay sufficiently well to attract and retain 
them.  Not paying well limits public service to the rich.  Hamilton again 
and again pointed out the limits of the republican virtue ideal.  Humans 
do have selfish motives, which cannot be overcome by high-minded 
appeals alone.  This is in fact quite similar to Madison’s views of human 
nature in The Federalist. 
 Hamilton, again in reference to the United States’ relations with 
Great Britain, shows his far greater focus on building up the United States, 
rather than maintaining an intimate relationship with Great Britain, as Elkins 
and McKitrick depict him.  He wanted to reduce the United States’ 
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dependence on Great Britain, something encouraging manufacturing 
would help, because depending on Great Britain would be a threat to 
American security.  Specifically, as regards manufacturing, war-related 
industries need to be encouraged and built up to keep the United States 
safe.  Publicly-owned industries should be avoided, but may be necessary 
if private industry cannot supply something absolutely necessary for 
defense. 
“That among the objects of labour and industry, 
Agriculture considered with reference either to individual or 
national welfare is first in importance may safely be affirmed 
without derogating from the just and real value of any other 
branch. It is indeed the best basis of the prosperity of every 
other. In proportion as nations progress in population and 
other circumstances of maturity this truth forces itself more & 
more upon the conviction of Rulers and makes the cultivation 
of the soil more and more an object of public patronage and 
care. Institutions for promoting it sooner or later grow up 
supported by the public purse—and the fruits of them when 
judiciously conceived and directed have fully justified the 
undertaking. Among these none have been found of greater 
utility than BOARDS composed of proper characters charged 
with collecting and communicating information and enabled 
to stimulate enterprise and experiment by premiums and 
honorary rewards. These have been found very cheap 
instruments of immense benefits. They serve to excite a 
general spirit of discovery & improvement to stimulate 
invention to excite new & useful experiments—and 
accumulating in one center the skill and improvement of 
every part of the nation they spread it thence over the whole 
nation at the same time promoting new discovery and 
diffusing generally the knowlege of all the discoveries which 
are made. 
In the U States hitherto no such institution has been 
essayed though perhaps no country has stronger motives to 
it. Agriculture among us is certainly in a very imperfect state. 
In much of those parts where there have been early 
settlements the soil impoverished by an unskilful tillage yields 
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but a scanty reward for the labour bestowed upon it, and 
leaves its possessors under strong temptation to abandon it 
and emigrate to distant regions more fertile because they are 
newer and have not yet been exhausted by an unskilful use. 
This is every way an evil. The undue dislocation of our 
population from this cause promotes neither the strength the 
opulence nor the happiness of our Country. It strongly 
admonishes our national Councils to apply as far as may be 
practical by natural & salutary means an adequate Remedy. 
Nothing appears to [be] so unexceptionable & likely to be 
more efficacious than the institution of a Board of Agriculture 
with the views I have mentioned & with a moderate fund 
towards executing them. After mature reflection I am 
persuaded it is difficult to render our country a more precious 
and general service than by such an institution. 
I will however observe that if it be thought expedient 
the objects of the Board may be still more comprehensive. It 
may embrace the encouragement of the mechanic and 
manufacturing arts by means analogous to those for the 
improvement of Agriculture & with an eye to the introduction 
from abroad of useful machinery &c. Or there may be 
separate Boards one charged with one object the other with 
the other. 
I have heretofore suggested the expediency of 
establishing a national university and a Military Academy. The 
vast utility of both these measures presses so seriously and so 
constantly upon my mind that I cannot forbear with 
earnestness to repeat the recommendation. 
The Assembly to which I address myself will not doubt 
that the extension of science and knowledge is an object 
primarily interesting to our national welfare. To effect this is 
most naturally the care of the particular local jurisdictions into 
which our country is subdivided as far as regards those 
branches of instruction which ought to be universally diffused 
and it gives pleasure to observe that new progress is 
continually making in the means employed for this end. But 
can it be doubted that the General Government would with 
peculiar propriety occupy itself in affording neutriment to 
those higher branches of science which though not within the 
reach of general acquisi[ti]on are in their consequences and 
relation, productive of general advantage? Or can it be 
doubted that this great object would be materially 
advanced by a University erected on that broad basis to 
which the national resources are most adequate & so liberally 
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endowed as to command the ablest professors in the several 
branches of liberal knowlege? It is true and to the honor of 
our Country that it offers many colleges and Academies 
highly respectable and useful—but the funds upon which 
they are established are too narrow to permit any of them to 
be an adequate substitute for such an institution as is 
contemplated & to which they would be excellent auxiliaries. 
Amongst the motives to such an institution the assimilation of 
the principles opinions manners and habits of our countrymen 
by drawing from all quarters our youth to participate in a 
common Education well deserves the attention of 
Government. To render the people of this Country as 
homogeneous as possible must lend as much as any other 
circumstance to the permanency of the Union & prosperity. 
The eligibleness of a Military Academy depends on that 
evident maxim of policy which requires every nation to be 
prepared for war while cultivating peace and warns it against 
suffering the military spirit & military knowlege wholly to 
decay. However particular instances superficially viewed may 
seem exceptions it will not be doubted by any who have 
attentively considered the subject that the military art is of a 
complicated and comprehensive nature, that it demands 
much previous study as well as practice and that the 
possession of it in its most improved state is always of vast 
importance to the security of a Nation. It ought therefore to 
be a principal care of every Government however pacific its 
general policy to preserve and cultivate indeed in proportion 
as the policy of a Country is pacific & it is little liable to [be] 
called to practice the rules of the Military Art does it become 
the duty of the Government to take care by proper 
institutions that it be not lost. A Military Academy instituted on 
proper principles would serve to secure to our country though 
within a narrow sp[h]ere a solid fund of military information 
which would always be ready for national emergencies & 
would facilitate the diffusion of Military knowlege as those 
emergenc[i]es might require. 
A systematic plan for the creation of a moderate navy 
appears to me recommended by very weighty 
considerations. An active external Commerce demands a 
naval power to protect it—Besides the dangers from War in 
which a state is a party. It is a truth which our Experience has 
confirmed that the most equitable and sincere neutrality is 
not sufficient to exempt a state from the depredations of 
other nations at war with each other. It is essential to induce 
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them to respect that neutrality that there shall be an 
organised force ready to vindicate the national flag. This may 
even prevent the necessity of going into war by discouraging 
from those insults and infractions of right which sometimes 
proceed to an extreme that leave no alternative. The U 
States abound in Materials. Their Commerce fast increasing 
must proportionably augment the number of their seamen 
and give us rapidly the means of a naval power respectable 
if not great. Our relative situation likewise for obvious reasons 
would render a moderate force very influential more so 
perhaps than a much greater in the hands of any other 
power. It is submitted as well deserving consideration whether 
it will not be prudent immediately and gradually to provide 
and lay up magazines of Ship Timber and to build & equip 
annually on[e] or more ships of force as the developpement 
of resources shall render convenient & practicable—so that a 
future War of Europe, if we escape the present storm may not 
find our Commerce in the defenceless situation in which the 
present found it. 
There is a subject which has dwelt long & much upon 
my mind which I cannot omit this opportunity of suggesting. It 
is the compensations to our public Officers; especially those in 
the most important stations. Every man acquainted [with] the 
expence even of the most frugal plan of living in our great 
cities must be sensible of their inadequateness. The impolicy 
of such defective provision seems not to have been 
sufficiently weighed. 
No plan of governing is well founded which does not 
regard man as a compound of selfish and virtuous passions. 
To expect him to be wholly guided by the latter would be as 
great an error as to suppose him wholly destitute of them. 
Hence the necessity of adequate rewards for those services 
of which the Public stand in need. Without them the affairs of 
a nation are likely to get sooner or later into incompetent or 
unfaithful hands. If their own private wealth is to supply in the 
candidates for public Office the deficiency of public liberality 
then the sphere of those who can be candidates especially 
in a country like ours is much narrowed and the chance of a 
choice of able as well as upright men much lessened. Besides 
that it would be repugnate to the first principles of our 
government to exclude men from the public trusts because 
their talents & virtues however conspicuous are 
unaccompanied by wealth. If the rewards of the 
Government are scanty those who have talents without 
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wealth & are too virtuous to abuse their stations cannot 
accept public offices without a sacrifice of interest which in 
ordinary time may hardly be justified by their duty to 
themselves and their families. If they have talents without 
virtue they may indeed accept offices to make a dishonest & 
improper use of them. The tendency then is to transfer the 
management of public affairs to wealthy but incapable 
hands or to hands which if capable are as destitute of 
integrity as of wealth. For a time particular circumstances 
may prevent such a course of things and hitherto the 
inference has not been verified in our experience. But it is not 
the less probable that time will prove it to be well founded. In 
some Government men have many allurements to office 
exclusive of pecuniary rewards—but from the nature of our 
government pecuniary reward is the only aliment to the 
interested passion, which public men who are not vicious can 
expect. If then it be essential to the prosperous course of 
every Government that it shall be able to command the 
services of its most able & most virtuous citizens of every class, 
it follows that the compensations which our Government 
allows ought to be revised & materially increased. The 
character & success of Republican Government appear 
absolutely to depend on this policy. 
Congress have repeatedly directed their attention to 
the encouragement of manufactures, and have no doubt 
promoted them in several branches. The object is of two 
much importance not to assure a continuance of their efforts 
in every way which shall appear proper & conducive to the 
end. But in the present state of our Country we cannot 
expect that our progress in some essential branches will be as 
expeditious as the public welfare demands—particularly in 
reference to security & defence in time of War. This reflection 
is the less pleasing when it is remembered how large a 
proportion of our supply the course of our Trade derives from 
a single nation. It appears very desireable that at least with a 
view to security and defence some measures more 
efficacious than have heretofore been adopted should be 
taken. As a general rule manufactories carried on upon 
public account are to be avoided. But every general rule 
may admit of exceptions. Where the state of things in our 
Country leaves little expectation that certain branches of 
manufacture will for a great length of time be sufficiently 
cultivated—when these are of a nature to be essential to the 
furnishing and equipping of the troops and ships of war of 
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which we stand in need—are not establishments on the 
public account, to the extent of the public demand for 
supply, recommended by very strong considerations of 
national policy? Ought our country to be dependent in such 
cases upon foreign supply precarious because liable to be 
interrupted? [If the necessary Supplies should be procured in 
this mode at great expense in time of Peace—will not the 
Security and independence arising from it very amply 
compensate? Institutions of this Kind commensurate only with 
our peace Establishments, will in time of War be easily 
extended in proportion to the public exigencies. And they 
may even perhaps be rendered contributary to the Supply of 
our citizens at large so as greatly to mitigate the privations 
arising from the interruption of trade. The idea at least is 
worthy of the most serious consideration. If adopted, the plan 
ought of course to exclude all those branches which may be 
considered as already established in our Country, and to 
which the efforts of individuals appear already as likely to be 
Speedily adequate. 
A reinforcement of the existing provisions for 
discharging our public Debt was mentioned in my address at 
the opening of the last Session. Congress took Some 
preliminary steps, the maturing of which will no doubt engage 
their zealous attention during the present. I will only add, that 
it will afford me heartfelt Satisfaction to concur in such 
auxiliary measures as will ascertain to our country, the 
prospect of a Speedy extinguishment of the Debt. Prosperity 
may have Cause to regret, if, from any motive, intervals of 
tranquility are left unemployed, for accelerating this valuable 
end.”220  
  
 There are some limits on what government should do, according to 
Hamilton.  There is such a thing as an “excess of regulation,” but how to 
determine what is a good idea and what not?  For Hamilton, one needs 
the appropriate kind of administrators, men of “sound judgement,” and 
NOT what Hamilton referred to as “theorists,” which as is well-known, was 
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what he called Jefferson, Madison, and others who shared their opinions 
on government.  Hamilton enunciates an Aristotelian argument in arguing 
for a “medium,” and not “general principles,” to determine how 
government should act.  Once the Federalists had lost the election of 
1800, and Democratic-Republican policies were put into place by the 
Jefferson Administration, Hamilton wrote in The Examination Number XI 
from 1802: 
“It is certainly possible to do too much as well as too little; to 
embarrass, if not defeat the good which may be done, by 
attempting more than is practicable; or to overbalance that 
good by evils accruing from an excess of regulation. Men of 
business know this to be the case in the ordinary affairs of life: 
how much more must it be so, in the extensive and 
complicated concerns of an Empire? To reach and not to 
pass the salutary medium is the province of sound judgment: 
To miss the point will ever be the lot of those who, enveloped 
all their lives in the mists of theory, are constantly seeking for 
an ideal perfection which never was and never will be 
attainable in reality. It is about this medium, not about 
general principles, that those in power in our government 
have differed; and to experience, not to the malevolent 
insinuations of rivals, must be the appeal, whether the one or 
the other description of persons have judged most 
accurately. Yet discerning men may form no imperfect 
opinion of the merits of the controversy between them, by 
even a cursory view of the distinctions on which it has 
turned.”221 
 
 With James Madison what we really see is a difference of opinion 
with Hamilton in degree.  In so many ways, their conflicts reflected not a 
vast gulf of different principles, but rather different priorities.  There were 
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some issues on which they differed markedly, but these are the exception.  
Sadly, each interpreted the other’s actions in the worst manner possible.  
Fear, rather than giving the benefit of the doubt, ruled both.  Like 
Hamilton, Madison also saw the need for the federal government to have 
the power to regulate trade during the time of the Articles of 
Confederation.  For Madison, the states simply cannot effectively regulate 
trade by themselves.  There needed to be a common overseer of trade 
for the United States, just like other countries had. 
 Again like Hamilton, Madison argued that free trade with other 
countries would be the ideal, but it was just not possible at that time, due 
to the policies of other governments.  Given that reality, the United States 
needed to enact similar policies to protect itself.  A tariff would be the 
best option for not only controlling trade, giving the United States 
leverage in negotiations with other countries, and equally important, 
paying off the debt owed to other countries.  To James Monroe he wrote 
in 1785: 
“Viewing in the abstract the question whether the power of 
regulating trade, to a certain degree at least, ought to be 
vested in Congress, it appears to me not to admit of a doubt, 
but that it should be decided in the affirmative. If it be 
necessary to regulate trade at all, it surely is necessary to 
lodge the power, where trade can be regulated with effect, 
and experience has confirmed what reason foresaw, that it 
can never be so regulated by the States acting in their 
separate capacities. They can no more exercise this power 
separately, than they could separately carry on war, or 
separately form treaties of alliance or Commerce. The nature 
of the thing therefore proves the former power, no less than 
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the latter, to be within the reason of the fœderal Constitution. 
Much indeed is it to be wished, as I conceive, that no 
regulations of trade, that is to say, no restrictions or imposts 
whatever, were necessary. A perfect freedom is the System 
which would be my choice. But before such a system will be 
eligible perhaps for the U. S. they must be out of debt; before 
it will be attainable, all other nations must concur in it.”222 
  
 With Madison more so than Hamilton, though, we see the notion of 
using trade with other countries as a weapon.  Other than in The 
Federalist, Hamilton does not mention this as an option for the federal 
government.   With Madison, especially in his non-official papers, this idea 
occurs comes up far more often.  The United States must be able to, for 
instance, “extort redress” from other countries.  Again to Monroe in the 
same letter as above he wrote: 
“What is to be done? Must we remain passive victims to 
foreign politics; or shall we exert the lawful means which our 
independence has put into our hands, of extorting redress? 
The very question would be an affront to every Citizen who 
loves his Country. What then are those means? Retaliating 
regulations of trade only. How are these to be effectuated? 
only by harmony in the measures of the States. How is this 
harmony to be obtained? only by an acquiescence of all the 
States in the opinion of a reasonable majority.”223  
 
 At first, Madison wanted amendments to be made to the Articles of 
Confederation.  He did not initially want a quite different form of 
government, which the Constitution eventually was.  However, the 
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“machinations” of Great Britain needed to be dealt with, and only a 
stronger federal government could do that. 
“But let us not sacrifice the end to the means: let us not rush 
on certain ruin in order to avoid a possible danger. I 
conceive it to be of great importance that the defects of 
the fœderal system should be amended, not only because 
such amendments will make it better answer the purpose for 
which it was instituted, but because I apprehend danger to 
its very existence from a continuance of defects which 
expose a part if not the whole of the empire to severe 
distress. The suffering part, even when the minor part, can 
not long respect a Government which is too feeble to 
protect their interest; But when the suffering part come to be 
the major part, and they despair of seeing a protecting 
energy given to the General Government, from what 
motives is their allegiance to be any longer expected. 
Should G. B. persist in the machinations which distress us; and 
seven or eight of the States be hindered by the others 
from obtaining relief by fœderal means, I own, I tremble at 
the anti-fœderal expedients into which the former may be 
tempted.”224 
  
 Not just Great Britain needs to be dealt with, but also some 
American citizens are behaving in ways contrary to the nation’s best 
interest.  Specifically, Madison identifies the “mercantile interest” as being 
far too closely aligned with Great Britain than the United States.  We saw 
this above with Hamilton’s concern with the “trading interest.”  Madison 
identifies the continued animosity towards Great Britain as a resource 
which could be made use of in order to counteract the baleful influence 
of the merchants and Great Britain. 
“Add to all this that the mercantile interest which has taken 
the lead in rousing the public attention of other States, is in 
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this so exclusively occupied in British Commerce that what 
little weight they have will be most likely to fall into the 
opposite scale. The only circumstance which promises a 
favorable hearing to the meditated proposition of Congs. is 
that the power which it asks is to be exerted agst. G. B, and 
the proposition will consequently be seconded by the 
animosities which still prevail in a strong degree agst. her.”225  
 
 The malignant influence of Great Britain is something that was 
clearly much more on Madison’s mind than Hamilton’s, although Hamilton 
did decry a lack of American ability to deal on more equal terms with 
other countries.  He was just far more concerned about BOTH France and 
Great Britain than Madison was.  In any case, we see again and again in 
Madison’s writings a focus on dealing specifically with Great Britain, and 
he hoped that the people at large would become fed up with the ways 
in which Great Britain was treating the United States, thus agreeing to give 
the federal government more power.  His home state of Virginia was 
especially recalcitrant in Madison’s estimation, mainly due to the recovery 
in the prices it was receiving for its farm exports.  Madison was especially 
afraid that Great Britain’s ultimate goal was to effect a disunion of the 
United States.  To Thomas Jefferson he wrote in 1785: 
“The machinations of G. B. with regard to Commerce have 
produced much distress and noise in the Northern States, 
particularly in Boston, from whence the alarm has spread to 
New York & Philada. Your correspondence with Congs. will no 
doubt have furnished you with full information on this head. I 
only know the General fact, and that the sufferers are every 
where calling for such augmentation of the power of 
Congress as may effect relief. How far the Southern States & 
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Virginia in particular will join in this proposition cannot be 
foreseen. It is easy to foresee that the circumstances which in 
a confined view distinguish our situation from that of our 
brethren, will be laid hold of by the partizans of G. B. by those 
who are or affect to be jealous of Congress, and those who 
are interested in the present course of business, to give a 
wrong bias to our Councils. If any thing should reconcile 
Virga. to the idea of giving Congress a power over her trade, 
it will be that this power is likely to annoy G. B. against whom 
the animosities of our Citizens are still strong. They seem to 
have less sensibility to their commercial interests; which they 
very little understand, and which the mercantile class here 
have not the same motives if they had the same capacity to 
lay open to the public, as that class have in the States North 
of us. The price of our Staple since the peace is another 
cause of inattention in the planters to the dark side of our 
commercial affairs. Should these or any other causes prevail 
in frustrating the scheme of the Eastern & Middle States of a 
general retaliation on G. B. I tremble for 
the [event]. A majority of the states deprived of a regular 
remidy for their distresses by the want of a fœderal spirit in the 
minority must feel the strongest motives to some 
irregular experiments. The dan[ger] of such a crisis makes me 
surmise that the policy of Great Britain results as much 
from the hope of effecting a breach in our confederacy as of 
monopolising our trade.”226 
 
To George Washington in 1785 he expressed his conclusion that the 
reason behind the states’ refusal to grant the federal government more 
control over commerce came down to simple fear.  Madison showed his 
classical education by comparing the situation the United States was in to 
that of the Greek city-states just prior to their conquest by Macedonia.  
Like the Greek confederation, Madison thought the United States was in 
danger because it had not granted its general government enough 
power to effectively deal with foreign countries. 
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“Your favour of the 30. Novr. was received a few days ago. 
This would have followed much earlier the one which yours 
acknowledges had I not wished it to contain some final 
information relative to the commercial propositions. The 
discussion of them has consumed much time, and though the 
absolute necessity of some such general system prevailed 
over all the efforts of its adversaries in the first instance, the 
stratagem of limiting its duration to a short term has ultimately 
disappointed our hopes. I think it better to trust to further 
experience and even distress, for an adequate remedy, than 
to try a temporary measure which may stand in the way of a 
permanent one, and must confirm that transatlantic policy 
which is founded on our supposed distrust of Congress and of 
one another. Those whose opposition in this case did not 
spring from illiberal animosities towards the Northern 
States, seem to have been frightened on one side at the idea 
of a perpetual & irrevocable grant of power, and on the 
other flattered with a hope, that a temporary grant might be 
renewed from time to time, if its utility should be confirmed by 
the experiment. But we have already granted perpetual & 
irrevocable powers of a much more extensive nature than 
those now proposed and for reasons not stronger than the 
reasons which urge the latter. And as to the hope of renewal, 
it is the most visionary one that perhaps ever deluded men of 
sense. Nothing but the peculiarity of our circumstances could 
ever have produced those sacrifices of sovereignty on which 
the fœderal Government now rests. If they had been 
temporary, and the expiration of the term required a renewal 
at this crisis, pressing as the crisis is, and recent as is our 
experience of the value of the confederacy, sure I am that it 
would be impossible to revive it. What room have we then to 
hope that the expiration of temporary grants of commercial 
powers would always find a unanimous disposition in the 
States, to follow their own example. It ought to be 
remembered too that besides the caprice, jealousy, and 
diversity of opinions, which will be certain obstacles in our 
way, the policy of foreign nations may hereafter imitate that 
of the Macedonian Prince who effected his purposes against 
the Grecian confederacy by gaining over a few of the 
leading men in the smaller members of it.”227 
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  In contrast to Hamilton, where most of our sources of his ideas come 
from his writings, with Madison we fortunately also have a wealth of his 
thoughts given through his speeches in the Continental Congress, the 
legislature of Virginia, and also the Congress of the United States.  As 
regards the question of direct taxation by the federal government, even 
during his service in the Continental Congress, Madison stressed the need 
for the federal government to have the power of directly taxing the 
people, rather than that of sending requisitions to the states, in order to 
have better control of the United States’ economy.  Specifically, the 
federal government needed to be able to pay the country’s debts, most 
especially those owed overseas, but could only do so if it had the ability to 
levy taxes without state interference. 
“My honorable friend seems to think that we ought to spare 
the present generation, and throw our burthens upon 
posterity. I will not contest the equity of this reasoning, but I 
must say that good policy as well as views of œconomy, 
strongly urge us even to distress ourselves to comply with our 
most solemn engagements. We must make effectual 
provision for the payment of the interest of our public debts. 
In order to do justice to our creditors, and support our credit 
and reputation; we must lodge power some where or other 
for this purpose.”228 
  
 While not stressing the issue as much as Hamilton, Madison also 
expressed a greater fear of state power than federal power.  This once 
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again shows the differences between the two were quite often more ones 
of degree than of differing principles.  From the same speech in the 
Continental Congress as above, Madison expressed his conviction that 
the federal government needed to have the ability to “suppress” state 
power if necessary. 
“I do not thoroughly comprehend the reasoning of my 
honorable friend, when he tells us, that the federal 
government will predominate, and that the state interest will 
be lost; when at the same time he tells us, that it will be a 
faction of seven states. If seven states will prevail as states, I 
conceive that state influence will prevail. If state influence 
under the present feeble government has prevailed, I think 
that a remedy ought to be introduced by giving the general 
government power to suppress it.”229 
 
 Both Madison and Hamilton wanted the United States to remain 
neutral in the ongoing European conflicts, most notably those between 
France and Great Britain.  Both argued in favor of the United States 
building and maintaining a navy in order to enforce its neutrality, as both 
Great Britain and France had interfered with American shipping because 
the United States simply did not have a naval force with which to protect 
itself.  Madison, in stark contrast to Hamilton, though, did not like having to 
have a standing military establishment.  He nevertheless saw the need for 
one, given the realities of how other countries treated the United States. 
“He supposed that my argument with respect to a future war 
between Great-Britain and France was fallacious. The other 
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nations of Europe have acceded to that neutrality while 
Great-Britain opposed it. We need not expect in case of such 
a war, that we should be suffered to participate of the 
profitable emoluments of the carrying trade, unless we were 
in a respectable situation. Recollect the last war. Was there 
ever a war in which the British nation stood opposed to so 
many nations? All the belligerent nations in Europe, with 
nearly one half of the British empire, were united against it. 
Yet that nation, though defeated, and humbled beyond any 
previous example, stood out against this. From her firmness 
and spirit in such desperate circumstances, we may divine 
what her future conduct may be. I did not contend that it 
was necessary for the United States to establish a navy for 
that sole purpose, but instanced it as one reason out of 
several, for rendering ourselves respectable. I am no friend to 
naval or land armaments in time of peace, but if they be 
necessary, the calamity must be submitted to. Weakness will 
invite insults. A respectable government will not only intitle us 
to a participation of the advantages which are enjoyed by 
other nations, but will be a security against attacks and insults. 
It is to avoid the calamity of being obliged to have large 
armaments that we should establish this government. The 
best way to avoid danger, is to be in a capacity to withstand 
it.”230 
 
 Madison’s efforts in regards to creating a stronger union through 
government involvement in the economy did not stop when he helped 
achieve his goal of ratifying the Constitution.  As he began his service in 
the House of Representatives, Madison again stressed the imperative that 
the United States put its finances in order.  Madison still wanted as much 
free trade as possible, but given the continued reality of tariff usage by 
other countries, he again argued in favor of not only the necessity, but the 
utility as well, of the United States making use of tariffs. 
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“The union, by the establishment of a more effective 
government having recovered from the state of imbecility, 
that heretofore prevented a performance of its duty, ought, 
in its first act, to revive those principles of honor and honesty 
that have too long lain dormant. 
The deficiency in our treasury has been too notorious to 
make it necessary for me to animadvert upon that subject. 
Let us content our selves with endeavouring to remedy the 
evil. To do this a national revenue must be obtained; but the 
system must be such an one, that, while it secures the object 
of revenue, it shall not be oppressive to our constituents: 
Happy it is for us that such a system is within our power; for I 
apprehend that both these objects may be obtained from an 
impost on articles imported into the United States. 
In pursuing this measure, I know that two points occur 
for our consideration. The first, respects the general regulation 
of commerce, which in my opinion ought to be as free as the 
policy of nations will admit. The second, relates to revenue 
alone, and this is the point I mean more particularly to bring 
into the view of the committee.”231 
 
 Madison, in contrast with Hamilton, argued for the need to focus 
more on current revenue concerns than promoting manufactures.  Here is 
in fact a very important point to understand in regards to the differences 
the two had, and the effects those differences had on the United States.  
Manufacturing was simply not as important for Madison as it was for 
Hamilton.  He did assume manufacturing would eventually be added to a 
more diversified American economy, but in so many ways he dreaded 
that eventuality, given his conviction that a more manufacturing-based 
economy would be a threat to the republican virtue on which the United 
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States ultimately depended. 
“It was my view to restrain the first essay on this subject 
principally to the object of revenue, and make this rather a 
temporary expedient than any thing permanent. I see 
however, that there are strong exceptions against deciding 
immediately on a part of the plan, which I had the honor to 
bring forward, as well as against an application to the 
resources mentioned in the list of articles just proposed by the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania. 
I presume, that however much we may be disposed to 
promote domestic manufactures, we ought to pay some 
regard to the present policy of obtaining revenue.”232 
 
 Madison did consistently display his more nationalistic preferences 
by urging others in the nascent Congress of the United States to focus on 
the common needs of the country as a whole, rather than just the needs 
of their individual states. 
“I am sensible that there is great weight in the observation 
that fell from the hon. gentleman from South-Carolina, (Mr. 
Tucker) That it will be necessary on the one hand, to weigh 
and regard the sentiments of the gentlemen from the 
different parts of the United States; but on the other hand, we 
must limit our consideration on this head, and 
notwithstanding all the deference and respect we pay to 
those sentiments, we must consider the general interest of the 
union, for this is as much every gentleman’s duty to consider 
as is the local or state interest—and any system of impost that 
this committee will adopt, must be founded on the principles 
of mutual concession.”233 
 
 While nowhere near as convinced of their importance as Hamilton, 
Madison did not completely oppose the encouragement of 
manufacturing by the federal government, now that such power had 
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been granted to Congress by the Constitution.  Nevertheless, he once 
again expressed his preference for a free market, rather than extensive 
government control of the economy. 
“There is another consideration. The states that are 
most advanced in population and ripe for manufactures, 
ought to have their particular interest attended to in some 
degree. While these states retained the power of making 
regulations of trade, they had the power to protect and 
cherish such institutions; by adopting the present constitution 
they have thrown the exercise of this power into other 
hands—they must have done this with an expectation, that 
those interests would not be neglected here. 
I am afraid, Sir, on the one hand, that if we go fully into 
a discussion of the subject, we shall consume more time than 
prudence would dictate to spare; on the other hand, if we do 
not develop it and see the principles on which we mutually 
act, we shall subject ourselves to great difficulties. I beg leave 
therefore to state the grounds on which my opinion with 
respect to the matter under consideration is founded, 
namely, whether our present system should be a temporary or 
permanent one? In the first place, I own myself the friend to a 
very free system of commerce, and hold it as a truth, that 
commercial shackles are generally unjust, oppressive and 
impolitic—it is also a truth, that if industry and labour are left to 
take their own course, they will generally be directed to those 
objects which are the most productive, and this in a more 
certain and direct manner than the wisdom of the most 
enlightened legislature could point out. Nor do I think that the 
national interest is more promoted by such restrictions, than 
that the interest of individuals would be promoted by 
legislative interference directing the particular application of 
its industry.”234  
 
 Madison also thought the federal government should take similar 
steps to encourage agriculture, in which he argued the United States 
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already had advantages over other countries, in order to counter-
balance the advantages European countries had in manufacturing.  
“In my opinion, it would be proper also, for gentlemen 
to consider the means of encouraging the great staple of 
America, I mean agriculture, which I think may justly be stiled 
the staple of the United States; from the spontaneous 
productions which nature furnishes, and the manifest 
preference it has over every other object of emolument in this 
country. If we compare the cheapness of our land with that 
of other nations, we see so decided an advantage in that 
cheapness, as to have full confidence of being unrivaled; 
with respect to the object of manufacture, other countries 
may and do rival us; but we may be said to have a monopoly 
in agriculture. The possession of the soil and the lowness of its 
price, give us as much a monopoly in this case, as any nation 
or other parts of the world have in the monopoly of any 
article whatever; but, with this advantage to us, that it cannot 
be shared nor injured by rivalship. 
If my general principle is a good one, that commerce 
ought to be free, and labour and industry left at large to find 
its proper object, the only thing which remains, will be to 
discover the exceptions that do not come within the rule I 
have laid down. I agree with the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania, that there are exceptions, important in 
themselves and claim the particular attention of the 
committee: Altho the freedom of commerce would be 
advantageous to all the world, yet, in some particulars, one 
nation might suffer, to benefit others, and this ought to be for 
the general good of society.”235 
 
 In addition to actions he believed the federal government needed 
to take to involve itself in the economy due to the policies of other 
governments, Madison argued there were other exceptions to an overall 
policy of free trade that would be necessary.  Tariffs are one, but also 
where tariffs have been used to help create businesses, the federal 
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government needs to continue to protect them, since they are 
dependent upon government aid.  In keeping with his republican virtue 
focus, Madison also sees a role for sumptuary laws, in order to encourage 
appropriate civic virtue amongst the citizens.  Embargoes during war are 
another case, as well as protections for defense-related industries. 
 But, in contrast to Hamilton, Madison argued these sorts of 
protections are not as important as many think.  The experiences the 
United States had during the Revolutionary War are not as clear a lesson 
for Madison as for Hamilton.  Mainly, he was not as convinced of the need 
for federally-protected defense-related industries if they were too 
expensive.  He argued that, even in war, the United States would be able 
to obtain supplies from abroad.  Finally, Madison introduces an income-
based argument in favor of tariffs, as being a just way to tax the rich 
instead of the poor, since the amount of tax paid would be in proportion 
to the differing levels of consumption by those two groups. 
“Duties laid on imported articles may have an effect 
which comes within the idea of national prudence; It may 
happen that materials for manufactures may grow up 
without any encouragement for this purpose; it has been the 
case in some of the states, but in others, regulations have 
been provided and have succeeded in producing some 
establishment, which ought not to be allowed to perish, from 
the alteration which has taken place: It would be cruel to 
neglect them and divert their industry to other channels, for it 
is not possible for the hand of man to shift from one 
employment to another, without being injured by the 
change. There may be some manufactures, which being 
once formed, can advance toward perfection without any 
adventitious aid, while others for want of the fostering hand of 
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government will be unable to go on at all. Legislative 
attention will therefore be necessary to collect the proper 
objects for this purpose, and this will form an other exception 
to my general principle. 
I observe that a sumptuary prohibition is within the view 
of some of the proposed articles and forms another 
exception; I acknowledge that I do not in general think any 
great national advantage arises from restrictions passed on 
this head, because as long as a distinction in point of value 
subsists, sumptuary duties in some form or other will prevail 
and take effect. 
Another exception is embargoes in time of war; these 
may necessarily occur and shackle the freedom of 
commerce; but the reasons for this are so obvious, that it 
renders any remark unnecessary. 
The next exception that occurs, is one on which great 
stress is laid by some well informed men, and this with great 
plausibility. That each nation should have within itself, the 
means of defence independent of foreign supplies: That in 
whatever relates to the operation of war, no state ought to 
depend upon a precarious supply from any part of the world: 
There may be some truth in this remark, and therefore it is 
proper for legislative attention. I am though, well persuaded 
that the reasoning on this subject has been carried too far. 
The difficulties we experienced a few years ago, of obtaining 
military supplies, ought not to furnish too much in favour of an 
establishment which would be difficult and expensive; 
because our national character is now established and 
recognized throughout the world, and the laws of war 
favor national exertion more than intestine commotion, so 
that there is good reason to believe that when it becomes 
necessary, we may obtain supplies from abroad as readily as 
any other nation whatsoever. I have mentioned this because 
I think I see something among the enumerated articles that 
seems to favor such policy. 
The impost laid on trade for the purpose of obtaining 
revenue, may likewise be considered as an exception; so far 
therefore as revenue can be more conveniently and certainly 
raised by this, than any other method without injury to the 
community, and its operation will be in due proportion to the 
consumption, which consumption is generally proportioned to 
the circumstances of individuals, I think sound policy dictates 
to use this mean; but it will be necessary to confine our 
attention at this time peculiarly to the object of revenue, 
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because the other subject involves some intricate questions, 
to unravel which we perhaps are not prepared.”236 
 
 Again, though, Madison did argue there were exceptions to his 
preference for free trade, but how to identify them would be left up to an 
examination of whether or not they were necessary for the common 
good.  Specifically, any tariff, being a tax, should be apportioned to the 
ability of those affected by it to actually pay.  He identified different 
effects of tariffs on variously the poor and the rich, and decried what he 
considered unjust amounts expected out of either. 
“In the first point of view we may consider the effect it will 
have on the different descriptions of people throughout the 
United States, I mean different descriptions as they relate to 
property. I readily agree, that in itself a tax would be unjust 
and oppressive that did not fall on the citizens according to 
their degree of property and ability to pay it; were it therefore 
this single article which we were about to tax, I should think it 
indispensible that it should operate equally agreeably to the 
principle I have just mentioned. But in order to determine 
whether a tax on salt is just or unjust, we must consider it as 
part of a system, and judge of the operation of this system as 
if it was but a single article; if this is found to be unequal it is 
also unjust. Now, examine the preceding articles, and 
consider how they affect the rich, and it will be found that 
they bear more than a just proportion according to their 
ability to pay—by adding this article we shall rather equalise 
the disproportion than encrease it, if it is true, as has been 
often mentioned, that the poor will contribute more of this tax 
than the rich.”237 
  
 It was the differences among the states as regards economic 
regulation that led Madison to consider it necessary for the federal 
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government to step in.  In some cases, the states did not have any 
regulations at all on various points, such as tariff collection, while others 
specifically prohibited any state official from enforcing federal regulations.  
So, it became necessary in Madison’s opinion for the federal government 
to establish its own means, and the officials to carry them out, in order for 
any tariff to be collected.  Thus, it is in this case precisely the states’ refusal 
to take action that caused the federal government to establish a 
bureaucracy it might not have had to otherwise, had it been able to rely 
on state officials to collect the tariff.   
However, Madison clearly mentions below a major point of 
disagreement with Hamilton, that of encouraging manufacturing by the 
federal government.  Far from there being a pressing need for such 
action, Madison specifically identified any such decision as “premature.”  
In a letter to Edmund Pendleton from 1789 he wrote: 
“The House of Reps. is still occupied with the impost. It is a 
subject which is not very simple in itself; and is rendered not a 
little difficult by the diversity of State regulations—by the total 
want of regulations in several States—by the case of R. Island 
and N. Carolina; and by the law of Virginia disqualifying State 
officers, Judiciary as well as others, from executing federal 
functions. The latter circumstance seems to threaten 
additional delay, since it may require some special provision 
of a Judiciary nature for cases of seizure &c; until the 
Judiciary department can be systematically arranged; and 
may even then oblige the fedl. Legislature to extend its 
provisions farther than might otherwise be necessary. In 
settling the rate of duties the ideas of different quarters Nn. & 
Southn. Eastern & Western, do not entirely accord: but the 
difficulties are adjusted as easily as could be well expected. If 
the duties should be raised too high, the error will proceed as 
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much from the popular ardor to throw the burden of revenue 
on trade, as from the premature policy of stimulating 
manufactures.”238 
 
Elkins and McKitrick, in their The Age of Federalism, have, as I have 
discussed in the Introduction to this work, characterized the main 
difference between Hamilton and Madison as following from the different 
preferences each had as regards France and Great Britain, the two 
“superpowers” of the day.  I have taken issue with that, but there is some 
evidence that, at least in Madison’s case, he did indeed have a 
preference for France, but only up until the time Napoleon took over.  This 
preference for France was at first based on gratitude for help during the 
Revolution, but then after the French Revolution it was based on support 
for a kindred republican state.  The effect of this support did, while it 
lasted, give him a reason to support federal government involvement in 
the economy in favor of relations with France.  For Madison, this was in 
part supported by his conviction that the public at large wanted France 
to have privileges other countries did not. 
“Some gentlemen have seemed to call in question the policy 
of discriminating between nations in commercial alliance with 
the United States, and those with whom no treaties exist; for 
my own part, I am well satisfied that there are good and 
substantial reasons for making it; in the first place, it may not 
be unworthy of consideration, that the public sentiments of 
America will be favourable to such discrimination. I am sure 
with respect to that part from which I came, it will not be a 
pleasing ingredient in your laws, if they find foreigners of every 
nation put on a footing with those in alliance with us. There is 
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another reason which perhaps is more applicable to some 
parts of the union than to others; one of the few nations with 
which America has formed commercial connections has 
relaxed considerably in that rigid policy it before pursued, not 
so far to be sure as America could wish, with respect to 
opening her ports to our trade, but she has permitted our 
ready built ships a sale, and entitles them to the same 
advantage, when owned by her own citizens, as if they had 
been built in France, subjecting the sale to a duty of 5 per 
cent. The British market receives none; the disabilities of our 
ships to trade with their colonies continue even if they are 
purchased by the subjects of Great-Britain. Of consequence 
they cannot be sold without a considerable loss; nay so 
cautious are they to prevent the advantages we naturally 
possess, that they will not suffer a British ship to be repaired in 
America, beyond a certain proportion of her value; they 
even will not permit our vessels to be repaired in their 
ports.”239 
 
 Sometimes for Madison, the need for federal government 
involvement in the economy comes from, as in the case with Great 
Britain, where the free market has not resulted in the optimal situation, due 
to previous political influences.  In the case of these “unnatural” situations, 
it is appropriate for the federal government to correct the situation by 
various means.  These “political advantages” given to some but not other 
countries will, in Madison’s estimation, lead to greater economic 
exchange in those instances, correcting what he argues was a 
disproportionate amount of influence by Great Britain.  Also, it would lead 
to other nations being more willing to make favorable trade agreements 
with the United States, in order to increase the amount of business with the 
United States. 
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“There are also other considerations which ought to be taken 
into view. From artificial or adventitious causes the commerce 
between America and Great Britain exceeds what may be 
considered its natural boundary. I find from an examination of 
the accounts of tonnage for the three large states of 
Massachusetts, Virginia, and South Carolina, that the tonnage 
of nations in alliance with us holds no proportion with that of 
Great Britain, or of the United States. This is a proof, that a very 
small direct commerce takes place between those countries 
and this; that there is less of direct intercourse than would 
naturally be if those extraneous and adventitious causes did 
not prevent it; such as, the long possession of our trade, their 
commercial regulations calculated to retain it, their similarity 
of language and manners, their conformity of laws and other 
circumstances, all these concurring has made their 
commerce with us more extensive than their natural situation 
would require it to be. I would wish therefore to give such 
political advantages to those nations as might enable them 
to gain their proportion of our direct trade from the nation 
who has acquired more than is naturally her due. From this 
view of the subject, I am led to believe it would be good 
policy to make the proposed discrimination between them. Is 
it not also of some importance, that we should enable nations 
in treaty with us to draw some advantage from our alliance, 
and thereby impress those powers that have hitherto 
neglected to treat with us, with the idea that advantages are 
to be gained by a reciprocity of friendship? If we give every 
thing equally to those who have or have not formed treaties, 
surely we do not furnish to them any motive for courting our 
connection.”240 
 
 The United States simply cannot have an overall, blanket policy of 
free trade, at least at this point in its history, according to Madison.  The 
other countries of the world just do not follow that line of reasoning, and 
so the US must behave in a similar manner.  When it is in the United States’ 
interest, it can follow a free market approach, but when it is not, it must 
nevertheless follow its interest, and not the principle of free trade. 
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“I am a friend to free commerce, and at the same time a 
friend to such regulations as are calculated to promote our 
own interest, and this on national principles. The great 
principle of interest is a leading one with me, and yet my 
combination of ideas on this head, leads me to a very 
different conclusion from that made by the gentleman from 
New-York (Mr. Lawrance). I wish we were under less necessity 
than I find we are to shackle our commerce with duties, 
restrictions and preferences; but there are cases in which it is 
impossible to avoid following the example of other nations in 
the great diversity of our trade.”241 
 
 In some ways, though, Madison wanted to have the federal 
government direct commerce just as much as Hamilton, but in a different 
direction.  He argued for the need to have the federal government 
counteract powerful interests and individuals in society.  Especially, the 
federal government needed to behave in ways to overcome established 
wealth, which would lead to greater equality amongst citizens. 
“I beg leave to remark in answer to a train of ideas which the 
gentleman last up has brought into view, that although 
interest will in general operate effectually to produce political 
good, yet there are causes in which certain factitious 
circumstances may divert it from its natural channel, or throw 
or retain in an artificial one. Have we not been exercised on 
this topic for a long time past? Or why has it been necessary 
to give encouragement to particular species of industry, but 
to turn the stream in favor of an interest that would not 
otherwise succeed? But laying aside the illustration of these 
causes so well known to all nations, where cities, companies, 
or opulent individuals engross the business from others, by 
having had an uninterrupted possession of it, or by the extent 
of their capitals being able to destroy a competition; let us 
proceed to examine what ought to be our conduct on this 
principle, upon the present occasion. Suppose two 
commercial cities, one possessed of enormous capitals and 
long habits of business, whilst the other is possessed of superior 
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natural advantages, but without that course of business and 
chain of connections which the other has, is it possible in the 
nature of things, that the latter city should carry on a 
successful competition with the former? Thus it is with nations; 
and when we consider the vast quantities of our produce 
sent to the different parts of Europe, and the great 
importations from the same places, that almost all of this 
commerce is transacted thro’ the medium of British ships and 
British merchants, I cannot help conceiving that, from the 
force of habit and other conspiring causes, that nation is in 
possession of a much greater proportion of our trade than she 
naturally is intitled to. Trade then being restrained to an 
artificial channel, is not so advantageous to America as a 
direct intercourse would be; it becomes therefore the duty of 
those to whose care the public interest and welfare are 
committed, to turn the tide to a more favorable direction.”242 
 
 In an argument similar to one of Hamilton’s in favor of encouraging 
manufactures, Madison argues the federal government needs to 
counteract old habits leading to more trade with some countries than 
with others. 
“I cannot, from this view of the subject, be persuaded to 
believe that every part of our trade flows in those channels 
which would be most natural and profitable to us, or those 
which reason would dictate to us, if we were unincumbered 
of old habits, and other accidental circumstances that hurry 
us along.”243 
 
 Madison did agree with Hamilton on the need for a navy, given the 
United States’ interest in foreign commerce via its own ships.  Otherwise, 
the United States would have to rely on the ships of other countries, and 
would lose out on much of the wealth flowing from that business.  Also, he 
argued it would be a good thing for the United States to have its own 
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commercial ships, because they would supply the sailors it would need for 
a navy in case of a war.  Overall, giving preferences to some but not 
other countries, combined with merchant shipping, would lead in 
Madison’s opinion, to greater safety for the United States. 
“The more the subject has been examined the greater 
necessity there appears for discrimination. If it is expedient for 
America to have vessels employed in commerce at all, it will 
be proper that she have enough to answer all the purposes 
intended; to form a school for seamen, to lay the foundation 
of a navy, and to be able to support itself against the 
interference of foreigners. I do not think there is much weight 
in what has been observed relative to the duty we are about 
to lay in favor of American vessels, being a burthen on the 
community, and particularly oppressive to some parts; but if 
there were, it may be a burthen of that kind which will 
ultimately save us from one that is greater. 
I consider that an acquisition of maritime strength is 
essential to this country; if ever we are so unfortunate as to be 
engaged in war, what but this can defend our towns and 
cities upon the sea-coast? Or what but this can enable us to 
repel an invading enemy? Those parts which are said to bear 
an undue proportion of the burthen of the additional duty on 
foreign shipping, are those that will be the most exposed to 
the operations of a depredatory war, and require the 
greatest exertions of the union in their defence; if therefore 
some little sacrifice is made by them to obtain this important 
object, they will be peculiarly rewarded for it in the hour of 
danger. Granting a preference to our own navigation will 
insensibly bring it forward to that perfection so essential to 
American safety; and though it may produce some little 
inequality at first, it will soon ascertain its level, and become 
uniform throughout the union. A higher duty will become 
necessary on these principles, as well as on those of 
discrimination; the preference we give to foreign nations in 
alliance over those not in treaty, will tend to encrease the 
trade of our allies, but it will also enable our own shipping to 
carry on lower terms, than that nation who is in possession of 
such an unnatural proportion of commerce.”244 
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 Madison ties the importance of republican virtue to the idea of a 
free market, which is actually a departure in many ways from earlier 
writers on the subject.  For Madison, though, a free market is in his view 
essential for the success of the United States’ experiment in republican 
government.  However, the farming lifestyle is the best, indeed essential, 
way of making a living to help create the republican virtues needed.  
Manufacturing can only be done in cities, which are anathema to the 
independence and self-reliance necessary for a republican lifestyle.  
Writing for the National Gazette in 1792, he said: 
“A PERFECT theory on this subject would be useful, not 
because it could be reduced to practice by any plan of 
legislation, or ought to be attempted by violence on the will 
or property of individuals: but because it would be a monition 
against empirical experiments by power, and a model to 
which the free choice of occupations by the people, might 
gradually approximate the order of society. 
The best distribution is that which would most 
favor health, virtue, intelligence and competency in 
the greatest number of citizens. It is needless to add to these 
objects, liberty and safety. The first is presupposed by them. 
The last must result from them. 
The life of the husbandman is pre-eminently suited to 
the comfort and happiness of the individual. Health, the first 
of blessings, is an appurtenance of his property and his 
employment.  Virtue, the health of the soul, is another part of 
his patrimony, and no less favored by his 
situation. Intelligence may be cultivated in this as well as in 
any other walk of life. If the mind be less susceptible of polish 
in retirement than in a croud, it is more capable of profound 
and comprehensive efforts. Is it more ignorant of some 
things? It has a compensation in its ignorance of 
others. Competency is more universally the lot of those who 
dwell in the country, when liberty is at the same time their lot. 
The extremes both of want and of waste have other abodes. 
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’Tis not the country that peoples either the Bridewells or the 
Bedlams. These mansions of wretchedness are tenanted from 
the distresses and vices of overgrown cities.”245 
 
 Again and again Madison emphasized that agriculture, rather than 
manufacturing, was the path to the independence, happiness and public 
liberty for everyone that classical republican virtue offered.  To help 
achieve this goal, he did approve of government involvement in the 
economy.  For Madison, there was no need to promote manufacturing, 
with its baleful effects on virtue, but government could employ itself 
profitably by promoting farming. 
“The class of citizens who provide at once their own 
food and their own raiment, may be viewed as the most truly 
independent and happy. They are more: they are the best 
basis of public liberty, and the strongest bulwark of public 
safety. It follows, that the greater the proportion of this class to 
the whole society, the more free, the more independent, and 
the more happy must be the society itself. 
In appreciating the regular branches of manufacturing 
and mechanical industry, their tendency must be compared 
with the principles laid down, and their merits graduated 
accordingly. Whatever is least favorable to vigor of body, to 
the faculties of the mind, or to the virtues or the utilities of life, 
instead of being forced or fostered by public authority, ought 
to be seen with regret as long as occupations more friendly to 
human happiness, lie vacant. 
The several professions of more elevated pretensions, 
the merchant, the lawyer, the physician, the philosopher, the 
divine, form a certain proportion of every civilized society, 
and readily adjust their numbers to its demands, and its 
circumstances.”246 
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 Madison was not always entirely consistent on this point, though.  He 
did sometimes support government actions taken on behalf of 
manufacturing.  If it came down to the continued existence of an already 
established industry, he was willing to make exceptions. 
“Mr. Madison thought it was worthy of consideration, whether 
it would not be expedient to make an exception in favour of 
white cotton goods. He understood there was a manufactory 
of some consequence established in this country, whose 
business it was to print these white cottons, and if this 
exception was not made, this additional duty might go to the 
destruction of it. Indeed as the printing of this article added 
as he was informed, two-thirds to its value, it might be 
considered as a raw material. He believed this manufactory 
was carried on by persons who came from foreign countries. 
If their manufactory succeeded, it might induce others to 
follow them, to exercise their several professions amongst us, 
which could not fail to be of advantage to the country; but if 
the present manufactory should be destroyed by one of our 
laws bearing hard upon its proprietors, it would have quite a 
contrary effect. He owned he was not much acquainted with 
the manufactory in question, nor had he made much 
calculation upon the subject; but, from the face of it, it 
seemed to require an exception. He therefore made the 
motion.”247 
 
   Even though, as I have shown above, Hamilton and Madison did 
have underlying differences in their expectations for the United States, 
specifically in this case on what, if any, role the federal government would 
have in the economy, in more ways they were actually quite similar rather 
than having dramatic differences of opinion.  As I mentioned above, it 
really is just too bad that all the individuals from that time that I am have 
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read just did not give each other the benefit of the doubt, and 
immediately attributed the different preferences each had to some kind 
of betrayal of the American Revolution, rather than just understanding 
that intelligent people of good will can and do quite often come to 
different conclusions regarding the questions of the day. 
 Between the two, Madison is more hesitant than Hamilton to have 
the federal government involve itself extensively in the economy, but this 
is a difference in degree, and not principle.  Both wanted the new federal 
government to correct the problems that had occurred under the Articles 
of Confederation.  Just how to do so, and what underlying Constitutional 
support for any actions taken, were the areas on which they differed. 
 Both agreed on the need for tariffs, but Madison was, as we have 
seen, much more interested in using these to achieve not only the goal of 
revenue for the federal government, but also as a tool for use in foreign 
relations.  He clearly wanted to shift the United States’ economy away 
from primary trade with Great Britain towards a much more diversified 
situation, especially by giving France greater benefits.  Hamilton seemed 
much more content with the trade situation with Great Britain, but clearly 
wanted the United States to become more independent over time 
through expanding its own manufacturing base. 
 The goal both had at all times, though, does show them to have 
been in essential ways far more similar than different.  Each was 
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concerned with, and proposed policies based on, the good of the 
American people as a whole.  That they were unable to see this in each 
other, and give each other the benefit of the doubt, is an all-too-common 
tragic reality in American life which continues still to this day. 
 Republicanism for both Hamilton and Madison mandated 
government focus on the common good.  However, they had different 
ideas about whether, to what extent, and what kinds of federal 
government activity were necessary to help the American republican 
experiment succeed.  For Hamilton, that focus on the common good 
required the federal government take a widespread active role in the 
economy in order to provide a good standard of living for the American 
people.  That way, the people would accept, and continue to support, 
the American republic.  Further, this necessary, and good, federal 
government involvement in the economy required taxation.  It would be 
through taxes that the United States could be effectively protected from 
threats at home and abroad, plus it would achieve respectability with 
other countries.  For Hamilton, these need to be addressed for any kind of 
country, including a republic, to succeed. 
 Very different from Madison, Hamilton again and again included 
“Greatness” as one of his goals for the United States.  Indeed, he listed 
greatness as one of the absolute vital necessities in order for the American 
republican experiment to succeed.  Only in a large, wealthy, great 
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republic could America survive and thrive.  This is of course a departure 
from classical republican theory on Hamilton’s part, but as we have seen, 
both departed from classical theory at various times. 
 With Madison, we see such a departure in his emphasis on a free 
market, with as little government regulation as possible, as necessary for 
the American republican experiment to succeed.  Also, Madison did see 
a good, indeed vital, role for the federal government in the economy, but 
to encourage agriculture, not manufacturing as Hamilton wanted.  The 
agricultural life was, far more for Madison than Hamilton, the best way to 
encourage the kind of civic virtue among citizens which would help the 
American republic succeed. 
 Interestingly, both Hamilton and Madison saw an important role for 
the federal government in the economy in order to counteract powerful 
economic interests within the United States itself with goals contrary to the 
common good.  Hamilton identified the “trading interest,” while Madison 
spoke of the “mercantile interest” as not having interests always in 
accordance with the good of the United States as a whole.  That both 
agreed on the value of federal government involvement in the economy 
on this subject shows that their differences were not absolute, and it is 
simply too bad they could not see they had points on which they were in 
agreement. 
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Conclusion 
“The oldest and strongest emotion of mankind is fear, and the oldest and 
strongest kind of fear is fear of the unknown.” – H.P. Lovecraft248 
 As I conclude this dissertation I will focus on the overall implications for 
republicanism of the differing points of view Hamilton and Madison had.  As I 
mentioned above, there is no one definitive definition of the word “republic,” 
and so what it means for the United States to be a republic has been a source 
of constant debate throughout its history.  The differences Hamilton and 
Madison had will help highlight that debate, as both were pivotal figures in the 
early history of the United States, and their influence has continued to this day.  
This dissertation has expanded the comparison of Hamilton and Madison into 
new areas that have not been as fully explored before.  As I stated before, this is 
my original contribution to the literature on Hamilton, Madison, Constitutional 
interpretation, and the early history of the United States republic. 
 In Chapter One, I reviewed the history of the idea of a republic, beginning 
with Polybius and continuing up until the time of Hamilton and Madison.  My 
approach followed, for the most part, the presentation from J.G.A.  Pocock’s 
The Machiavellian Moment.    My approach differed slightly from his, though, in 
that I included some individual thinkers he does not. 
 In Chapter Two I compared Hamilton and Madison on the issue of slavery.  
Hamilton was a documented opponent of slavery since service in the Army 
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during the Revolution.  He also was active in the New York Manumission society 
to the end of his life.  Madison, on the other hand, while he disliked slavery, and 
even expressed a desire to have as little to do with it as possible, did not take 
any overt action to oppose slavery throughout his life.  Only late in life did he 
offer a rather tepid support for the idea of resettling voluntarily freed slaves in 
Africa.  Also, Hamilton did not display any bias towards blacks, considering them 
to be to be just as competent as whites.  He did not express any reservations or 
fears regarding freed slaves living alongside other Americans.  Madison, though, 
was convinced to the end of his life that blacks and whites could not life 
together successfully. 
 In Chapter Three I compared Hamilton and Madison on the issue of how 
the United States should position itself between the two major powers of the 
early period of American history, France and Great Britain.  As I showed, 
Hamilton had a staunch focus on the well-being of the United States.  He was 
concerned about the influence of both major powers, and the influence of 
Europe in general, rather than having a preference for one over the other.  
Madison, though, was more attached to republicanism, as he understood it, 
than to France.  He supported connections with France as a way of 
counterbalancing the influence of Great Britain, but once France had left its 
experiment in republicanism behind for the rule of Napoleon, he treated France 
no differently than any other foreign country. 
 In Chapter Four I compared Hamilton and Madison on the issue of 
224 
 
 
Constitutional interpretation.  Their differences of opinion existed even during the 
time they worked together on The Federalist, as Hamilton and Madison’s 
opinions during that time showed sharply different expectations.  Neither 
departed from the other in later years, because neither understood they had 
conflicting views all along.  That they did not realize this only shows that they 
simply did not have an in-depth discussion of their expectations for the future of 
the United States. 
 In Chapter Five compared Hamilton and Madison on the issue of religion.  
Madison, as is well known, was an ardent defender of individual religious 
freedom throughout his adult life.   He did not express any strong religious beliefs 
of his own at any point in his life.  His focus was not on personal piety, but rather 
on freedom from religion.  He even tried to have the protections from official 
religion in the United States Constitution extended to limit the state governments 
as well as the federal government during the time Congress was writing the Bill 
of Rights.  Hamilton was similarly not given to religious expressions during most of 
his life, but he did show some religious reflections when young and still living in 
the Caribbean.  However, as he aged, especially after leaving public office, he 
showed greater and greater interest in religion.  He expressed his thoughts on 
Christianity in writing more and more during the late 1790s and early 1800s.  
Finally, as he lay dying, he wanted to receive Communion. 
 In Chapter Six I compared Hamilton and Madison on the issue of federal 
government involvement in the economy.  Both showed their later preferences 
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before the Constitution was ratified, so again, neither genuinely departed from 
the other in later years.  Hamilton showed his strong preference for government 
regulation of various aspects of the economy all along, and Madison, while 
favoring regulation in some ways, was nowhere near as eager to involve the 
federal, rather than state, government in economic matters. 
 Overall, the conflict between Hamilton and Madison is just one example 
of the difficulty in even defining the word “republic” precisely.  I mentioned John 
Adams’ letter to Mercy Warren in my Introduction, and how many different 
types of governments have been described as republics over history, and so it is 
not really possible to clearly identify any one kind of government as “the” one 
and only way to think of what a republic should be like.  The problem Adams 
identified has not changed in the years since, so what can we take away from 
the material I have presented here? 
 First it is important to understand that both Hamilton and Madison 
considered themselves republicans, and both were unalterably committed to 
the success of the United States as one, unified nation.  Clearly, though, they 
had different ideas of what the United States would be like.  I included the 
quote from H.P. Lovecraft at the beginning of this Conclusion, though, to begin 
to present my main contention as to what I think is the single most important 
implication for republicanism to take away from Hamilton and Madison’s 
disagreements. 
 Both Hamilton and Madison considered their expectations for the United 
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States as “the” one, correct and best vision for the United States.  That they 
could not give each other the benefit of the doubt when their differences 
became apparent is, I argue, the result of the “fear of the unknown” Lovecraft 
cited.  The United States was a very young country, that no one knew for sure 
whether or not it was going to succeed, and neither could accept the reality of 
anyone having a conflicting point of view of their own.  Still to this day there is 
the completely unreasonable expectation among people of many different 
ideologies that theirs is the only possible way for the United States to survive and 
thrive.  In that regard, sadly, nothing has changed since Hamilton and Madison. 
 The simple reality is, there have demonstrably been a wide variety of 
different visions for the United States over time, and with the single exception of 
the issue of slavery, the United States has managed to survive, and thrive 
enormously, for over two centuries, without any major internal conflict or 
bloodshed.  This desire for unanimity is simply unreasonable, counter-productive, 
and unattainable.  There are many different ways of thinking about what a 
republic should be, and many different ways a country can find to survive and 
thrive.  The United States has not finished, if that is even possible, defining the 
meaning of a republic, at least in its own case.  The political process, which 
again has worked in almost all eras of the history of the United States without 
major violence and bloodshed, is the only peaceful alternative, so why not 
simply continue to make use of that in order to “define the republic?” 
 Far too many look to the Founders for a coherent vision for the United 
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States.  If nothing else, this dissertation will, I hope, help to dispel that 
misconception.  So many want the Founders to have had a coherent 
understanding of, and vision for, the United States, as a group.  They simply did 
not.  However, the influence of the Founders is vast, though not in regards to 
their agreements.  Rather, it is their disagreements that have proven to be of 
lasting influence, which for instance initially resulted in the first two political 
parties in the United States, the Federalists and the Democratic-Republicans.  
The notion of having different political parties, to express and represent different 
underlying expectations for the United States, has not gone away, and why 
should it? 
 I entitled this dissertation “Defining the Republic” initially because each of 
Hamilton and Madison had, in his own way, a definition.  Their definitions 
differed, though, as I have shown.  Such disagreements are inevitable.  Humans 
are simply not capable of unanimity.  In order for any country to succeed, it 
must find ways to resolve those differences of opinion, at least for a period of 
time, in a peaceful manner.  While not perfect, if indeed any such standard of 
perfection is possible, the political process is far preferable to violence and 
bloodshed.  It is to the political process that I argue the United States needs to 
look to “define the republic,” at least for any one moment in time. 
 Hamilton and Madison’s fear of each other, though, is an example of the 
major impediment to meaningful resolution, for any period of time, of 
disagreements over what the republic of the United States should be like.  If 
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people cannot recognize that disagreements do NOT mean the other person, or 
group, is going to destroy the country through the potential enactment of their 
policy preferences, conflicts like the Civil War are the only option left to provide 
a resolution.  Fear simply cannot be allowed to govern the nation’s political 
choices in all but a few circumstances.   
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 The “Great Divergence” between Alexander Hamilton and James 
Madison is one of the most well-known events in the early history of the United 
States.  Together, Hamilton and Madison wrote most of The Federalist, and each 
was pivotal in securing the acceptance of the Constitution in their state ratifying 
conventions.  That within just a few years of the establishment of the new form of 
government each had worked so hard to achieve, they became bitter political 
enemies, is an often remarked upon, but little studied event. 
 In this dissertation I compare Hamilton and Madison on several different 
topics, and show they all along had underlying differences of opinion as to what 
they expected the United States would eventually be like.  That they “diverged” 
is not the result of a change by either individual after the Constitution was 
ratified, but rather the result of unspoken and unexplored assumptions each had 
long before they worked together on The Federalist. 
  
238 
 
 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT 
 I was born and raised in Iowa.  I attended the University of Iowa, where I 
earned a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science.  In the years since, I have earned 
a Master of Arts in Political Science at Marquette University, and an additional 
Master of Arts due to the time I was in the PhD program in Political Science at 
the University of Wisconsin-Madison.  I have been extremely fortunate the faculty 
of the Department of Political Science, and the Administration of Wayne State 
University, have allowed me to transfer to Wayne State in order to complete my 
PhD. 
 
 
